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LAWYER ETHICS: A PEDAGOGICAL MOSAIC
JAMES R. ELKINS*
PRELUDE
After several unsuccessful attempts to weld my results [of
"philosophical investigations"] together into... a whole, I
realized that I should never succeed. The best that I could
write would never be more than philosophical remarks; my
thoughts were soon crippled if I tried to force them on in
any single direction against their natural inclination. And
this was, of course, connected with the very nature of the
investigation. For this compels us to travel over a wide
field of thought criss-crossed in every direction. The philo-
sophical remarks in this book are, as it were, a number of
sketches of landscapes which were made in the course of
these long and involved journeyings. 1
-Ludwig Wittgenstein
[T]hose who are willing to engage in a genuinely critical




I. FINDING OUR WAY BACK TO SOCRATES
Looking to the early history of philosophy, we find Plato's
portrayal of Socrates engaged in moral discourse. Imagine Soc-
rates in the agora (market place), a space about the size of one of
today's large shopping-mall parking lots, at the foot of an impos-
ing hill crowned with the Parthenon. The perimeter of the agora
is lined with small merchant shops, and beyond the shops, the
bustling city life of ancient Athens. In the agora we hear the
shouts of merchants and shop sellers and it is here too we find
Socrates talking about matters in a way we still today find
instructive.
* Professor of Law, West Virginia University College of Law.
1. LUDWIG WITrGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS ix (G.E.M.
Anscombe trans., 3d ed. 1968).
2. WAYNE C. BOOTH, THE COMPANY WE KEEP: AN ETHICS OF FICTION 347
(1988).
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It would, of course, help to imagine all of this if you have
been to Greece, stood in the agora, walked through the plaka of
Athens (the old town), visited the bay at Sounion to see the tem-
ple dedicated to Poseidon and watched the blazing sun disap-
pear into the sea at Sounion Bay with breathtaking finality. After
the sunset, perhaps you walk down to a tiny cafe on the far side
of the bay and ask the old Greek woman for a plate of fried
calamari. Yes, it would help to have been there, but experiences
of this sort can be imagined and appreciated from afar.
It is with Socrates in mind that we might begin to think
about the teaching of lawyer ethics and the way we engage stu-
dents in ethical inquiry. If we set out to learn ethics by way of
moral discourse, we find in the conversations Plato attributes to
Socrates in old Athens,3 a way to proceed. Socrates was not one
to beat around the bush when he posed a question and teachers
of ethics know the feel of a blunt question themselves. A student,
for example, puts the point immediately: "What good does all
this ethics talk serve?" Or more bluntly still, "You don't expect us
to make money with ethics, do you?"
Socrates might respond with a question of his own: "Would
you not agree, my friend, that when all is said and done, in talk-
ing ethics we are talking about how to live a good life and how to
be a good person?"4 The student, with immediate matters press-
ing upon him and the good life a fantasy of what lies ahead, with-
out the slightest embarrassment replies, "I have nothing to say
about ethics" and adds, with an aggressive flourish, "ethics is just
talk." Another student, taking courage from the first, joins the
conversation, "I look forward to being a lawyer because lawyers
are involved in action, in solving problems, in getting things
done. We get things done for our clients." And another adds,
"Lawyers should represent anyone who has a legal claim regard-
less of what we lawyers might think about what the client seeks to
3. For those unfamiliar with Socrates and the way he engaged his compa-
triots in conversation, B.A.F. HUBBARD & E.S. KARNOFSKY, PLATO'S PROTAGORAS
(1982), provides a wonderful introduction. The genius of the Hubbard and
Karnofsky edition of Protagoras is a set of commentary questions that engages a
reader/student/teacher in conversation not unlike the one between Socrates
and his interlocutors. For my claims for Socratic pedagogy, see James R. Elkins,
Socrates and the Pedagogy of Critique, 14 LEGAL STUD. F. 231 (1990). On both the
practical and philosophical implications of a Socratic inspired lawyer ethics dia-
logue, see JAMES BOvD WHITE, WHEN WORDS LOSE THEIR MEANING: CONSTITU-
TIONS AND RECONSTITUTIONS OF LANGUAGE, CHARACTER AND COMMUNITY 93-113
(1983).
4. Socrates' question is as viable today as when he posed it and some phi-
losophers still see it as a central question for philosophy. See, e.g., BERNARD WIL-
LIAMS, ETHICS AND THE LIMITS OF PHILOSOPHY 1-21 (1985).
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do in the name of the law. Don't you think it's awfully late, here
in law school, to be talking ethics."
Socrates, hearing all the conventions of his day expressed in
the confidence and arrogance of these remarks, responds: "Now
tell me, what are you going to do, when your work for a client
results in harm to others or harm to the community in which you
live? Will you always be so eager to use your skills and knowledge
to help others accomplish in the name of the law that which is so
clearly contrary to the well-being of your community? Would it
be a good thing to act as if the law could exist without regard to
justice? What kind of person would that make you, if you, as a
lawyer tried to ignore justice and did it for money, and spoke
proudly of the fine living you make by doing it? How long do
you think it would be before your neighbors denounced you as a
scoundrel?"
Some of the students have grown silent, but one, still eager
to press his views and question Socrates' notion of goodness, ven-
tures forth. "Well, of course, I can represent any client so long as
he does not seek to do that which the law prohibits. Real estate
developers and corporate polluters need lawyers like everyone
else. And I can discredit witnesses and lead jurors to believe my
client's version of the story so long as I do not violate explicit
ethical rules. In our zealous representation of a client, the law-
yer's conception of goodness is governed by the rules of our pro-
fession, not by our conscious."
But this notion, to Socrates, sounds peculiar. "This is all very
strange. Do you claim that it is good to do what lawyers do solely
because it is sanctioned by fellow lawyers grown accustomed to
such practices? That your profession does not do more to eradi-
cate its questionable practices brings no honor. Are you oblivi-
ous to where this kind of 'many in our profession do it' thinking
can lead? Have you given thought to what it might cost the com-
munity in which you live, indeed the sense of community more
generally, to have lawyers and all their power aid someone to use
the law to harm others, to use law to aid their greed? When law-
yers help those who harm others, can their participation in that
harm be ignored? Can you and your fellow lawyers hold out in a
world in which your fellow citizens, indeed, even your own col-
leagues, are scornful of your practices?" Socrates, with so many
questions before them, pauses, and asks more directly, "Do you
mean to say that it can be good to harm the many for the plea-
sure of the one client?"
"Oh no, it is not good to harm others," the student explains,
"I do not set about to intentionally hurt others. I am simply serv-
ing my client. It is my job."
20001
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Socrates appears unconvinced. "Helping those who seek
help is to be commended. But surely you would not mean to say
that you can advance the interests of your friends and those who
pay you to be their 'professional friend' regardless of the conse-
quences to those who stand outside this closed circle of
friendship."
Realizing that he may have overstated his position, the stu-
dent retreats, but in the most guarded way. 'Yes, I know I must
be concerned about others, as well as my clients. But when I
practice law, I make a promise to help those who come to me
and to disregard the claims and concerns of those who are not
my clients. It is only in helping my client that others are hurt. I
have no desire to see that happen and do not actively choose to
hurt others. To help my client I must ignore what happens to
others."
Socrates, turning over this thought and a small smooth peb-
ble in his hand, poses another question: "Then you share with
me a concern for others and the belief that it is better to live so
that those who stand along our path are not harmed?"
' Yes, of course."
"Then, if it would be possible to find a way to help your cli-
ent and avoid hurting others, you would agree that lawyers
should do so?" Socrates, for those listening to the conversation,
seems here to have turned the conversation, to have issued an
invitation to move from the conventions of the day to some bet-
ter way of thinking about how ethics works. But it is also at this
moment that one of the eager students realizes, as do some of his
fellow students, that in his explanation of what lawyers do, he has
been speaking about himself, recounting not just the cliches of
the day but his own limited sense of the professional life he will
take up. Indeed, he fears he has revealed far more than he
intended. He, too, sees that the conversation has taken a turn,
and that Socrates has elicited a concession that calls into ques-
tion the kind of adversarial advocacy he and his friends have
been proclaiming with great vigor. The student now wishes to
retreat, not so much from the position he has advanced, but
from the conversation itself. What he most wishes to be free of is
the questions Socrates has been posing, and so he says, "I am
afraid that if I say much more, you are going to make me look
uncharitable and uncaring. That's really not who I am."
Socrates, standing at the opening framed by this uneasy
moment, says, "It is difficult to accept responsibility for our ideas
and for the consequences of the words we so readily speak. It is
your own words that have taken us down this road. Perhaps it is
LAWYER ETHICS
not the deviousness of my questions, but your own cleverness by
which you have tricked yourself into thinking one thing about
yourself while becoming another."5
Socrates, in conversations such as this one, was a threat to.
those who proclaimed the conventional thinking of the day-
indeed, to all who might lead an unexamined life. Socrates used
questions to provoke serious conversation, spur thinking, and
engage his interlocutors in moral inquiry; he sought to expose,
with searching questions, the unexamined premises, forgotten
purposes, ill-defined commitments, and assumed identities we
carry with us into everyday life.6 He demanded that we rethink
the assumptions that underlie our conventional views and the
way we have set out to lead what we trust to be a good life. Socra-
tes is the patron saint of all those who venture into serious talk
about lawyer ethics.7
5. Plato, in the early Socratic dialogues, was the first to demonstrate the
therapeutic use of language. Socrates tries to make others aware of their misun-
derstandings of pivotal words and concepts, misunderstandings that resulted
inevitably in a "misrepresentation of reality":
Moreover, thinking they knew what in fact they did not, they were not
conscious of the dislocation of values inherent in their misunderstand-
ing. Socrates therefore sought to unravel, by dialectic, the compo-
nents of the misunderstanding, to expose the linguistic flaw that was
the foundation of the false construction of reality.
This was the first step toward a more adequate construction, and
it was on this step that Socrates remained, never permitting himself to
rush ahead to the work of construction until the dismantling of false
conceptions of reality had been completed. By so doing, Socrates
demonstrated the potential of language to discover and analyze mis-
representations of reality. Language is primarily therapeutic or
remedial.
MARGARET R. MILES, IMAGE AS INSIGHT: VISUAL UNDERSTANDING IN WESTERN
CHRISTIANITY AND SECULAR CULTURE 139 (1985).
6. Moral discourse requires reflection on the questions put to us and
questions we put to ourselves. Questions lie at the .heart of moral discourse.
But there is no way to insure that a particular Socratic question will be the right
one, or that a particular question will spark one's moral imagination. In the
quest for questions worth asking, we encounter various pitfalls and traps. For
example, some questions posed to us should be rejected. The problem is that
we often reject questions which make worthwhile demands of us. The trek into
an unexplored ethical world following questions put to us by others is often
threatening. For some, the perplexity that emerges will be exciting and empow-
ering. For others it is frightening to have a secure world of legal discourse (with
its conventions, persona, and resonant "professional" voice) turned on its head,
exposed for all the world to see. On the strategies used to turn away from
moral discourse, see James R. Elkins, Symptoms Exposed When Legalists Engage in
Moral Discourse: Reflections on the Difficulties of Talking Ethics, 17 VT. L. REv. 353
(1993).
7. On Socrates as a teacher whose exemplary 'critical discourse has
instructive possibilities for teachers of legal and moral discourse, see Thomas D.
2000]
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II. STARTING CLOSE TO HOME
Three painters work in the hallway outside my office. I lis-
ten as they share stories about co-workers, friends, weekend activ-
ities, approaching cold weather, and their plans for the last warm
days of the fall season. They talk about their work: calling in sick
when "the wife" wants to take a long weekend (the painters are
men), a co-worker who does "shoddy work" and blames others
for his mistakes, "cooling out" supervisors who are arbitrary in
their demands or put pressure on them to do "shoddy" work, and
how many paint brushes a "careful painter" uses on a week-long
job. These painters might scoff at the idea of moral discourse
presented as academics would describe it, and they most defi-
nitely would not view themselves as philosophers. The painters
would likely say to the academic, "We were just talking." Or, "It's
just what we do. A man's got to get through the day." But talk,
even that of painters trying to get through a day of painting,
turns inevitably to more weighty matters. (Even talk itself is sub-
ject to scrutiny when the men discuss a colleague who "does
more talking than painting."' )
As I listen to the painters, one of the philosophical threads
in their conversation is quality-how to do a "good job," dealing
with "difficult" fellow .workers, supervisors who please the "boss"
and ignore the needs of their crew. Yes, there was talk about
sports, television, fishing and hunting, and neighbors, but it was
the talk about "good work" that captured my attention.
We might see in the conversation of these painters, the ordi-
nary, everyday practice of philosophy, the kind of philosophy we
find entwined in the meander of daily conversations about work
and our lives. Consequently, my proposition is a rather simple
one. Let us take up the study of lawyer ethics, not as a body of
ethical rules (and legal constraints), or a set of disciplinary prin-
ciples, but as the kind of conversation painters engage in about
Eisele, Bitter Knowledge: Socrates and Teaching by Disillusionment, 45 MERCER L.
REV. 587 (1994); Thomas D. Eisele, Must Virtue Be Taught?, 37J. LEGAL EDUC.
495 (1987); Elkins, supra note 3; Anthony T. Kronman, Foreword: Legal Scholar-
ship and Moral Education, 90 YALE L.J. 955, 959-67 (1981); Richard K Neumann,
A Preliminary Inquiry into the Art of Critique, 40 HASTINGS L.J. 725 (1989); James
Boyd White, The Ethics of Argument: Plato's Gorgias and the Modern Lawyer, 50 U.
CHI. L. REv. 849 (1983).
8. Painters who talk too much and are work "shy" are made the subject of
gossip. Law students know the reality of this kind of situation first hand. In the
law school world, fellow students who seem always and forever talking in class
are often the subject of disparaging lounge conversation.
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"good work."9 If we study lawyer ethics with the painters in mind,
we might find ethics more congenial, more inviting, than the eth-
ical teaching conceived by academics and legalists. Painters talk
to make their work tolerable and sociable, to give it the meaning
it would lack absent their conversations. The study of legal ethics
could use this kind of sociability and needs all the meaning we
can lay claim to.
There is still another reason we might turn to painters con-
versation as a model of the kind of lawyer ethics talk that students
might find instructive. Much of our work as lawyers is based on
incessant talk, listening (in which we are often far less skilled),
and argument. When lawyers talk and listen, they are engaging
in an element of lawyering, and they need to learn to do it well,
whether presenting a client's case or articulating views about law-
yer ethics.
And what are we to talk about in this lawyer ethics conversa-
tion? We might begin with our work, with what it means to do
law work, to make a life talking about law and doing the work
that lawyers do. We might try to talk about our love for the work,
about the abilities, talents, and skills of those around us from
whom we learn and whom we seek to emulate. We might also
talk about the community in which lawyering work is done. In
this talk about lawyer work, it will be difficult to avoid basic proto-
philosophical questions: Do we, as lawyers, have special obliga-
tions to the community? Can we do the work our clients want
done and let the community take care of itself?
The painters enhance the course of their day by complaints,
gossip, and stories. A painter who does nothing but complain
will find himself with few friends; one who gossips too much will
be viewed with suspicion. But one might see in their entertain-
ment of complaints and gossip, not only some therapeutic value,
but a making-way for real stories. In legal ethics devoted to talk
about lawyer work, we turn to stories because that's what happens
when people talk. We seek for conversation those who can tell
stories. We tell and elicit stories from colleagues. Work is a
source of stories and a place to tell them. Stories provide a way
to raise questions and points of view that might be viewed less
9. There are many ways to think and talk and teach legal ethics. We can
be no more certain and definitive about the correct way to talk about ethics
than we can devise ways to secure definitive (determinative) results in law. Both
ethics and law, when put to the test, are shadowed by indeterminancy. We may
talk as if ethics and law were settled-secure, certain, known-but when
pushed, or caught in a candid moment, we are forced to admit that in law, as in
ethics, certainty and determined outcomes are as much the exception as the
rule.
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favorably if approached more directly. And we know that work
needs to be questioned; questions come with us to work and are
forced upon us by the work we find ourselves doing. We may
have no answers to the questions that plague us (and we may not
even know what the questions are). But we do have stories to
share. To tell stories and ask questions about work makes it pos-
sible to get through the day; work acquires sociability. As social
creatures we are drawn to the stories and questions around us.
We want to hear others talk about work and listen as they
respond with stories, listening for answers to unasked questions.
Listening to stories, there may be occasion to raise objections, to
question whether it really happened, or whether the teller of the
story knew all the facts, or whether the story might not be told
differently by someone with a different perspective (less involve-
ment, more involvement, more education, less education). We
might even find occasion to argue, to attempt to change a col-
league's mind about some story about how the world works or
how people work (and why they do the things they do). We may
(or may not) want to put our stories and arguments on the line
and see how others might react to them, how they might be
heard, what kind of response they might evoke. It is not only in
the law work we do, but the stories we tell and the questions we
pose about this work, that we make ourselves known to ourselves
and to others.
In conversation (talking and listening), we stumble into
agreement and find those with whom we share an outlook on the
world; we disagree and find ways to deal with our differences.
Like painters, lawyer ethics talk must follow a course of conversa-
tion that pursues matters of real interest, matters that trouble us,
concerns that capture our attention, conditions found in legal
work that make it bothersome and difficult and questionable. In
conversation, painter friendly and law school studious, there is
an opportunity to explore act and consequence, self and other,
work and play, good and bad, ordinary and special, appearance
and reality. We create, in conversation, a social and qualitative
ground for our professional work life.1 ° We might, I am arguing
here, learn something about lawyer ethics from something quite
simple-a sustained course of conversation.
10. The exploration and probing we do in serious, law school classroom
conversations is not, of course, the only place in which such conversations take
place.. Indeed, we might also want to acknowledge the conversations we have
with ourselves in the form of interior monologues, ruminations, daydreaming,
and moments of deep reflection.
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In legal education, we have an opportunity to do what paint-
ers do and to be reflective about it. We can engage each other in
ethics talk, focus our attention on how moral and ethical think-
ing about the practice of law works and on how legal thinking
breaks down when carried into the realm of ethics. In lawyer
ethics talk we have an advantage over the painters since our con-
versation is directed to work that still lies ahead, to a life not yet
fully shaped by daily routines and conventional professional prac-
tices. Law students are in a position, if they could only realize it
(and their teachers make it more obvious), to be more self-reflec-
tive and make these reflections part of their learning.11 Ethics
talk allows us to explore conventional and commonplace views
about lawyers, and to test these views against collective hopes and
ideals, to test them against our imaginings and fears of what lies
ahead.
In the painters way of lawyer ethics, there need be no study
of prominent legal ethicists or famous moral philosophers, no
effort to learn the various "schools" of moral philosophy. When
we think about ethics as a way of talking, as conversation, rather
than a formal subject of study, we avoid academic lines of inquiry
which have left the study of ethics badly misshapen. The painters
may lack formal study and a working knowledge of moral philos-
ophy, but they know painting; they enjoy their work and they
know how to converse and learn from each other. Painters know
well the obstacles to doing a "good job" and that these obstacles
are to be understood by way of the give and take of conversation
with fellow painters. For those who teach lawyer ethics, there is
much to learn from painters.
1 2
11. Some law students, like their counterparts in the world of painters,
are undoubtedly just trying to get through the day. We will find some students
far more interested in getting law school behind them than they are in intro-
spective ethics talk.
12. Hanna Pitkin describes a philosophical approach she attributes to
ordinary language philosophers that captures the approach to lawyer ethics I
have in mind:
Instead of studying moral rules or principles or traditional systems of
morality, the teachings of religious leaders or philosophers, they [ordi-
nary language philosophers] are interested in the way moral discourse
functions in everyday life, how we ordinarily talk about moral matters.
For it is in ordinary use that our concepts of morality and action are
learned and shaped.
HANNA FENICHEL PTKIN, WITTGENSTEIN AND JUSTICE 149 (1972). Pitkin makes
clear that while this is not the only way to think or talk about ethics, "it is a
powerful and instructive way...." Id. See also Sally Engle Merry, The Discourses
of Mediation and the Power of Naming, 2 YALE J.L. & HuMAN. 1 (1990) (Exploring
"forms of talk" used by participants in lower courts and mediation programs;
distinguishing between moral, legal, and therapeutic discourse).
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III. A COURSE OF CONVERSATION
In legal education, we adhere to notions about lawyer ethics
that stifle the conversation we should be having. Consider the
following rather conventional notions about the study of lawyer
ethics: (i) law students already have their ethics (that is, their
"real" ethics and their moral character) when they arrive at law
school; and (ii) the law school study of lawyer ethics is first and
foremost the application of a body of ethical rules.13 The conven-
tional law school version of ethics translates ethics into law-like
rules, 14 a convenient strategy for those who seek to convince the
outside world that we have an interest in ethics even as we have
already concluded there is nothing to be done about the moral
character of those who set out to become lawyers. We want the
world to believe we have an interest in ethics when truthfully we
don't want to be bothered with ethics at all.
Everyday painter conversation about lawyer ethics is discour-
aged when we assume that a student's ethics are already in place
when they take up the study of ethics. The assumption would
have us believe that it is futile to address, confront, or question
lawyer ethics. Moreover, the assumption allows us to ignore the
moral presuppositions our students bring with them to the class-
room, 15 and the moral qualms and confusions they have about
law work. Consequently, moral discourse (in contrast to the end-
less talk about ethics rules) requires that we confront this perva-
sive (and conventional) skepticism about ethics-the belief that
ethics talk is futile.16
13. There are now indications that legal educators have finally begun to
abandon the rule-oriented approach to lawyer ethics pedagogy. See Symposium,
Teaching Legal Ethics, 58 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1-389 (1995).
14. I return, time and again, to this translation of ethics into law and the
pedagogical confusion it creates.
15. Alfred North Whitehead noted that "philosophical truth is to be
sought in the presuppositions of language rather than in its express state-
ments." ALFRED NORTH WHITEHEAD, MODES OF THOUGHT vii (1938).
16. Skepticism about ethics has been with us for a long time. It was
explored in Plato's Socratic dialogues when Socrates and the Sophists argued
about whether virtue could be taught. Contemporary students of lawyer ethics
claim, when confronted with moral discourse and ethical introspection, that
they already have their ethics when they come to law school and that there is
little for them now, as adults, to learn about morals and ethics in a law school
course. Listen to law students talk about ethics and their skepticism about eth-
ics is rendered in particulars:
"I don't know what you mean when you talk ethics. In fact, I am a
little suspicious of those who have a strong need to talk about such
things."
"It is 1998 and no time to be thinking in transcendent value
terms. We are each free to do whatever we must. We are no longer
LAWYER ETHICS
Lawyers and law students know that there are ethical rules
governing the attorney-client relationship and that they must
know these rules and observe them. But in knowing these rules,
can they not also learn how a persistent and exclusive focus on
ethics rules becomes an all too convenient way to let the "study"
of legal ethics be a substitute for meaningful ethical inquiry, an
inquiry in which we might actually learn something about the
moral dimension of lawyering?
My proposition, going back to the painters, is a simple one:
study lawyer ethics by engaging in moral discourse. Ethics is
learned by doing ethics, by immersion in a conversation in which
ethics is not a "subject" but an engagement in which one has a
personal "stake,"1 7 a stake in a serious conversation about matters
of real importance. An inquiry into lawyer ethics is rooted in
rhetoric not rules. Lawyer ethics grounded in conversation (lit-
erally, a course of conversation) about law work becomes a stage
on which we rehearse, a theater in which we see actors working
out the consequences and meanings of their proposed actions.
Hanna Arendt observed that it is "[i] n acting and speaking, men
[and women] show who they are, reveal actively their unique per-
sonal identities and thus make their appearance in the human
chained to the provincial, dogmatic, patriarchal religious views of the
past."
"I have no desire to be a saint and consequently don't have much
time for ethics."
"I am afraid that modern forms of moralism (call it ethics, call it
whatever you will) will result in less freedom. I am afraid we will have
less tolerance and a more dangerous world if we try to see things from
a moral perspective. The world is filled with mad men and garden
variety terrorists who wage war against the innocent. The new moral-
ism is just terrorism of a different sort."
"If we aren't careful, we will destroy the hard won objectivity that
gives us the ability to demand justification of actions. Reason provides
a good middle-ground, a buffer-zone where we can live together with-
out violence. To fairly, equitably and justly resolve our problems we
need more reason, less morality."
17. It is our involvement in moral discourse that leads Hanna Pitkin to
claim:
[T]he characteristic setting for moral discourse is one of dialogue
among persons who are actually involved in what has happened ....
No doubt we can contemplate moral principles in the abstract or hold
public discourse about them, but the center of gravity of moral dis-
course falls in personal conversation.
PITKIN, supra note 12, at 150. I assume that moral inquiry into lawyer ethics is
worthwhile because morals and ethics matter in the shape and outcome of our
professional lives.
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world .... -18 When we act by speaking, the moral dimension of
our character "shows through." This moral dimension, always
present, lurking in our law school conversations a9 is particularly
fond of hiding and thus reveals itself in metaphors and images,20
the primary ingredients of lawyer ethics talk.
We learn ethics by talking about what we value (and learning
how our valued notions might have been contaminated along the
way) and about how matters of value are shared and disputed in
the world we inhabit with others. A study of lawyer ethics limited
to a study of law-like ethical rules is a poor, even pernicious, sub-
stitute for ethics. Lawyer ethics taken up in conversation puts
ethics back where it belongs-in the spoken, everyday world of
connective, communal, constitutive talk.
Moral discourse-lawyer ethics taken up in conversation-
teaches as it pushes and pulls us to evaluate, defend, and (some-
times) reconfigure the character we find ourselves holding forth
in these conversations. We learn, in the best practices of moral
discourse, to distinguish between idle talk (and the conventions
and cliches in which it thrives) and talk that bespeaks a more
compelling and esteemable character. When talk implicates our
18. HANNAH ARENDT, THE HUMAN CONDITION: A STUDY OF THE CENTRAL
DILEMMAS FACING MODERN MAN 159 (1959). "Action and speech are so closely
related because the primordial and specifically human act must at the same
time contain the answer to the question asked of every newcomer: 'Who are
you?' This disclosure of who somebody is, is implicit in both his words and his
deeds ... ." Id. at 158.
Certainly there is more to ethics than what we say about it. A claim for the
value of conversation in ethical inquiry is tempered by the recognition that
some people are indeed "all talk and no action." We are taught, early and
often, that "action speaks louder than words." We all have friends and col-
leagues who do not "live up to their word."
There is, in ethics, danger that as we talk about ethics, we demean philoso-
phy by being mindless about doing it, talk about ethics while ethics goes
undone. Notwithstanding such reservations about the limits of talk, there is
much to learn from the ethics we see at work (and play) when we direct conver-
sation to the moral dimension of our professional lives. We can, in a course of
conversation devoted to ethics, engage in talk as practice for doing, if not doing
itself.
19. My little, worn-out dictionary defines conversation as informal spoken
exchange; familiar talk. Ethics, like conversation, is informal, spoken, and
exchanged, something we do together. And there are, of course, times when
we carry on conversations with ourselves. The conversations we have with our-
selves are often about ethical matters.
20. For an accessible account of the prominent place of metaphor in our
everyday lives, see GEORGE LAKOFF & MARK JOHNSON, METAPHORS WE LIVE By
(1980). Lakoff s more recent work on metaphor focuses on morality and poli-
tics. See GEORGE LAKOFF, MORAL POLITICS: WHAT CONSERVATIVES KNOW THAT
LIBERALS DON'T (1996). See also generally ERIC MOUNT, JR., PROFESSIONAL ETHICS
IN CONTEXT: INSTITUTIONS, IMAGES AND EMPATHY (1990).
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character, as it must, and as it does most particularly in making
claims about the moral limits of lawyer practices and the argu-
ments in which we have a personal stake, moral discourse is not
just a rehearsal of action, but moral character in action.
In serious ethics talk, students learn that there is a voice
(and a part of themselves) that begs to slow down, to pause, to
think, to deliberate, to reflect, before rushing on to the next
case, next course, and the life that lies ahead. Talking becomes a
way of pausing to see, a way of practicing how to see and value the
work and the world that lies before us (and within us).
It is not, I think, whimsical to contemplate that in Socrates
and in the painters, we have found forms of conversation that
make ethical inquiry possible and inviting (even if, at times, pain-
fully difficult). It is not, I know from personal experience,
beyond hope that a law school course of lawyer ethics conversa-
tion can (with good fortune, concerned students, and a teacher
willing to take the risk) take on a life of its own. Indeed, a course
of ethical conversation can be as engaging and rigorously
demanding as any classroom work found in a law school. But, it
can also be more; a course of conversation can be revitalizing by
its realness, with the shape and personality it acquires. A course
of conversation has a personality of its own: friendly and easy-
going like an old friend, sometimes moody and temperamental,
at times boring, at other times manic and wild, or just exasperat-
ing. When a course of ethical conversation takes on a life of its
own, the student must establish a relationship with it-tolerate it,
puzzle over it, complain about it, or learn from it.21 When lawyer
ethics talk is real, it can not be left unattended, ignored, or
dismissed.
Courses of conversation, like persons, get lost, depressed,
alienated, disenchanted. They sometimes go off the deep end,
commit suicide. But when things go well, a course of studied
conversation makes it possible to talk about law work and what it
means to us. It allows us to practice engagements with like-
minded and better-minded colleagues, colleagues who can some-
times show us the way to wisdom. There are real possibilities and
real risks in such conversations and the pedagogies that
encourage them; we could not expect otherwise.
21. We have strong feelings about courses of study as we do our friends,
talking about them incessantly, even obsessing about them. "I loved it," one
student says of his study of legal ethics. And another, "It was terrible. I couldn't
stand it."
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I confess to attempts to teach by way of the kind of conversa-
tions I describe here. I have watched as conversations between
guarded and law school weary students develop a life of their
own, talked into realness. I've listened with reverence and fear as
students attempt to come to grip with matters that I, as their
teacher, cannot fully explain or provide a formula for under-
standing. I engage in such courses of conversation with no plea-
sure, knowing that they must inevitably result in confusion and
pain and lurch toward an uncertain future.2 2 Knowing this,
experiencing it first-hand, I still begin each course of conversa-
tion with students about lawyer ethics with great hope, knowing
that there are real possibilities along the path we follow as we
learn about the fantasies and fear that attend lawyers and their
work. It is this combination of possibility and failure that makes
lawyers and our talk about their ethics, real, alive and
threatening.
A course of ethical conversation does not, of course, begin
when I step into the classroom (as I must continually remind
myself). Yet there is a sense in which we each begin anew, start-
ing from the beginning (knowing this is impossible), acting as if
this conversation had not already taken place. For me then, the
classroom continues to be a space of vast energy and hope in
which we can form and shape ourselves.2" Conversations in
which we seek the limits of possibility are sometimes deep, some-
times shallow. At times, they take your breath, make you gasp.
Before we begin our work on lawyers ethics talk together, I some-
times feel isolated and alone, waiting for the discovery of how it
will take place-this new conversation with all its fits and starts,
twists and turns, moments of exhilaration and feelings of futility.
This course of conversation I imagine, is ever so much like a vul-
nerable child, protected, cared for, preached to, and prayed
over, and then sent off to make its way in the world. Courses of
22. When I prepare for an ethical encounter with my students, I imagine
their presence as I go about imagining the course our conversation might fol-
low. There is no face, no name, but they are real nevertheless. Yet, they are
always real in a different way than my fantasy would have them be, when our
foray into lawyer ethics gets underway. I confess to anxiety as I contemplate
these encounters. Who there, in that throng of faces, will take ethics seriously?
Who will speak their disdain of ethics-a disdain that their education, culture,
and profession encourage? Who will show us the way to wisdom?
23. I have spoken of what lies ahead as a fantasy. In my fantasy, when we
talk ethics, we take ethics seriously, and make ethics real. When we talk ethics
we set the stage for making ethics a part of our social and political lives as
lawyers. When we are most real to each, when the plot deepens, and our con-
versation becomes perplexing and troubled, we will need to draw on such
fantasies.
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study rooted in conversation, like the passage from childhood to
adulthood, must find their own way.
A student, quiet, self-confident with a sparkling smile, visits
my office to talk about an ethics course now completed. We talk
of the twists and turns our classroom conversation took, the
sometimes dramatic encounters (those made a part of our con-
versation and those we did not pursue), the frequent frustration
and boredom ("what are we accomplishing here?"), and the anxi-
ety that sometimes caught up with us. The student speaks openly
of what he found troubling; he was disturbed by the persistent
obstacles that sprang up and continually plagued our conversa-
tions, obstacles that seemed at times to undermine the promise
that we might actually learn something about lawyers and their
ethics.2 4 He went on to recall a remark I had made at an orienta-
tion program about how law school has the potential to change
the way we see the world.2" We agreed, this student and I, that in
the wild energy of our dialogue on lawyer ethics, we had indeed
engaged in a course of conversation that would be remembered.
For many students, a fair number of law school courses leave
little to remember. As for my ethics conversations with students,
I hope they might be remembered (if nothing more). Ideally, I
hope they might be seen as a kind of friendship. With friends we
set out to be wonderful, big-hearted, kind-spirited, thoughtful,
warm, and caring; in a course of ethics conversation, we find ide-
als of friendship, a friendship which flounders when we exploit it
or treat it as something it is not. To seek to experience the won-
der around us and to evoke the mystery that follows us ever so
closely, cleverly hidden in the shadow of everyday language and
everyday life, we make a true claim to friendship. Expect no
more of ethics talk than you do of your friends!
24. The obstacles to moral discourse are serious and deserve far more
scholarly attention than they have received. For two contrasting views of the
"difficulty" in teaching legal ethics as moral discourse, see Thomas D. Eisele,
From "Moral Stupidity" to Professional Responsibility, 21 LEGAL STUD. F. 193 (1997),
and Elkins, supra note 6.
25. This change in one's view of the world and the effort required to
understand and to turn the change to productive and morally worthwhile ends
has been the primary focus of the work of James Boyd White. See, e.g., JAMES
BOYD WHITE, THE LEGAL IMAGINATION: STUDIES IN THE NATURE OF LEGAL
THOUGHT AND EXPRESSION (1973).
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IV. FINDING A METAPHOR
We use metaphors in everyday speech, especially when we
have difficulty saying exactly what we mean. We need to know
more about the metaphors we use, how we use them, and how
common metaphors shape our thinking. Along the way we
might find new metaphors to replace the old ones that have
worn thin and become ragged with use. Metaphors appear in
conversation, never more prominently than when we talk about
our work and our lives (they are also found prominently in our
talk about social relations and social institutions). In law, meta-
phors are always close at hand: we think of the law as a tool, as a
means of dispute resolution, a form of protection, or a set of
rules. We think of ourselves as technicians, hired-guns, counsel-
ors, friends, or as warriors for litigants engaged in battle. These
images and metaphors have moral implications, 26 some serve as
continuing support for conventional practices while others serve
as reparative or defenses as we combat out-grown images and
debilitating, dysfunctional metaphors.27
Lawyering is a complex activity and lawyers go about their
professional work in diverse ways. Facing complexity and diver-
sity, we make still more use of metaphors. Seymour Wishman, in
Confessions of a Criminal Lawyer, during the course of an instruc-
tive narrative, talks about his experience of lawyering as a game,
contest, battle, fight, brawl, ritualized aggression, art form, trade,
job, craft, drama, performance, and power-brokering.28 We know
law and the practice of law through metaphors of this kind (and
still others). We also know our lives through metaphor. Life,
law, and ethics are games, contests, journeys, stories, dreams,
nightmares, tragedies.
26. See generally MOUNT, supra note 20, at 73-103. William Twining, in a
celebrated article of some years past, presented two starkly differing images of
the lawyer-the lawyer as technician/plumber and as Pericles, the famous
Greek orator. See William Twining, Pericles and the Plumber, 83 LAw Q. REv. 396
(1967). There is, it seems, always some image of the lawyer at work (and play)
in the practices and ethic(s) we adopt. On the role of professional images and
their relation to professionalism, see WILLIAM F. MAY, THE PHYSICIAN'S COVE-
NANT: IMAGES OF THE HEALER IN MEDICAL ETHics (1983), and Aroskar, The Frac-
tured Image: The Public Stereotype of Nursing and the Nurse, in NURSING: IMAGES &
IDEALS (Stuart F. Spicker & Sally Gadow eds., 1980).
27. Susanne K. Langer, the philosopher, reminds us that, "the mind of
man is always fertile, ever creating and discarding, like the earth." SUSANNE K
LANGER, PHILOSOPHY IN A NEW KEY- A STUDY IN THE SYMBOLISM OF REASON,
RITES, AND ART 17 (3d ed. 1980).
28. See Seymour Wishman, Confessions of a Criminal Lawyer 6, 10, 11, 15,
17, 116, 142, 151, 182, 200-02, 223-24, 231-32, 242 (1982).
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These metaphors evoke images and images have power.
They channel and shape our thinking. For example, the images
that accompany the metaphor of conversation that has evolved in
my teaching of lawyer ethics has changed the nature of my teach-
ing and, one might assume, the experience of students who
undertake a course of study with me. Images have power
because they are not random and isolated, not picked up off the
image counter at a shop at the mall, but are a part of the literal
stories we live out as lawyers. Our images of ourselves, and our-
selves as lawyers, are linked up through the threaded plot of nar-
rative. An image is an encoded story, a hologram of a discrete
way of life, a path with a destination. We end up as characters in
the plots we devise, plots that link up the various images to which
we have become attached.
With metaphor, we speak the connective images that estab-
lish meaning.29 We use metaphors in lawyer ethics talk that
reveal our ethical stances and the ethics we carry with us (as tacit
knowledge) into our work.3° The need to become more con-
scious of these metaphors arises when our everyday talk about
ethics falls short, that is when we have difficulty translating the
ethics we assume we already have into practices that secure the
approval of others. By learning (and living) new metaphors we
give ethics real meaning.
One can imagine a variety of metaphors for ethics: tool, 3 '
strategy, problem, dilemma, puzzle, a hurdle to overcome, rules
29. William Gass, the literary critic, says that metaphor is "a manner of
inferring; a manner of setting down as directly and briefly and simply as possi-
ble whatever is necessary" for a desired inference. Wi~uJAm H. GASS, FICTION &
FIGURES OF LIFE 63-64 (1971). A metaphor, Gass argues, is a way of showing, or
presenting. "Showing argues and showing produces acquaintance. It presents
to the mind one thing in order that the mind may seem to have possession of
another." Id.
30. A study of metaphor teaches:
The concepts that govern our thought are not just matters of the intel-
lect. They also govern our everyday functioning, down to the most
mundane details. Our concepts structure what we 'perceive, how we
get around in the world, and how we relate to other people. Our con-
ceptual system thus plays a central role in defining our everyday reali-
ties. If we are right in suggesting that our conceptual system is largely
metaphorical, then the way we think, what we experience, and what we
do every day is very much a matter of metaphor.
LAKoFF & JOHNSON, supra note 20, at 3.
31. Tool suggests an instrument, an object used as a means to some end.
We own tools and make use of them because they are instrumental to ends-a
hammer for pounding nails, a knife for cutting wood, a shovel for digging
holes. The idea of tool is to get something done, to make something happen,
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or principles to be obeyed, a special language comprised of
words that require definition, or as the light we shine on the
dark places our lives place us.
to produce another object or arrangement of value. Generally, one doesn't
own a tool for the sake of possessing the tool. We use tools to make something,
or undo something already constructed.
32. Instead of trying to define ethics, I find it more instructive to talk
about ethics, to explore the undefined ethics we've already got, and to wrestle
with a present but undefined ethics that defines our character. Ethics talk is
turned to definition by those most confused and perplexed by the effort to take
ethics talk seriously.
We treat definitions as the building blocks of objective thought. Defini-
tional work is a foundation of modem academic discourse and knowledge: "We
are inclined to begin a subject by asking how crucial terms can be explained or
defined, and that approach in turn leads to a separation of understanding and
doing, between comprehension and motivation. What we need is a better way
to begin." ELIZABETH H. WOLGAST, THE GRAMMAR OFJusTcE 201 (1987).
Kenneth Burke has given us the following instructive allegory:
Suppose that a flock of birds, while consorting together, had
developed a great variety in their ways of living. They now sought dif-
ferent foods in different places, so that the kinds and degree of danger
which they incurred varied considerably. Also, their ways of food-gath-
ering had altered their aptitude for escape: Some could get away more
quickly than others, etc. Those fleeing in trees met dangers which did
not concern those on the ground or in the water.
Yet suppose that they still considered themselves a homogeneous
flock, and still clung discordantly together, attempting to act by the
same orientation as they had when living in a homogeneous culture.
How would this cultural mongrelism affect them? Their responses
would be thrown into a muddle. The startled cry of one member
would lose its absolute value as a sign. The placidity of the group in a
tree might not any longer be an adequate safety sign for those in the
water. A cry of danger among those feeding on the shore might no
longer indicate similar danger for those in the water or in the trees.
Suppose them at this point endowed with speech. Would they
not immediately begin insisting upon definitions, in order that they
might get this muddle cleared away? Words for danger, safety, food,
etc., would not be enough. A scrupulously critical vocabulary would
have to be introduced: danger under what conditions, food for which
members of the flock, etc. Their old poetic methods of flapping their
wings and crying out would lose prestige among the flock. Only the
demagogues or the imbeciles would still resort to such procedures.
The most intelligent birds would insist upon the perfection of a strict
and unambiguous nomenclature.
KENNETH BuRKE, PERMANENCE AND CHANGE 55-56 (1965).
Ethics, when viewed from the Olympian standpoint of definitional rational-
ity, is simply "not the kind of entity to which the conception of rationality is
applicable." Berlin, Rationality of Value Judgments, in RATIONAL DECISIONs 221
(Carl J. Friedrich ed., 1964). We get closer to ethics by talking and reading
stories than we do when we argue about definitions of ethics and ethical terms.
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I have used conversation as a pedagogical metaphor for the
inquiry into lawyer ethics. It is time to ask if the metaphor is a
good one? Wayne Booth, a literary critic and rhetorician, offers
the following criteria for evaluative judgement of metaphors:
Good metaphors are active, lending the energy of
more animated things to whatever is less energetic or per-
sonal, or more abstract and passive.
Good . . metaphors are concise, economical.
Good metaphors are appropriate, not just as tested by
some general standard of decorum.., but as appropriately
grand or trivial, precise or general, active or pacifying:
appropriate to the task at hand. If the point is to heighten
sublimity, then trivial metaphors must be avoided. But if
depreciation is desired, the more trivial the better.
Good metaphors accommodate the audience.
Good metaphors are novel, original, striking. Nothing
can destroy an effect more completely than an obvious
effort to say something clever when the result is
commonplace. ...
If good metaphors are concise and economical, then ethics as
conversation is a model of* simplicity; we already know what con-
versation is and how it works. There is nothing esoteric in the
idea of conversation (even though, we may find, like Walker
Percy's Allison in the novel, The Second Coming, that we sometimes
speak in "code"). Conversation works better as a metaphor for
ethics than does philosophy (too abstract), principle (too con-
densed), rules (too rigid), or professionalism (too grand and
amorphous on the one hand and a shield for self-deception on
the other).
The fit of the conversation metaphor and its audience is
harder to determine.3 4 A conversation devoted to ethics cannot,
standing alone, command the attention and respect of all those
who would presently hold ethics talk in disdain. While some stu-
33. BOOTH, supra note 2, at 312-16. See also PHILIP WHEELWRIGHT, META-
PHOR AND REALITY 71 (1968) ("What really matters in a metaphor is the psychic
depth at which the things of the world, whether actual or fancied, are trans-
muted by the cool heat of the imagination.").
34. See MICHAEL POLANYI & HARRY PROSCH, MEANING 70 (1975) ("It is
commonly known that metaphors, like jokes, lose their effectiveness if they are
explained in detail.").
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dents find ethics talk long overdue, others resist it. There is,
between those who believe in ethics talk and those who do not, a
continual struggle over the matter of futility ("why talk?"), relativ-
ism ("every view about ethics is as good as any other"), and cyni-
cism ('You can talk but I won't listen").
Finally, Booth observes that our best metaphors are striking,
novel, and original. I cannot claim originality for the conversa-
tion metaphor; it has, of late, been discovered by philosophers,35
political scientists, literary critics," and even legal scholars. Con-
versation has found use in new theories of reading (the conversa-
tion of reader and author), political theory (the conversation
promoted by constitutionalism), psychology (the conversation of
patient and therapist), and feminism (the conversation of
women's consciousness-raising). Just because conversation as a
metaphor for ethics is unoriginal does not mean it is not strik-
ingly vivid: striking toward the heart of some matter of signifi-
cance, pushing through fog and confusion, aggressively
confronting the forgetting and denial that would have us turn
away from moral discourse as futile.
Using conversation (and indeed ethics) as metaphor is a way
of imagining a participatory ethics, something we do together,
something common in our everyday interactions and routines, in
contrast to something academic, external, and imposed on us.
What we do together, conversationally, is figure out how ethics
works, how we use and confuse our speaking about moral mat-
ters, how the metaphors and images smuggled into ethics talk
reflect the shape and limits of our moral sensibilities. The con-
versation metaphor works-for me-because conversation is
what it takes to get me started on the journey. Journey, of
course, is itself a metaphor; I don't know how to talk about ethics
without using metaphors!
V. JOURNEYS AND BACKROADS
We take a path, pursue a purpose, 7 and strive toward an
end. We take pride in the fact that we are constantly on the go,
that we are so active and relentless in our pursuit of the good
35. See, e.g., THE INTERPRETATION OF DIALOGUE (Tullio Maranhao ed.,
1990).
36. See, e.g., BOOTH, supra note 2.
37. Some contend it is better to have no purpose, moral or otherwise. Be
loose, spontaneous, free. Let the purpose emerge from whatever it is we are
doing. It is our purposes that get us into trouble. To be modem, contempo-
rary ("with it," "cool") is to have no purpose, live day-to-day, be as formless as
possible in a world that demands order. See generally JAMES OGLvY, LIVING WITH-
OUT A GOAL: FINDING THE FREEDOM TO LIVE A CREATIVE AND INNOVATIVE LIFE
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life." Yet, there are times when conditions along the path make
travel rough. But we proceed, slowing down as we must, or seek-
ing a new route, and when all else fails, we are forced to turn
back. There are times, regardless of the path we follow, that we
must stop and take account of where we are and where the path
is taking us."9 Indeed, some journeys are not planned at all, and
on some, the destination (and purpose) may be unknown. Get-
ting ready for and taking and accounting for ajourney makes for
a good story.
When we get bored or beaten down (or begin to doubt the
story we are living), we take a trip to Florida, drive out to Califor-
nia, check out Montana, drive into town for a long weekend.
Trips shake loose old memories and create the possibility for new
ones.4" A traveler knows that home takes on the most distinctive
(1995);JEDEDAH PURDY, FOR COMMON THINGS: IRONY, TRUST, AND COMMITMENT
IN AMERICA TODAY (1999).
38. Having a sense of purpose, being purposeful, is a matter of drive,
dream, fate, personality, will. Its manifestation (and its justification), at least in
Freudian terms, derives from the total self: ego (will), id (drive), and superego
(ego ideals and conscience). Put simply, purpose is a matter of knowing what
we want, taking responsibility, and getting where we want to go.
Lawyers often have a strong sense of purpose. "My purpose," says one kind
of committed lawyer, "is to the legal system. I am devoted to the adversarial
ethic, to the presentation of claims and disputes to a neutral arbitrator (a
judge). I am devoted to being a good lawyer in the sense of having a reputation
for being tough-minded and zealous, a lawyer who can take the difficult case
(even the impossible case) and win it. I want to be known as the most zealous
lawyer in town. Zealousness in pursuit of my client's interest is my purpose."
We can have purposes, admit to having them, at least to ourselves, without
ever clearly identifying exactly what those purposes are and how they embody
images that we enact as lawyers (or as teachers, students, orjudges). There is
something of this sort going on in WISHMAN, supra note 28 and in ALBERT
CAMUS, THE FALL (Justin O'Brien trans., 1956).
We can be foggy about our purposes and end up with our purposes leading
us into the fog. See, e.g., PETE DEXTER, PARIS TROUT (1989) (depicting Harry
Seagraves, a lawyer protagonist whose muddled purposes lead to a tragic end).
Moral inquiry takes us into the fog of purposes, purposes that come and go,
purposes that we have but deny, purposes that we have but fear, purposes that
we have but fail even with sustained effort to realize, purposes that seem always
to elude us. Moral inquiry confronts us with purposes we have not named,
illuminates the nature of purposes we have already "spelled out" in our lives,
and prompts us to imagine purposes left unattended and unclaimed.
39. John S. Dunne, in one of his meditations, asks, "What kind of story
are we in? Is it the story of an adventure, a journey, a voyage of discovery?"
JOHN S. DUNNE, TIME AND MYrH 1 (1975).
40. Duncan Kennedy, in an article every law student should read in the
early days of his or her legal education, points out that law is a "trip":
All members of the [legal] community know that one's initial impres-
sion that a particular rule governs and that when applied to the facts it
yields X result is often wrong. That's what makes law such a trip. What
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meaning only after venturing forth beyond home, beyond pro-
vincial thinking and the local ways of doing things. We journey
because we are in search of something we cannot find at home-
experiences, people, memories-a story we can live only when
we see ourselves as other than one who has never left home.41
Journeys help us re-imagine our histories and refashion a
sense of self that takes account of ideals and dreams. Journeys
relocate and help us re-size the necessity that pervades the roles
we have adopted. (When we listen, away from the thunder of the
courtroom and the din of the law office, we hear voices that
don't get heard in the busyness of everyday life.) We travel to
respond to a vague unarticulated need, to see something new
and different, to be somewhere that allows us to re-imagine what
it means to be home.
Those who know about journeys (and life) know that we do
not always reach our destinations. The journey gets interrupted;
we abandon the path, take a detour, or get lost. We sometimes
turn back, return home, or stay close to home and travel vicari-
ously. Even those who travel to get to where they thought they
were going, find the place (the work, the time, the experience,
the people) disappointing. What we find is that we have ended
up, not in the special place we imagined, but in another version
of the place we left behind. We get to China and find it built
over with the worst of Western architecture. It is not easy to find
places that live up to their billing in our imagination; in particu-
lar, it is hard to find places that still have some sacred quality to
them.
4 2
at first looked open and shut is ajar, and what looked vague and alto-
gether indeterminate abruptly reveals itself to be quite firmly settled
under the circumstances.
Duncan Kennedy, Freedom and Constraint in Adjudication: A Critical Phenomenol-
ogy, 36J. LEGAL EDUC. 518, 522 (1986).
41. During the journey, we rediscover selves ignored or abandoned. "We
are no longer simple beings in the image of a single God," says James Hillman,
"but are always constituted of multiple parts: impish child, hero or heroine,
supervising authority, asocial psychopath, and so on.... [W]e have come to
realize that each of us is normally a flux of figures . . . ." JAMES HILLMAN, RE-
VISIONING PSYCHOLOGY 24 (1975). For further exploration of Hillman's thesis
of the multiple self, see ROBERT JAY LIFTON, THE PROTEAN SELF: HUMAN REsILI-
ENCE IN AN AGE OF FRAGMENTATION (1993); DAVID L. MILLER, THE NEW POLYtHE-
isM: REBIRTH OF THE GODS AND GODDESSES (1974); JAMES OGILVY, MANY
DIMENSIONAL MAN: DECENTRALIZING SELF, SOCIETY AND THE SACRED (1977).
42. One has to marvel that some sacred places never lose energy.
People still go to Stonehenge and to the Acropolis long after the reli-
gions that built them have disappeared. The mysterious energy of
sacred places attracts pilgrims as surely as rubbed amber attracts parti-
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In my work with lawyer ethics, I find solace in the reflective
journey work of Robert Pirsig's Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Main-
tenance.4 3 The unnamed narrator of the story says of the Central
Plains, as he leaves Minneapolis for the Dakotas on a motorcycle:
"This highway is an old concrete two-laner that hasn't had much
traffic since a four-laner went in parallel to it several years ago.""
When we talk about ethics, and try to make ethics a central con-
cern in our lives, we head out on an "old concrete two-laner."
The road one follows in moral discourse is old, narrow, poorly-
maintained. You don't find any of those fancy sodium lamps that
illuminate urban expressways. Consequently, ethics talk can be
slow going, with all the twists and turns and slow travel we associ-
ate with two-lane back roads.
Pirsig reminds us, however, that there are compensations for
taking back roads. Some are lined with trees and there is much
to see; being on the road is a pleasure. There are open fields,
farmhouses and a sense that there are still people who live in
these places along these roads, people who work and conduct
their lives without pretense.
"I'm happy," says the narrator of Pirsig's famous philosophi-
cal travelogue, "to be riding back into this country. It is a kind of
nowhere, famous for nothing at all and has an appeal because of
just that."45 I say just this sort of thing about a conversation
devoted to lawyer ethics. As one who travels these back roads of
ethical conversation, I know to expect interesting sights and a
world of intriguing people (who will say almost anything). And,
like Pirsig's central plains of Minnesota, a conversation about
lawyer ethics can be "a kind of nowhere, famous for nothing."
Ethics is certainly not a major student attraction, nowhere and
not famous at all in legal education.46 Yet, I engage in these con-
cles. Century after century, people just go, drawn by the place and
impelled there from within themselves.
EUGENE VICTOR WALKER, PLACEWAYS: A THEORY OF THE HUMAN ENVIRONMENT 74
(1988).
43. ROBERT PIRSIG, ZEN AND THE ART OF MOTORCYCLE MAINTENANCE: AN
INQUIRY INTO VALUES 190 (1974).
44. Id. at 11.
45. Id.
46. If asked to name significant courses in the law school curriculum stu-
dents might choose constitutional law, evidence, civil procedure, or perhaps
environmental law. It is difficult to imagine a student who would claim legal
ethics as an important and significant course in their legal education. For spec-
ulation as to how ethics gets located in this nowhere space of the "famous for
nothing," see Ronald M. Pipkin, Law School Instruction in Professional Responsibil-
ity: A Curricular Paradox, 1979 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 247.
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versations about ethics, happy as is Pirsig's narrator "to be riding
back into this country."
The narrator, with his son Chris riding behind him on the
motorcycle, has time to take note of things he sees along the way.
When he sees a red-winged blackbird he whacks Chris's knee and
points to it, hollering out to his son, "Blackbird." Chris hollers
back, "I've seen lots of those, Dad!" The narrator notes that, "[a] t
age eleven you don't get very impressed with red-winged
blackbirds."47 Long past Chris's age, many law students don't
find many occasions to be impressed with ethical blackbirds. We
study law and head out on a professional life that takes us onto
fast four-lane highways; we move from one task to another so
quickly it's hard to look out for red-winged blackbirds or ethics.
We grow up, and like the youthful Chris, assume we know all the
ethics we need to know. However, it's not just red-winged
blackbirds we fail to see, but also the growing tensions among
lawyers, and how the new "hardball" tactics of zealous advocacy
put the profession to shame. We don't know all that well how
the changes in the legal profession have taken place and we cer-
tainly don't try to figure out how these institutional changes in
the profession4" (and the culture) might have a direct bearing
on our own personal ethics as a lawyer. Our assumptions, about
ourselves, about ethics, and the things its possible to see along
the way, make ethics talk difficult.
Seeing a red-winged blackbird in a way that Chris cannot is
"all mixed with memories that he [Chris] doesn't have."49
The pungent smell then was from muck stirred up by
hip boots while we were getting in position for the sun to
come up and the duck season to open. Or winters when
the sloughs were frozen over and dead and I could walk
across the ice and snow between the dead cattails and see
nothing but grey skies and dead things and cold. The
blackbirds were gone then. But now in July they're back
47. PIRSIG, supra note 43, at 11-12.
48. In both news media accounts and academic commentaries we find
confirmation that there is trouble afoot. The numbers of lawyers grow. Fewer
lawyers practice in individual and small firm practices and increasingly join the
practices of mega-firms. The character of law practice is increasingly shaped by
a mega-firm mentality that carries its own moral worldview. For accounts of the
Wall Street practice of law, one fictional, the others journalistic, see Louis
AUCHINCLOSS, THE GREAT WORLD AND TIMOTHY COLT (1987); CAMERON
STRACHER, DOUBLE: A YOUNG LAWYER'S TALE OF GREED, SEX, LIES, AND THE PUR-
SUIT OF A SWIVEL CHAIR (1998); ELLEN JOAN POLLOCK, TURKS AND BRAHMINS:
UPHEAVAL AT MILBANK, TWEED (1990).
49. PIRSIG, supra note 43, at 12.
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and everything is at its alivest and every foot of these
sloughs is humming and cicking and buzzing and chirp-
ing, a whole community of millions of living things living
out their lives in a kind of benign continuum.
50
Chris may be too young to appreciate red-winged blackbirds the
way his father does. And so, too, students of law may be too
young in the profession, lacking experience and memory that
makes ethical reflection memorable. We need memory to be
ethical.5
Pirsig invites the reader to listen in as his narrator remem-
bers his life. These rememberings are an intellectual autobiogra-
phy that take the form of Chautauquas, the talks made famous by
19th century traveling tent shows. For Pirsig, the Chautauquas
are an "inquiry into values" (the subtitle of Zen and the Art of
Motorcycle Maintenance), a "series of popular talks intended to
edify and entertain, improve the mind and bring culture and
enlightenment to the ears and thoughts of the hearer." 2 These
Chautauquas are of particular interest to lawyers because they
take up as their central theme a search for the meaning of Qual-
ity-in teaching, in the care of motorcycles, and in the way we
think about ourselves and the world. Pirsig's story, actually a
number of stories, nestled one inside another, telescopes a per-
sonal narrative and a philosophical exploration of Quality, as the
reader journeys with the narrator into the "high country of the
mind.""'
Pirsig says of the philosophical tale he wants to tell in the
Chautauquas:
54
The Chautauquas were pushed aside by faster-paced
radio, movies and TV, and it seems to me the change was
not entirely an improvement. Perhaps because of these
changes the stream of national consciousness moves faster
now, and is broader, but it seems to run less deep. The old
50. Id.
51. On the use of memory to recover a more authentic sense of self, see
CAmus, supra note 38; ALICE KOLLER, AN UNKNOWN WoMAN: AJouRNEY TO SELF-
DISCOvERY (1983). Alice Koller'sjourney of discovery is further documented in
ALICE KOLLER, THE STATIONS OF SOLITUDE (1990).
52. PIRSIG, supra note 43, at 15.
53. Id. at 127. After an interlude of eighteen years following the publica-
tion of Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance, the journey was updated. See
ROBERT M. PIRSIG, LILA: AN INQUIRY INTO MORAS (1991).
54. We are beginning to admit that it is the lot of every discipline to be
embodied in "tales." See, e.g., HOWARD BRODY, STORIES OF SICKNESS (1987);
JONATHAN REP, PHILOSOPHICAL TALES (1987);JOHN VAN MAANEN, TALES OF THE
FIELD: ON WRITING ETHNOGRAPHY (1988).
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channels cannot contain it and in its search for new ones
there seems to be growing havoc and destruction along its
banks. In this Chautauqua I would like not to cut any new
channels of consciousness but simply dig deeper into old
ones that have become silted in with the debris of thoughts
grown stale and platitudes too often repeated. "What's
new?" is an interesting and broadening eternal question,
but one which, if pursued exclusively, results only in an
endless parade of trivia and fashion, the silt of tomorrow. I
would like, instead, to be concerned with the question
"What is best?," a question which cuts deeply rather than
broadly, a question whose answers tend to move the silt
downstream. There are eras of human history in which the
channels of thought have been too deeply cut and no
change was possible, and nothing new ever happened, and
"best" was a matter of dogma, but that is not the situation
now. Now the stream of our common consciousness seems
to be obliterating its own banks, losing its central direction
and purpose, flooding the lowlands, disconnecting and iso-
lating the highlands and to no particular purpose other
than the wasteful fulfillment of its own internal momen-
tum. Some channel deepening seems called for.5 5
Listening to Pirsig talk about the need to "edify and enter-
tain, improve the mind and bring culture and enlightenment to
the ears and thoughts of the hearer" and do some "channel
deepening" sounds like a worthwhile agenda for those of us
interested in lawyer ethics.
VI. A JouRNEY AND A PARABLE
My approach to ethics, like Pirsig's efforts to talk about
Quality by way of motorcycle maintenance, may at times be indi-
rect; it's not always possible to get at ethics directly, head-on.
There are times when the desire for straight talk and definitions
and assurances that all will turn out well undermines moral dis-
course. Ethics can be an elusive fox. Consequently, we must
sometimes look beyond our profession's work and conventional
practices for ethical guidance.
Bowen McCoy, a Wall Street businessman, relates for readers
of the Harvard Business Review (and for himself) an experience
which occurred while hiking in Nepal. 6 McCoy and a compan-
55. PIRsiG, supra note 43, at 15-16.
56. Bowen H. McCoy, The Parable of the Sadhu, 61 HARv. Bus. REv. 103
(1983) [hereinafter McCoy, Parable]. On the use of McCoy's parable as an evo-
cative teaching text on the limits of zealous advocacy, see James R. Elkins, The
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ion, Stephen, an anthropologist, were in a small party of climb-
ers, approaching the highest pass in a sixty day Himalayan trek,
an 18,000 feet pass which had to be traversed to reach the village
of Muklinath, an ancient holy place. Six years earlier McCoy had
attempted the climb and was forced back by altitude sickness.
The weather on the day of the attempted traverse with Stephen
was not good and McCoy feared that his party would be forced to
turn back.
At 15,500 feet, it looked to me as if Stephen were shuf-
fling and staggering a bit, which are symptoms of altitude
sickness.... I felt strong, my adrenaline was flowing, but I
was very concerned about my ultimate ability to get across.
A couple of our porters were suffering from the height,
and Pasang, our Sherpa sirdar (leader), was worried.
Just after daybreak, while we rested at 15,500 feet, one
of the New Zealanders, who had gone ahead, came stagger-
ing down toward us with a body slung across his shoulders.
He dumped the almost naked, barefoot body of an Indian
holy man-a sadhu-at my feet. He had found the pilgrim
lying on the ice, shivering and suffering from hypothermia.
I cradled the sadhu's head and laid him on the rocks. The
New Zealander was angry. He wanted to get across the pass
before the bright sun melted the snow. He said, "Look,
I've done what I can. You have porters and sherpa guides.
You care for him. We're going on!" He turned and went
back up the mountain to join his friends.
I took a carotid pulse and found that the sadhu was
still alive. We figured he had probably visited the holy
shrines at Muklinath and was on his way home. It was fruit-
less to question why he had chosen this desperately high
route instead of the safe, heavily traveled caravan route
through the Kali Gandaki gorge. Or why he was almost
naked and with no shoes, or how long he had been lying in
the pass. The answers weren't going to solve our problem.
Stephen and the four Swiss began stripping off outer
clothing and opening their packs. The sadhu was soon
clothed from head to foot. He was not able to walk, but he
was very much alive. I looked down the mountain and
spotted below the Japanese climbers marching up with a
horse. Without a great deal of thought, I told Stephen and
Pasang that I was concerned about withstanding the
Moral Labyrinth of Zealous Advocacy, 21 CAP. U.L. REv. 735, 755-61 (1992). For
McCoy's later reflections on teaching his parable, see Bowen H. McCoy, When
Do We Take a Stand?, 75 HARV. Bus. REv. 60 (1997).
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heights to come and wanted to get over the pass. I took off
after several of our porters who had gone ahead.
On the steep part of the ascent where, if the ice steps
had given way, I would have slid down about 3,000 feet, I
felt vertigo. I stopped for a breather, allowing the Swiss to
catch up with me. I inquired about the sadhu and Ste-
phen. They said that the sadhu was fine and that Stephen
was just behind. I set off again for the summit.
Stephen arrived at the summit an hour after I did.
Still exhilarated by victory, I ran down the snow slope to
congratulate him. He was suffering from altitude sickness,
walking 15 steps, then stopping, walking 15 steps, then
stopping. Pasang accompanied him all the way up. When
I reached them, Stephen glared at me and said: "How do
you feel about contributing to the death of a fellow man?"
I did not fully comprehend what he meant. "Is the
sadhu dead?" I inquired.
"No," replied Stephen, "but he surely will be!" After I
had gone, and the Swiss had departed not long after, Ste-
phen had remained with the sadhu. When the Japanese
had arrived, Stephen had asked to use their horse to trans-
port the sadhu down to the hut. They had refused. He
had then asked Pasang to have a group of our porters carry
the sadhu. Pasang had resisted the idea, saying that the
porters would have to exert all their energy to get them-
selves over the pass. He had thought they could not carry a
man down 1,000 feet to the hut, reclimb the slope, and get
across safely before the snow melted. Pasang had pressed
Stephen not to delay any longer. The Sherpas had carried
the sadhu down to a rock in the sun at about 15,000 feet
and had pointed out the hut another 500 feet below. The
Japanese had given him food and drink. When they had
last seen him he was listlessly throwing rocks at the Japa-
nese party's dog, which had frightened him.
We do not know if the sadhu lived or died.
McCoy's story raises, in the most dramatic, poignant, and
immediate way, ethical questions of a sort that might confront a
lawyer: What duty do I have to care for others? What are the
social, political, psychological, and spiritual constraints that limit
my ability to care for those I encounter along the way?58 McCoy's
57. McCoy, Parable, supra note 56, at 104.
58. For instructive accounts of caring, see CAROL GiLuGAN, A DIFERrNr
VOICE: PSYcHOLOGICAL THEORY AND WOMEN'S DEVELOPMENT (1982) (on the eth-
ics of caring as a fundamental orientation in the moral perspective of women);
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parable invites conversation and offers, as McCoy reflects on his
experience, an array of instructive clues about how ethics works.
We cannot talk about Bowen McCoy and what happened on the
mountain or McCoy's response to his encounter with the sadhu
without engaging each other in moral discourse. When we talk
about the McCoy story, we learn something about ethics and take
a step closer to understanding how our ethics as lawyers might
work.
A. Blindness
Ethical dilemmas are hard to see; we walk right past them.59
We don't recognize the ethical nature of the problems that con-
front us.6" McCoy, reflecting on his encounter with the sadhu,
realizes that he "had literally walked through a classic moral
dilemma without fully thinking through the consequences."61
When we talk with each other about ethics we see the recognition
problem first hand and up close; we are often blind to the moral
dimension of our habits and practices, our conventions and con-
PiRsIG, supra note 43, at 3-25 (particularly his description of the lackadaisical
motorcycle mechanics, see id. at 23-43, and the old-time welder, see id. at 355).
59. See STANLEY HAUERWAS, TRUTHFULNESS & TRAGEDY- FURTHER INVESTI-
GATIONS IN CHRiSTAN ETHICS 54 (1977):
Our obligations are correlative to the world we see, but our seeing is
inherently perverted by our inveterate tendency to self-deception. To
be "rational" requires the humility to see the world truthfully, since
the world always comes as a challenge to our prideful assumption that
we wish to know the "facts." The significance of virtue is clear once we
understand that the moral life involves not just what we ought to do,
but how we see the world at all.
60. Recognizing the presence of an ethical dimension is simple when
there is clearly harmful or negligent conduct involved. The nature of the ethi-
cal problem is less clear-cut when a potential client contacts you about putting
together a real estate deal which will involve the demolition of historical homes;
a client asks you to set up an appointment to review his will so that he can
disinherit his only daughter because she has moved to California and no longer
corresponds with him; a client suggests the possibility of"pulling strings" with
the prosecutor to dismiss a drunken driving charge; a client wants to consider a
malpractice suit against a thoughtful and competent physician because a loved
one has died under his care. The moral problems we "see" in these situations
are a matter of judgment and character..
One way to deal with the question-"What is a moral dilemma?"-is to
conclude that morals and ethics pervade all the work we do, however careful we
do it. If you can't get away from ethics then all problems have a moral dimen-
sion. All true enough, but I suspect that most of us think about the world and
about ethics somewhat differently. We go about the business of deciding what
is and what is not of moral and ethical concern as if we could actually distin-
guish between those situations in which we confront moral decisions and those
which involve no significant moral questions.
61. McCoy, Parable, supra note 56, at 106.
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cerns. Some seem even to take pride in their blindness. (Self-
deception knows no bounds.) To get beyond blindness we need
curiosity and an openness to inquiry, but many of us are more
closed than we suspect or are willing to admit. The antidotes for
blindness are curiosity, courage, and imagination. It takes cour-
age to talk ethics, to puzzle through our personal, moral-shaped
metaphors and images of professionalism. It takes skill to listen
for trace elements of ethics in our talk. It takes imagination to
see how ethics works in our everyday professional lives.
B. Disagreement
Engaged in ethical inquiry, we often disagree about what
ethics requires us to do. McCoy, upon his return from Nepal,
argues with Stephen about the duty they owed the sadhu. McCoy
took the position that appropriate care had been given the
sadhu; Stephen argued they did not do enough. How are we to
evaluate McCoy's and Stephen's contrasting (competing) views?
What kind of rhetoric(s) do we have available when we try to
persuade each other that one ethical view (or resolution) is bet-
ter than another? How deep are their differences and what com-
monality can be located in their different perspectives? Can we
identify, without falsely reifying, the differences in their views?6 2
Can we disagree, reach no resolution, produce no "answer," and
continue the conversation and ethical inquiry? In talking about
lawyer ethics we sometimes disagree even on such fundamental
questions as whether ethics talk serves a worthwhile purpose.
There will be times when our differences are pronounced,
argument escalates, and the gap between views seems too wide.63
But caution dictates we not magnify our differences. "[O]ur
efforts at justification need not break down helplessly at the first
mention of bitter, prolonged disagreement. Disagreement itself
is not the beginning. We want to explore why people disagree,
62. Oddly enough, commonality and difference are juxtaposed on the
surface and at each level of descent (or ascent) into moral discourse. See, e.g.,
PIRSIG, supra note 43, at 73-80 (describing Pirsig's descent to the level of bed-
rock difference in the recognition of different visions of reality-he called clas-
sic and romantic-reflected in his experience riding and working on
motorcycles with his friends, John and Sylvia.) Consider the differences we asso-
ciate with the cultural designations masculine and feminine, male and female.
See GILLIGAN, supra note 58.
63. In ethics talk we are reminded of the cost of individualism and the
shortfalls of a culture of freedom. We stand at the foot of the tower of Babel.
On the tower of Babel as "a symbol of our moral condition," see JEFFREY STOUT,
ETHics AFTER BABEL: THE LANGUAGES OF MORALS AND THEIR DIscoNTENTs 1
(1988).
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what reasons they offer to defend their views, how compelling
their reasons are."64 Ethics is a study of contested truths.65
What we need is the kind of "edifying talk" described by
Joan Williams:
64. DON HERZOG, WITHOUT FOUNDATIONS: JUSTIFICATIONS IN POLITICAL
THEORY 235 (1985) (commenting on disagreement in politics).
65. See KARL JASPERS, WAY TO WISDOM: AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY
29 (Ralph Manheim trans., 1951):
Through thousands of years the warring schools [of philosophy] have
been unable to demonstrate the truth of any one of them. In each
view some truth is manifested, namely an attitude and a method of
inquiry which teach men to see something in the world. But each one
becomes false when it lays claim to exclusiveness and strives to explain
all existence.
The contested nature of ethical life reflects the politics of pluralism. We
say we are a pluralist society and we say it with pride. The pride of pluralism
makes tolerance a value. "Live and let live" is more than a libertarian motto.
When we point to the plural nature of society, we sometimes do so as a defense
of tolerance and a way to justify our expressed disdain for ethics. Tolerance,
misread, can impede the active exercise ofjudgment in moral deliberation. We
begin to live and assume that it is beyond our capacity "to engage in productive
moral discourse with one another." MICHAEL PERRY, MORALITY, POLITICS, AND
LAW 4 (1988). Such a proposition is "sobering, even frightening-it presents a
bleak dispiriting vision of human relations-and ought not to be accepted
uncritically." Id.
Perry asks if "moral claims" have "truth value." Id. at 9. The skeptic is
doubtful. The relativist says it all depends. Perry points out that moral skepti-
cism has little currency among contemporary philosophers but is still found in
American law schools "where some provincial lawyer-academics continue to
subscribe to the outdated morally skeptical views of an earlier generation of
legal philosophers." Id. at 10.
What, then, constitutes moral knowledge?
[M]oral knowledge is knowledge of how to live so as to flourish, to
achieve well-being. More precisely, it is knowledge about how particu-
lar human beings-the particular human being(s) I am, or we are, or
you are, or she (or he) is, or they are-must live if they are to live the
most deeply satisfying lives of which they are capable, or at least lives as
deeply satisfying as any of which they are capable.
Id. at 11. How ought I to eat to flourish? How ought I to live as a moral person to
flourish? Connect the two. We do not abandon the former question because we
have different taste and combine our foods into different diets. But whatever
your diet, nutrition matters in how well you live and flourish. Cannot the same
be said for our moral sensibilities?
[Mioral knowledge is primarily about what sort of person a particular
human being ought to be-what projects she ought to pursue, what
commitments she ought to make. What traits of character she ought
to cultivate if she is to live the most deeply satisfying life of which she is
capable.
Id. Perry notes that there are different "competing conceptions of flourishing:
egoistic, altruistic, materialistic, spiritual, etc." Id. at 15.
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A pragmatic approach abandons the search for a sin-
gle viewpoint because it abandons the search for a cer-
tainty that compels agreement. In its place, pragmatism
substitutes an "edifying conversation" that views societal
differences as food for thought. The pragmatist's search
for a workable society is a search not for universal princi-
ples but for strategies through which a population, inevita-
bly divided by differences over a very broad range of their




The disagreements we have about ethics emerge in conversa-
tions and arguments with our friends, teachers, colleagues, fam-
ily and neighbors.6 7 For McCoy, the "parable of the sadhu"
emerges from conversation and argument with his friend Ste-
phen, a conversation that began on the mountain when they
encountered the sadhu and continued in McCoy's commentary
in the article.68
D. Slowing Down
We are most directly confronted by ethics when, the Other
"suddenly intrude[s]" in our lives. 69 Ethics throws a monkey
wrench into the perpetual motion machine of routine habit; eth-
ics disrupts an unexamined life. Ethics requires us to slow down
and attend matters taken for granted. Ethics frustrates expecta-
tions, calls the accepted into question, creates obstacles to easy
marches along well-worn paths. When we talk ethics we interrupt
unreflective moral stances and taken-for-granted attitudes and
call their accepted utility and wisdom into question.
66. Joan Chalmers Williams, Culture and Certainty: Legal Histoy and the
Reconstructive Project, 76 VA. L. REV. 713, 735 (1990). For an extended explora-
tion and argument of how this kind of talk might proceed, see WAYNE C.
BOOTH, CRITICAL UNDERSTANDING: THE POWERS AND LIMITs OF PLURALISM
(1979).
67. We have, in a similar fashion, moral disagreements with books we
read, with ourselves, and even with God (as did Job).
68. See McCoy, Parable, supra note 56, at 104 ("For many of the following
days and evenings Stephen and I discussed and debated our behavior toward
the sadhu.").
69. Id. at 103. Paradoxically, while ethical dilemmas happen to us unin-
vited (they happen to good people who live good lives), we seem to place our-
selves in situations in which the fate that seeks us finds us. We set ourselves up




Our ethical encounters teach us about life. McCoy tells the
parable of the sadhu because the encounter "had a powerful
impact" on his thinking about his "corporate ethics."70 The
sadhu story has instructive meaning for McCoy and he assumes
that it might speak to his business colleagues as well. McCoy says,
"How the group [of climbers] responded I think holds a lesson
for all organizations no matter how defined."'71 The sadhu, Ste-
phen, and the encounter became teachers for McCoy, he offers
the story to us as moral instruction.
F. Stories
We see ethics at work in the particularity of McCoy's story.
We learn ethics in the particulars of a story because stories pull
us into contextual, intentional worlds that can be evaluated by
reference to our own experience. McCoy finds that it is "[t]he
stories people tell... [that] transmit ... conceptions of what is
proper behavior."72 Stephen Gillers argues, that "[i]n the end,
every ethical rule must be tested against real stories."73 "I can
only answer the question 'What am I to do?' if I can answer the
prior question, 'Of what story or stories do I find myself a
part?'
If we are to understand our ethics as lawyers we must turn to
stories.75 It is in stories, and the conversations these stories make
70. Id.
71. Id. See also Wayne D. Brazil, Reflections on Community, Responsibility, and
Legal Education, 9 J. LEGAL PROF. 93 (1984). Brazil tells a story about Archie, a
street person, that he sees on his way to the law school, and how Archie became
a moral lesson for him. In his retelling, Archie becomes a moral warning for
the reader.
72. McCoy, Parable, supra note 56, at 107.
73. Stephen Gillers, Taking L.A. Law More Seriously, 98 YALE L.J. 1607,
1617 (1989). See also FRED R. DALLMAYR, CRITICAL ENCOUNTERs: BETWEEN PHI-
LOSOPHY AND POLITICS 193 (1987) ("In comparison with abstract theoretical
speculation, ethics.., is a domain peculiarly and constitutively linked with par-
ticularity, a domain in which general maxims are pointless unless instantiated
and exemplified in concrete actions or behavior patterns."). On the particular-
ity found in literature, see PERRY, supra note 65, at 48-49; John Denvir, Comic
Relief 63 TUL. L. REv. 1423, 1429 (1989).
74. ALASDAIR MACINT'RE, AFTER VIRTUE: A STUDY IN MoRAL THEORY 201
(1981).
75. The legal scholar most responsible for reminding us of this point is
Thomas Shaffer. See, e.g., THOMAS L. SHAFFER, FAITH AND THE PROFESSIONS
(1987). Some moral philosophers agree with Shaffer. See, e.g.,Jerome Schnee-
wind, The Use of Autonomy in Ethical Theory, in RECONSTRUCTING INDIVIDUALISM:
AUTONOMY, INDIVIDUALITY, AND THE SELF IN WESTERN THOUGHT 64 (Thomas C.
Heller et al. eds., 1986):
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possible, that the character of our virtues and vices as lawyers can
be witnessed, questioned, and tested. The problem is that our
lived stories too often disavow reflection, contemplation, intro-
spection, critical self-examination.76
We forget that we have a philosophy, that our lives reflect
choices that serve as plots in the lawyer story we are living. Phi-
losophy/choice/plot/story shape the professional ethic we adopt
(and adapt) in the work we do. Ethics, rooted in narrative,
story,77 conversation and dialogue, is close to the lives we live,
attentive to the images we adopt as lawyers.
G. Defensive Moves
When we talk ethics, we sometimes find ourselves on unfa-
miliar ground. We lack assurance that we know our ethics well
enough to hold out our views to question and scrutiny. And
when questioned about our ethics, Bowen McCoy says, "we dig
into a defensive position from which it is very difficult to
emerge. 78 We are made uncomfortable by what an inquiry into
ethics might reveal.
Ethics confronts us with all that we have promised, compro-
mised, ignored, forgotten, failed, and lost in living the profes-
sional lives we do. The possibility that the life I live can be found
The basic features of morality do not change much over the centuries,
any more than do the basic features of the natural world in which we
live. There are far more changes in the stories we tell ourselves about
morality, the stories by which we make it intelligible to ourselves in the
light of whatever else we take to be known about the world. Those
stories provide the vocabularies we use to express and criticize our
moral feelings and convictions.
The problem is that we tend to look askance at stories as a form of intelligence.
In the words of Toni Morrison, "[p]eople give a lot of credence to the intelli-
gence, the concentration, the imagination necessary for listening to music, but
never for listening to stories." Gail Caldwell, Toni Morrison, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct.
6, 1987, at 67. For instructive efforts to revision story-telling and narrative as
valued intelligence, see JEROME BRUNER, Acts OF MEANING (1990); JEROME
BRUNER, ACTUAL MINDS, POSSIBLE WORLDS (1986); JEROME BRUNER, THE CUL-
TURE OF EDUCATION 130-49 (1996); ROGER C. SCHANK, TELL ME A STORY A NEW
LOOK AT REAL AND ARTIFICIAL MEMORY (1990).
76. We see this problem of perspective and critical reflection worked out
most poignantly in literature. See, e.g., LEO ToLsTOY, THE DEATH OF IVAN ILYCH
95-156 (1966). On the psychological basis of our unreflective approaches to
work, see ABRAHAM ZALEZNIK & MANFRED F.R. KETS DE VRIES, POWER AND THE
CORPORATE MIND (1975).
77. For a philosophical rationale for grounding ethics in narrative, see
Stanley Hauerwas, From System to Story: An Alternative Pattern for Rationality in Eth-
ics, in HAUERWAS, supra note 59, at 15-39.
78. McCoy, Parable, supra note 56, at 106. This defensive posture is evi-
dent in the early Socratic dialogues, in particular the Gorgias.
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lacking is frightening. Ethics threatens to derail a life speeding
along the fast-track; ethics questions the morals of a lawyer bent
on "success" at any cost.
H. Intrigue and Puzzlement
As resistant as we sometimes are to the idea of ethics, we are
drawn into conversations about ethics because there is a deep
human need (unless we have completely given in to the impulses
of the banal and prosaic, to vanity and greed) to explore the puz-
zles and struggles that shape and texture our lives. Ethics reflects
a substrata in the lives we have covered over with professionalism
and assumptions about roles, necessity, and the Real World. Eth-
ics entices us, even as it perplexes and confounds, with its
choices, puzzles, mazes, and labyrinths. McCoy, his curiosity
awakened, is drawn into (and becomes entangled in). the effort
to understand his encounter with the sadhu.
I. Reasons and the Need to Explain
Moral and ethical concerns raised by others require that we
explain ourselves. McCoy argues with his friend Stephen and
tries to defend his care of the sadhu. Stephen questions McCoy.
McCoy, in turn, questions himself about the encounter, the
moment of choice, the decision to proceed and leave the ailing
sadhu behind.
We take action, make a choice, do nothing. McCoy provides
minimal care to an "almost naked, barefoot body of an Indian
holy man ... shivering and suffering from hypothermia" and sets
off to climb his mountain.79 Later McCoy asks: How could this
have happened? Why? What happened? Who am I? We try to
give, to ourselves and others, reasons that explain the action (or
the failure to act) and how the choices we have made are consis-
tent with the character we claim for ourselves.
Some of the "reasons" McCoy uses to justify abandoning the
sadhu turn out to be rationalizations. Moral rationalizations are
a first line of defense. "It's the lawyer'sjob." "We must represent
our clients zealously." "We must take aggressive action to secure
the goals of our clients." Our rationalizations, however, become
cliches, if not cryptic ways of talking ethics while denying it is
ethics we are talking about.
McCoy, speaking of his decision to climb the mountain and
leave the holy man behind, perhaps to die, attributes the deci-
sion to a "high adrenaline flow, a super-ordinate goal, and a
79. Id. at 104.
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once-in-a-lifetime opportunity . ".. . 0, McCoy now questions
these reasons. "On the mountain, none of us but Stephen real-
ized the true dimensions of the situation we were facing.""1
McCoy did, however, provide some help to the sadhu, and he
describes the situation as "ambiguous." 2 The "stress" of the situ-
ation and their purpose in attempting the climb were also rea-
sons to leave the sadhu. But Stephen and McCoy find that the
reasons, as he now tries to articulate them, simply do not work.
If you have an extra-marital affair, it is unlikely that a plea "I
didn't initiate the relationship" would be a good reason for
breaching a commitment you made to your spouse. If you per-
form badly in law school, a potential employer is unlikely to be
impressed with the statement: "I didn't know it was going to be
as hard as it turned out." Or, "I had better things to do." In
McCoy's case, his reasons don't measure up by his own standards.
"Despite my arguments, I felt, and continue to feel guilt about
the sadhu."83 Reasons, it turns out, are one way we defend our-
selves against guilt. And it is our reasons that tell us so much
about who we have become; it is our reasons that get us into
trouble.
84
J. Learning from Others
Ethics is something we do with others, something we do for
others, something we do because we are in the world with
80. Id. at 106.
81. Id. at 106-107. McCoy now sees that he walked through the situation
with the sadhu without truly understanding it as a moral dilemma. He was,
McCoy concludes, blind to what was happening.
82. Id. at 106.
83. Id.
84. McCoy's list of intermediate reasons (in addition to the stress of the
situation) for abandoning the sadhu include:
-We all cared. (There was no moral failure.)
-I did my part. (I'm not personally responsible for what happened.)
-What more could we (or I) have done? (We could not expect to be
saints. We were human beings.)
-The situation justified what we did. (There is a way to explain what
would otherwise look like a moral failure.)
-The sadhu had no right to disrupt our lives. (The one in need is
responsible for his harm, not those of us who could have rendered
aid.)
-I had my own well-being to worry about. (Self-interest too has moral
weight.)
-No one else was willing to help. (If there was any failing it was that




others.s5 McCoy points out that "[f]or many of the following,
days and evenings [after the encounter with the sadhu] Stephen
and I discussed and debated our behavior toward the sadhu.
8 6
McCoy and Stephen were engaged in a conversation about eth-
ics, the kind of moral discourse I advocate for students of lawyer
ethics. McCoy's subsequent writing about the experience and
the publication of the "parable" constitutes a continuing moral
dialogue about the care we owe others whom we encounter
along the way.
K Failure
McCoy talks of a failure of "moral imagination and vision"87
in their treatment of the sadhu. Stephen too fails, so McCoy
argues, because he did not get the support of the other climbers,
and McCoy, to give the sadhu appropriate care.8 8 McCoy con-
cludes that Stephen's failure was less than his own and explains
Stephen's being more attuned to what was happening as related
to his being a "committed Quaker" with a "deep moral vision.
89
It is McCoy, corporate executive and ordained ruling elder of the
United Presbyterian Church, whose moral vision shaped by cor-
porate life so thoroughly fails on the mountain. 90
VII. A LAWYER TuRNs REFLECTIVE
In becoming lawyers we can expect to encounter a few
sadhus along the way, clients and cases and situations and other
lawyers that provide the impetus for action and for moral choice.
There will be times, as the McCoy parable instructs, when the
rationalizations we deploy to defend our professional lives fail.
What happens when we learn that we have taken up practices
and a work life that leave us less than we imagine ourselves to be?
Seymour Wishman recounts just such a story in Confessions of
a Criminal Lawyer.9 The book begins with Wishman's account of
85. The ethical emphasis on what we do together is worked into an
account of moral character and moral life in LAURENCE THOMAS, LIVING MOR-
ALLY: A PSYCHOLOGY OF MORAL CHARACTER (1989).
86. McCoy, Parable, supra note 56, at 104.
87. Id.
88. See id. at 108.
89. Id. at 104.
90. McCoy's speculations about the role of groups (and. corporate cul-
tures) in ethical thinking is muddled in comparison to his more revealing spec-
ulations about the duty to care for the sadhu. See id. at 107-108.
91. WISHMAN, supra note 28. I draw here on an extended examination of
Wishman's "confession" and its pedagogical value. SeeJames R. Elkins, Teaching
a Lawyer's Confessions, 21 LEGAL STUD. F. 151 (1997).
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his confrontation with a screaming woman in a hospital lobby, a
woman he later realizes was the prosecutrix in a rape case in
which he had acted as defense counsel. Ms. Lewis expresses, in
the most graphic street language, her disdain for Wishman and
how he had treated her at the trial of her assailant. Wishman's
cross-examination of Ms. Lewis had been, in his words, "brutal."
Wishman concedes he "humiliated" Ms. Lewis and he wants to
believe (as some lawyers and students of law today believe), that
he was required to do what he did. He acted zealously, even ruth-
lessly, on behalf of a client. In this pugilistic version of the adver-
sarial ethic, Seymour Wishman acted according to a fighter's
code.
Following this strand of adversarialism, there is no ethical
duty to, or personal concern for, Ms. Lewis and her welfare, no
moral duty or obligation for Wishman, as an advocate, to con-
cern himself with the truth of Ms. Lewis's claims. (Of course,
even a lawyer enacting this "scorched-earth" version of an adver-
sarial ethic would have some interest in the truth. He cannot
knowingly present perjured testimony and must view truth as it
figures in his strategy for winning the case and securing a
favorable verdict for his client.) In this schema, Wishman is
expected to focus on the defendant's interest and suspend or for-
get about ordinary notions of truth, and about Ms. Lewis. As one
of my students put it, "lawyers have their own way of dealing with
truth."
But there is a problem. Ms. Lewis confronts Wishman in the
most direct, accusatory way, and refuses to allow him the refuge
of his professional role (and the sanction of officialdom). To Ms.
Lewis, his actions were reprehensible. Wishman, reflecting on
his humiliation of Ms. Lewis, ponders the possibility that he has
crossed an ethical line in his cross-examination.92 For a thought-
ful man, humiliating a person who seeks only to tell the truth
(and secure justice) is not easy to explain away. Wishman begins
to see his treatment of Ms. Lewis and a host of other incidents as
symptoms he must now address. Could it be possible that he has
let his adversarial zeal, and the legal-mind used to justify it,
embrace an adversarial ethic that has distorted his character and
undermined his ideals?
Wishman's story about the cross-examination of Ms. Lewis
poses a question that plagues thoughtful lawyers: can a lawyer, in
good conscience, and with the full approval of his professional
92. One focus of moral inquiry should be "the assessment and repair of
human relationships when these have been strained or damaged by the unfore-
seen results of some action." PITKIN, supra note 12, at 149.
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colleagues, humiliate a witness who he believes is telling the
truth? Wishman, as a good lawyer, knows that his treatment of
Ms. Lewis can be explained, yet his efforts to do so, he now finds
"flippant," "philosophical" excuses of which he is dubious. His
explanation and reasons seem far less persuasive when Wishman
momentarily sees himself through the eyes of Ms. Lewis, a
woman whose moral sensibilities have not been trained to disre-
gard the truth with impunity.93
How are we, readers of what Wishman calls a "confession,"
we teachers and students of law, to put Wishman's soul-searching
to use?9 4 What choices do we have? Are we, future lawyers, will-
ing to accept the kind of adversarial ethic Wishman practices on
Ms. Lewis, to adopt such an ethic as our own? How do we, in the
public forum of the classroom, articulate, defend, and criticize
Wishman's humiliation of Ms. Lewis and his new found reflec-
tiveness about what he did? How do we take account of the con-
fusion in the classroom created by the disagreement between
those who accept Wishman's methods of cross-examination and
those who disavow such methods?
Wishman's story presents students of law a moral dilemma
that cannot be resolved by resort to the profession's ethical rules.
The student must find a way of dealing with Wishman's treat-
ment of Ms. Lewis and his moral evaluation of his own conduct
that goes beyond rules, beyond clich6s about legal ethics. Some
students will attempt to circumvent the moral discourse
Wishman's story invites: "I don't expect to practice criminal
law." "If you can't stand the sight of blood, you might not want
to be a doctor." "I really don't think we need to worry so much
about Ms. Lewis; she was an adult and should know that when
you seek to take away someone's liberty there is going to be some
serious questions asked." Law students reading Seymour
93. The truth is, most assuredly, a complicating factor in the life of a law-.
yer. When the student informs me that lawyers have their own version of truth,
he may be offering a thinly disguised relativism and a preemptive justification
for his future life as a lawyer-for-hire whatever the cause. The view that there is
legal truth that need not be reconciled with ordinary notions of truth is a psy-
chological defense mechanism, a rhetorical and professional facade for the pas-
sive-aggressive, lawyer bully.
94. Other colleagues are more skeptical about the kind of teaching of the
story I prescribe. See Eisele, supra note 24; Paul T. Hayden, Sinners in the Hands
of an Angry Law Professor: Some Cautionary Thoughts on Teaching Moral Lessons in
the Professional Responsibility Course, 21 LEGAL STUD. F. 221 (1997). Still other
colleagues see pedagogical value in the Wishman story. See Nancy Cook,
Response-Ability: Merging the Personal and the Professional Through Action and Reflec-
tion, 21 LEGAL Si-uD. F. 239 (1997); Reed Elizabeth Loder, Professional Grieving,
21 LEGAL STUD. F. 267 (1997).
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Wishman's account of his humiliation of Ms. Lewis are as likely to
defend a practice Wishman seeks to question as they are to pause
and reflect on the limits of the adversarial ethic they are adopt-
ing. Even when confronted with an insider's warning about the
dangers of unbounded adversarial zeal, they are ever so reluctant
to question the character formed around the cliches and conven-
tions of the work that they will soon do.95
Whatever reluctance there may be in working through
Wishman's story, the effects the story might have on us cannot be
known until we probe the incident, ask how it happened, explore
Wishman's explanation, and morally evaluate the "reasons" he
presents for assuming his actions were ethical and professional in
nature. We cannot understand Wishman's humiliation of Ms.
Lewis and whether it can be justified (whether it might, under
some circumstances, be the right thing to do)96 unless we talk
through the problem, engage each other in conversation, con-
front the obstacles to understanding we experience as we explore
the moral dimensions of the story. We must examine the story,
see how it works, and how we are going to work with it.
95. Michael Perry's observations on the assumption that our beliefs are
"fixed" are worth noting here:
One's beliefs are not fixed for all time. Why does a person revise or at
least question her beliefs? What are the occasions of revision? Per-
haps she was unaware that she held inconsistent beliefs but is now
aware; or perhaps she was aware that she held inconsistent beliefs but
now finds herself in a situation in which she can no longer tolerate the
inconsistency and must resolve it. Perhaps due to some new experi-
ence, whether her own or that of some trusted other on whom she
relies, she has acquired a new belief inconsistent with one or more
beliefs previously held; or perhaps the new belief is not inconsistent
with any previously held belief but nonetheless renders her system or
"web" of beliefs less balanced or integrated or coherent and more ad
hoc. Perhaps she simply finds herself in a situation in which one or
more of her beliefs is subjected to a challenge that, as an existential or
at least practical matter, she cannot ignore. Revision of one or more
of the beliefs that constitute a person's web of beliefs may require revi-
sion of one or more further beliefs, and so on, given the extent to
which a person's beliefs are interdependent.
PERRY, supra note 65, at 27.
96. Philip H. Corboy, a prominent Chicago trial lawyer, recognizes that
cross-examination is a "fertile area for trickiness" and that the "tricks, ruses, and
artifices" that lawyers use, "range from the trivial to the unconscionable." Philip
H. Corboy, Cross-Examination: Walking the Line Between Proper Prejudice and Unethi-
cal Conduct, 10 AM. J. ADvoc. 1, 4 (1986). Corboy raises concern about these
practices and concludes that lawyers should not let "unswerving loyalty to client
or to victory to cloud their moral or ethical judgment." Id. at 13. Monroe
Freedman, in contrast, argues that lawyers have an ethical duty, once they have
chosen to represent a client, to "discredit" truthful witnesses on cross-examina-
tion. See MONROE FREEDMAN, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS' ETHICS 161-71 (1990).
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If stories and texts make demands on us, as surely they do,9 7
then Wishman's story makes substantial demands on the lawyer
reader. Is Wishman claiming that lawyers must seek the truth
above all else? There is little in Wishman's story to suggest such a
simplistic reading. Is he claiming that clients with a reason to lie
and a propensity to do so, don't deserve representation? Hardly.
Wishman isn't, it seems, so much trying to tell us how to think
about lawyers and truth-telling or trying to devise an authorita-
tive statement on the moral nuances of cross-examination, as he
is simply describing how his work as a lawyer set him at odds with
himself and how the incident with Ms. Lewis gave him pause to
reflect on who and what he was becoming. Wishman demands
that we come to grips on our own with this matter of truth-
telling.
One way of reading Wishman is to see that he does indeed
leave the reader with a moral injunction: You must reflect on your
embodiment and enactments of the adversarial ethic; you must decide
whether the accommodations you have made as a lawyer fit with the kind
of character you envision for yourself If you ignore matters of truth-
telling, it will, Wishman warns, come back to haunt you. The
demand Wishman makes on the reader is a dialogical one: you
must enter this conversation, consider my notions about lawyer-
ing, and in doing so, you must reflect on what you are becoming.
You can successfully escape the moral concerns associated with
your work as a lawyer only if you are willing to become the kind
of character that is oblivious to the harms in which you are impli-
cated, blind to the sadhus you meet along the way.
Wishman's interior conversation about these matters, and
his efforts to justify to the world (and Ms. Lewis) his version of
the adversarial ethic, offer those of us curious about lawyer ethics
something to talk about. Listening to Wishman's story, we must
respond. What are we to do about the professional virtue we
know as zealousness? Are we willing to let it undermine other
97. The texts, stories, events, and incidents which crowd our lives define
who we are and how our life's work will be vested with meaning. Consider, for
example, a law student who reads the Constitution (or National Labor Rela-
tions Act or Americans with Disabilities Act) during their legal education and
spends a lifetime as a constitutional lawyer. Our lives are often tied to texts: a
constitution; a statute; a book, perhaps Freud's Interpretation of Dreams, Kate Mil-
let's Sexual Politics, Scott Peck's The Road Less Traveled, or Richard Bach's
Jonathan Livingston Seagull, perhaps a biography of Madame Curie or Theodore
Roosevelt, a Nancy Drew book; or a fairy tale. Texts help crystallize and ener-
gize some part of the self or selves that demand expression. In stories like that
told by Seymour Wishman we have occasion to direct attention to the adver-
sarial ethic and those features of the legal-mind that threaten our downfall,
even as we claim the glory of the ethic we have adopted.
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aspects of our character? By talking about Wishman, we pursue
not just a moral dilemma-can a moral person who happens to
be a lawyer attempt to make the truth look like a lie?-but a
course of conversation in which the nature and purpose of our
moral commitments must be spelled out. We, like Wishman,
must determine what it is possible to say, feel, and do about this
lawyer ethic of adversarial zeal, an ethic powerful enough to set
itself above the truth and to shape the character of those who
embrace it.
Wishman, by way of his story, becomes a teacher of lawyer
ethics, a teacher who demands that we think carefully about the
legal persona and a legal mindset pushing zealousness to its lim-
its (and beyond). Wishman's confession demands that we reflect
on the moral character we create as we serve this adversarial
ethic.98 How do we try to justify what Wishman did? What
excuses do we give each other in our effort to minimize the
impact of Wishman's confession? Can wejustify (to each other)
an unreflective, unarticulated stance toward an adversarial ethic
that results in harm to others? If not, how do we know when to
exercise caution, when to question the ethic that lies so peril-
ously close to the actionable heart of our moral life? Taking on
98. The adversarial ethic lies at the heart of the partisan role lawyers play
on behalf of their clients, and consequently, at the heart of the character
pathologies associated with a legal persona devoted to an over-determined
ethic. If we are to understand the proudest and saddest moments in the life of
our careers as lawyers (and the disdain the public has for lawyers) we must
confront conventional views of lawyering that make "hard-ball tactics" a profes-
sionally sanctioned part of lawyering.
Lawyers cannot sustain their moral lives on zealousness alone. There is
nothing inherently wrong with zealousness; it is a virtue in which we take great
pride as lawyers. But zealousness is not enough; it can never be the ultimate
virtue by which all other virtues of professional character are measured and
adjudged. We must learn, concretely, as painful as it may be, that an adversarial
ethic is not an adequate foundation for professional life. See Elkins, supra note
56.
Wishman is a lawyer story-teller whose confessional narrative introduces
the "shadow" side of the adversarial ethic. Wishman helps us see how zealous
advocacy can have a serious, detrimental impact on the character of the advo-
cate, the cost of becoming an amoral zealot. On the philosophical and psycho-
logical relation of adversarial professional role and character, see BENJAMIN
SELLS, THE SOUL OF THE LAW (1994); Andreas Estate, Does a Lauyer's Character
Matter?, in THE GOOD LAWYER: LAWYERS' ROLES AND LAWYERS' ETHICS 259-69
(David Luban ed., 1983); Gerald J. Postema, Self-Image, Integrity, and Professional
Responsibility, in THE GOOD LAWYER, supra, at 70-85; Bernard Williams, Profes-
sional Morality and Its Dispositions, in THE GOOD LAWYER, supra, at 286-314.
Wishman's observation takes on added weight and his reflection more dif-
ficult to dismiss because they come from a lawyer-insider, a lawyer who deeply
respects the adversarial system.
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these questions we accede to the demands of Wishman's confes-
sion and put our selves, our professional ideals, and our ethics to
the test.
Wishman raises a host of questions: At what cost do we
embrace, without reflection, an adversarial ethic? How does a
legal mindset help us rationalize the humiliation of truthful
witnesses?99 How does a legal mind tune out moral concerns?
99. For a description of what I am calling the "legal mind-set," see STUART
A. SCHEINGOLD, THE POLITICS OF RIGHTS: LAWYERS, PUBLIC POLICY, AND POLIT-
ICAL CHANGE 151-69 (1974) (arguing that the legal mind-set is a "narrowing"
political vision that accompanies traditional methods of legal education); James
R. Elkins, The Legal Persona: An Essay on the Professional Mask, 64 VA. L. Rxv. 735
(1978) (examining the psychological features of the legal mind-set); Leonard
Riskin, Mediation and Lawyers, 43 OHIO ST. LJ. 29, 43-49 (1982) (presenting the
legal mind-set as a "headwind" in opposition to the mind-set and worldview
reflected in the practice of mediation).
Jerold Auerbach argues, that it is the lawyer's "dislike of vague generalities,
the preference for case-by-case treatment of all social issues, the structuring of
all possible human relations into the form of claims and counterclaims under
established rules, and the belief that the rules are 'there'" that constitute a
legalistic worldview. JEROLD AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JUSTICE: LAWYERS AND SOCIAL
CHANGE IN MODERN AMERICA 10 (1976). Stuart Scheingold notes:
When we accuse someone of being legalistic, we suggest an excessive
zeal for purely formal details which becloud rather than clarify the
real issue. The legalist is someone who is lost among the trees and
cannot or will not consider the overall shape of the forest. So it is a
sense of willful closure together with an obsession for procedure and
minutiae that we associate with the law game.
SCHEINGOLD, supra, at 156. Judith Shklar argues that legalism has a moral/ethi-
cal dimension. Legalism is "the ethical attitude that holds moral conduct to be
a matter of rule following and moral relationships to consist of duties and rights
determined by rules." JUDITH N. SHKLAR, LEGALISM 1 (1964). Legalism can be
seen as "a way of thinking about social life, a mode of consciousness" which
structures our social experience. ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, KNOWLEDGE
AND POLITICS 75 (1975).
The legalism described by Shklar, Scheingold, Auerbach, and Unger is
expressed in social institutions, political ideologies, philosophical thought, and
personal behavior. It is a pattern of individual conduct and a social ethos. But
it is in the legal profession and with lawyers that legalism finds its home. "Legal-
ism is, above all, the operative outlook of the legal profession, both bench and
bar." SHKLAR, supra, at 8. For an account of how legalism effects the lawyers'
relations with clients, see Richard Wasserstrom, Lawyers as Professionals: Some
Moral Considerations, 5 HUM. RTS. 1 (1975) [hereinafter Wasserstrom, Lawyers as
Professionals].
Jerold Auerbach has, somewhat extravagantly, described legalism as the
"omnipotent deity... worshiped by a cult of monotheistic professional zealots."
AUERBACH, supra, at 303. Auerbach further indicts the legal profession for its
failure to promote social justice, contending that the failure is due, in part, to a
legal mind "hemmed in by the ingrained professional preference for process
and order, moderation and compromise." Id. at 266. For an argument that
compromise undermines ethical behavior, see Stanley Hauerwas & Thomas
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Is a legal mind the only kind of mind one needs to be a
lawyer?100
When we talk about Wishman, we inevitably talk about our-
selves. When we talk about ourselves, we are not always going to
be pleased with what we hear and what we learn. When we talk
about what lawyers do and what we will do as lawyers, we find the
talk "tightens" and "constrains" and seems clearly not to be an
elixir.10 1 We can expect some strained conversations as we wit-
ness the tattered moral maps we carry into law school conversa-
tions about ethics. We begin to see and feel, in our talk about
Wishman, how vulnerable we are12 and how easy it is, talking
about moral matters, to succumb to a sense of futility. It turns
out to be no simple thing at all, this matter of talking about
Wishman, talking about ethics, talking about our work as lawyers.
We are rather quickly and dramatically pushed beyond the con-
Shaffer, Hope in the Life of Thomas More, 54 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 569, 581-82
(1979).
An ideological worldview premised on legalism "is as much an obscuring
veil as a clarifying lens for approaching social problems. Law and legal thinking
are as frequently the cause of social trouble as the means of resolving it." Peter
d'Errico, The Law is Terror Put into Words, 2 LEARNING & L. 39, 40 (1975). Legal-
ism has increasingly come under criticism for "its role in maintaining oppres-
sive social conditions and for the exceeding narrowness... as a world view." Id.
Richard Wasserstrom points out:
[T]he law is conservative in the same way in which language is con-
servative. It seems to assimilate everything that happens to that which
has happened. It seeks to relate any new phenomenon to what has
already been categorized and dealt with. Thus, the lawyers' virtually
instinctive intellectual response when he is confronted with a situation
is to look for the respects in which that situation is like something that
is familiar and that has a place within the realm of understood legal
doctrine.
I think that persons who are genuinely concerned with far-reach-
ing and radical-the generic sense of the term-solutions to social ills
ought to be on guard .against and ought to mistrust this powerful ten-
dency on the part of the lawyer to transmogrify that which is new into
what has gone before or to reject as unworkable or unintelligible that
cannot be so modified....
Richard Wasserstrom, Postscript: Lawyers and Revolution, 30 U. Prrr. L. REv. 125,
129 (1968) [hereinafter Wasserstrom, Lawyers and Revolution].
100. SeeJames R. Elkins, Thinking Like a Lawyer: Second Thoughts, 47 MER-
CER L. REv. 511 (1996).
101. Will moral discourse work? Michael Perry makes the point that
"moral discourse" is not "invariably a solvent of moral conflict" but that given
the alternatives it ought to be tried. PERRY, supra note 65, at 52. "There is surely
nothing to be gained in underestimating the possibility of productive moral
discourse." Id. at 53.
102. See Pitkin, supra note 12, at 154 (we find in moral discourse that
"[s]ome ways of elaborating our conduct only make things worse").
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versational world of painters, beyond their easy banter about and
casual reflections on the work that gets them through the day.
There is no formula we can follow to talk about ethics, as
there is no formula to become a good lawyer or good person.
Law students, still new to the idea of the practice of law,
speak convincingly as if they were already lawyers, already ethi-
cally composed (and compromised) by the necessities of a Real
World and the conventional roles held out to them when they
take their place in this world. We listen, as students convinced
about the necessities of the adversarial ethic push it beyond lim-
its justified by common sense and ordinary morality. We listen,
and witness the painful moments as those most certain about
themselves and their role mimic the talk of hard-ball lawyering.
We listen, as these students, ever eager to be Real Lawyers and
leave their student days behind them, argue with passion that
Seymour Wishman did nothing wrong in his cross-examination
of Ms. Lewis. They do not see in their defense of Wishman,
made all the more bold by their newly emerging law-shaped
speech, an ethic and a character with the potential to undermine
their ideals. Law students try to imagine themselves in a story °3
that puts them outside (or above) everyday moral concerns.
They defensively attempt to justify the harmful effects of
unbounded adversarial zeal when asked: Is there a more
thoughtful, caring, judicious, and truthful way to imagine our-
selves as lawyers than our education as lawyers now holds out for
us?
VIII. MAPS WE BRING WrrH Us
Testing our ethics in a course of conversation, as students do
when they confront the Seymour Wishman story, is a form of
educational adventure travel.'0 Some set off, in ethical conversa-
tion and in life, with little thought to where they are going.
Others make elaborate preparations before setting out and plan
every possible detail. I traveled once with a man from my
hometown in Western Kentucky who had planned a trip "out
West" for over a decade. In his seventies when the trip began, he
had been planning the trip from the day his ten year old grand-
103. Legal education constitutes a world of stories. See Pedagogy of Narra-
tive: A Symposium, 40J. LEGAL EDUC. 1-250 (1990).
104. On the importance of other adventures and travel in education, see
DAVID H. LEMPERT, ESCAPE FROM THE IVORY TOWER: STUDENT ADVENTURES IN
DEMOCRATIC EXPERIENTIAL EDUCATION (1996).
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son was born. He planned the trip so long he had become an
old man, old enough to need help to make the trip.
Some of us travel using maps, others seek destinations for
which no map seems needed.
When we listen to law students talking ethics, it's important
to keep in mind that they too draw on maps. Our ethics talk
(and even our silence about ethics) leave markers of paths we
follow to get from one place to another. In moral discourse
those maps are put to use. The maps we use in moral discourse
(or to hold it in disdain, placing it off the map) locate where we
are and the routes we follow.
When we talk ethics we travel where others have traveled
before. Since no one comes to ethics talk with a blank ethical
slate, our conversation about lawyer ethics is going to draw on
maps most readily available to us.105 Some of our maps may be
no better than the crude hand-drawn ones used by treasure
hunters. Others carry official maps. Still others resort to the
kind of maps you find at the chamber of commerce that show
local points of interest."°6 Simply put, we have a frame of refer-
ence10 7 that we bring with us to ethics and to our moral educa-
tion and training as lawyers. This frame of reference, or map,
105. What hypotheses about ethics and about our own moral lives do we
carry with us into ethical inquiry? Are these hypotheses adequate for the life we
are trying to live? How do these hypotheses illuminate and shadow our lives?
One problem in working with ethics is distinguishing what we know from
what we do not, what we know and cannot articulate from what we know and
can instructively articulate for others. We may know less than we think we know
(at least about some things, and some people). We may know, in some
instances, more than we want to talk about. The problem is a normative one:
how much of what I know about ethics must I be able to articulate in order to
insure that I know what I think I know?
106. We bring something to ethics both more significant and more troub-
ling than we might assume, something we already know and something we
struggle to disown.
107. There are many ways to talk about the maps we use when we engage
each other in ethics talk. Pierre Schlag describes two cognitive stances, rational-
ism and modernism, that are of particular interest to those who want to under-
stand ethics talk. See Pierre Schlag, Missing Pieces: A Cognitive Approach to Law, 67
TEX. L. REV. 1195 (1989). Schlag argues that rationalism is the "dominant cog-
nitive mode" found in the community of legal practitioners. Id. at 1222.
The hallmark of rationalist consciousness is the privileging of ego-
centered reason.... [Elgo-centered reason affirms the validity of the
rule of reason as determined by the individual rationalist self. This
consciousness posits a strongly idealist conception of reason in which
the rationalist self knows few (if any) limits on its ability to understand
and rationalize the world. Ego-centered reason understands that all
claims or arguments about the nature of law or the world are
addressed to the rational ego itself. The rationalist self is radically
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figures prominently in the kind of character we take on as
lawyers.
free-it need not (and should not) accept any claim that would de-
center itself or its reason in adjudicating the nature of reality.
Rationalist consciousness insists first and foremost on the justifica-
tion of claims according to established rules of logic, or, more broadly,
good reasoning. Claims are redeemable for rationalist consciousness
if one can demonstrate that they follow correctly from accepted prem-
ises. Because, in principle, the rationalist self knows few (if any) limits
on its capacity to understand or explain the world, any limits (or other
vexations) it does encounter must result from intellectual sloth, out-
right error, or intentional distortion by other conversants.
Because rationalist consciousness views all other selves as capable
of the same intellection, at least in theory, the rationalist assumes that
reasoned deliberation must govern all interpersonal enterprises. If all
parties conduct this deliberation in good faith, the better argument
will necessarily win the day. If the better argument does not prevail, it
can only be because some of the parties have chosen to be disingenu-
ous, dishonest, or fraudulent, or because they still do not understand
the rules of the game.
Id. at 1210-11.
Critical legal studies scholarship has brought another cognitive stance to
our attention, a stance that confronts and calls into question our reliance upon
rationalist consciousness. Modernism "pushes the critical edge" and "puts rea-
son on trial." Id. at 1208. Modernism strives, says Schlag, "to articulate in
polite, theoretical terms the unpresentable underside of reason." Id. Schlag
associates modernism with Hegel, Marx, and Freud, and to a lesser extent,
Nietzsche. See id. at 1208 n.62.
Modernism troubles the rationalist picture. For modernists, the-
ory, reason, and discourse are not only autonomous forms of thought
but also activities or practices whose status is underwritten by some
non-rational underside.... For modernists, reason itself must be scru-
tinized before its products can be admitted into the intellectual
arena ....
Modernism thus demands a de-centering of ego-centered reason
.... What is required is nothing less than a change in the very form in
which categories are used to think-a change not just in what is
thought, but in the way it is thought. This is a slippery and systemati-
cally repressed distinction, but it is extremely important. To under-
stand the distinction, one must abandon the characteristic focus on
substance in favor of form. As modernists see it-rationalists do not-
the difference between modernism and rationalism is not just a differ-
ence in theory, but a difference in the practice of theory.
• . . [M]odernism seeks to deepen Enlightment projects by
acquainting them with the dark side of reason .... The modernist...
understands the present as a period of anguish, estrangement, and
alienation.
Id. at 1213-14, 1218.
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Many of us use a map that we might call "common-sense."
This is the map we use to initiate a conversation ("How are you
today?"), seek directions ("How can I get to the Sears Build-
ing?"), establish the nature of the work we are being asked to do
("What do you want me to do now?" "How should we pro-
ceed?"). What are we doing? Where do we go from here? What
next? Without this common-sense map of everyday reality, we
would be lost. The common-sense map is the map the painters
use in their workday conversations.
The common-sense map is functional but one-dimensional.
When overused, and taken erroneously to be a map of more ter-
ritory than it actually represents, the common-sense map leaves
its user a subscriber of practicalism, a philosophical frame-of-refer-
ence with decidedly undesirable features. A prosaic mentality-
the kind of mind who overuses the common-sense mapl°8-is
pernicious when pushed beyond its limits.
108. On the prosaic mentality, see GEORGE W. MORGAN, THE HUMAN PRE-
DICAMENT: DISSOLUTION AND WHOLENESS 81-93 (1968). Morgan describes the
prosaic mentality:
[A person] interested in ... clear-cut boundaries. He wishes to have
things sharply defined. He wants to know exactly what is meant,
exactly what the facts are, exactly what constitutes his rights and
duties, and exactly how to proceed. He hates what he calls blurred
boundaries and sees them as a source of misunderstanding, confusion,
inefficiency, and conflict. He is determined to find out where to
"draw the line."
The prosaic man stresses literalness. Whatever is to be under-
stood and communicated he wants to see spelled out in explicit state-
ments. He thinks that stark, literal prose is the only instrument of
expression and communication, and sees deviation from such bare,
denotative prose as leading to error, miscommunication, and
emotionalism.
The prosaic man praises objectivity, regarding it as the essence of
reliability and truthfulness. ... [T]o be objective means to withhold
the feelings and to be detached and impersonal.
[ . . T]he prosaic person is forever incapable of considering
issues in depth. He stays at the surface; he remains with things that
permit specifiable action. He entertains no questions with respect to
life, man, or society that do not obviously lead to specific things to do.
Id. at 83, 89.
The practicalist assumes that the world can be mastered through the use of
skills (routinized and habituated). The practicalist seeks skills and values them
but is unwilling to question the purposes to which skills are devoted, and more
troubling, whose purposes they ultimately serve. The practicalist has a philoso-
phy, a powerful one, but she has no desire to know how it works.
We develop a prosaic mentality and accept conventional non-critical views
of what we see going on around us and become obedient because we are unwill-
ing to take risk. The need for security is so strong that we are unwilling to take
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How is this common-sense map related to our ethics as law-
yers? First, the map assumes a great deal of power because it
purports to represent reality. Static social conventions and
scripted roles are accepted as given, natural, inevitable. These
patterns become part of a taken-for-granted reality that encode
and disguise our assumptions about the moral dimensions of
professional life. We expect, as the natural order of a well func-
tioning life, that our ethics will be enfolded in our actions and
choices; we assume ethics to be an internalized set of principles
that need no articulation."0 9
For the everyday life of lawyer ethics, we need simply watch
lawyers in their offices talking to clients, and talking with each
other about clients. There is, of course, ethics reflected in the
law talk we do in trials and with judges, and in the narratives that
judges create in judicial decisions, but it is the everyday talk of
lawyer with client,1 ' and lawyers with other lawyers, and law stu-
dents and their teachers, that we find revealed the common-
sense maps that make moral notions a part of the reality of legal
practice. Letting our practices become habit, we follow the map
and the restricted routes it lays out for us.1"' Like fish immersed
in water, we are immersed in the ordinary practices of law." 2
the risk in being critical. See Edward E. Sampson, On Risk-Taking and Security, in
EGO AT THE THRESHOLD 46-48 (1975).
109. We are suspicious, and rightly so, about wordy (self-serving) pro-
nouncements of ethical principles. To start a conversation with principles is to
start where we want to end up. It's like watching the end of the movie first.
Principles matter, and they matter in significant ways. But they matter in ways
different than we assume. Principles are distillates of a life being lived, of life in
process. We find out what principles we have got by living them.
110. See Thomas L. Shaffer, The Practice of Law as Moral Discourse, 55
NOTRE DAME L. REv. 231 (1979). I find lawyer protagonists in fiction an instruc-
tive source (often by negative example) of moral discourse with clients. See, e.g.,
STEPHEN GREENLEAF, THE DITTO LIST (1986); GEORGE V. HIGGINS, KENNEDY FOR
THE DEFENSE (1980); GEORGE V. HIGGINS, PENANCE FOR JERRY KENNEDY (1985).
111. As Edward Stevens puts it:
[The choice] is not between operating or not operating according to a
given ... philosophy and morality. The question is rather whether
you go about your moral life with eyes open and well aware of your
operative philosophy or with eyes shut, unconscious of the assump-
tions and moral consequences of your decisions. The fact that you
never give morality a second thought doesn't mean ... that your deci-
sions have no moral import; it simply means that you are unaware of
the moral dimension. The fact that a person cannot spell or even pro-
nounce the word "philosophy" doesn't mean that he has no operative
philosophy in his life; it simply remains unconscious.
EDWARD STEVENS, BUSINESS ETHICS 8 (1979).
112. See infra notes 218-25 and accompanying text.
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Walker Percy, in his novel The Second Coming,11 introduces a
young woman named Allison who has difficulty doing the most
ordinary everyday sorts of things. She is dysfunctional because
she has no map of ordinary reality. Allison's difficulties are set
against the story of Will Barrett, a man in his mid-forties, retired
from a New York law practice after the death of his rich Carolina
wife Barrett has made effective use of the map of ordinary reality
(along with other maps) to become a "successful lawyer." When
you use the map of ordinary reality and are good at it, you can
get along quite well in life.
One difference, among others, between Barrett and Allison,
is that Barrett has used the map of ordinary reality to convince
others and himself that he knows what to do and how to do it,
where he is going and how to get there. He has certainly proven
he knows how to get ahead in life. And, as we might expect of a
lawyer, Barrett knows how to talk; he knows what to say and how
to say it.
Allison is a failure in all that Barrett has succeeded. Allison
recognizes that there is a map used by others that she doesn't
have-she calls it the "code"-which permits others to know this
ordinary reality114 and to interpret it. "[ S ] he reflected that peo-
ple asked questions and answered them differently from her.
She took words seriously to mean more or less what they said, but
other people seemed to use words as signals in another code they
had agreed upon." '1 5 Allison uses words literally; she finds that
others mean something different than her literal translation of
their words. To be real with those with whom she must interact,
to be more functional, Allison seeks access to this "code" which
will allow her to get to the secret meaning behind words." 6
Allison feels that with access to the code she can better deal with
the fact that the people she encounters don't "talk in complete
sentences. People didn't seem to need more than a word or two
to make their own sense of what you said." She discovered "she
could talk as long as she asked questions. Making statements was
risky."
1 17
113. WALKER PERCY, THE SECOND COMING (1980).
114. On language as "code" and how this code affects speaking, see PAUL
GOODMAN, SPEAKING AND LANGUAGE: DEFENCE OF POETRY 33-55 (1971).
115. PERCY, supra note 113, at 33-34.
116. On the use of transactional analysis to decode conversation, see ERIC
BERNE, GAMES PEOPLE PLAY (1964); ERIC BERNE, SCRIPTS PEOPLE LIVE (1975);
ERIC BERNE, WHAT Do You SAY AFTER YOU SAY HELLO?: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF
HUMAN DESTINY (1972).
117. PERCY, supra note 113, at 24-25.
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Allison's discoveries follow an encounter with a young man
in a Michigan State T-shirt sitting on a public bench:
He looked good-natured and dumb. She decided to
practice [talking] on him.
"Michigan State," she said. It came out not quite as a
question and not quite as a statement. "You-?"
This sounded more like a question.
"Oh no. Linwood High. I play for the Wolves."
"The Wolves. Oh yes." She noticed the banner. "Yes,
but is that permitted?"
"Is what permitted?"
"The Michigan State T-shirt."
That was a slight blunder. For a moment she had
imagined that there might be regulations preventing unau-
thorized persons from wearing university T-shirts, perhaps
a semi-official regulatory agency. In the next instant she
saw that this was nonsense.
But the youth did not see anything unusual. "You can
get them for three and a half from Good's Variety."
"Are the Wolves-?" She paused....
"If we win this one, we'll be state champs, single A," he
said.
"That's-" she said and stopped. But he didn't notice.
He must have been waiting for somebody, for suddenly he
was up and on his way.
"Have a nice-" he said, but he turned his face away.
"What?" she asked in a very clear question. "Have a
nice what?" But he was gone.
1 8
Even Will Barrett, while he has full access to the "code" that
Allison struggles to rediscover, finds that some of his conversa-
tions sound a bit strange. Barrett, playing golf with old Carolina
friends and a brother-in-law, Jimmy Rogers, reports the following
conversation:
His brother-in-law was lining up a putt, crouched over
his putter with its gimmicky semicircular head, elbows
sticking out, right foot drawn back daintily.... After the
putt Jimmy Rogers took his arm and drew close and said
Hail Caesar and he said Hail Caesai and Jimmy Rogers said
You really did it, didn't you? and he said Did what? And
Jimmy said You picked up all the marbles, that's all. You mar-
ried one of them and beat them at their own game in their own ball
118. Id. at 24-25.
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park. Them? Who's them? Yankees? What game? Practic-
ing law? Making money?
But then Jimmy drew close and looked solemn.




"What a wonderful person she must have been."
"Yes, she was."
Jimmy Rogers began to tell him ajoke about ajew and
a German and a black on an airplane with a single para-
chute .... Am I going crazy? he wondered curiously.
1 19
Will Barrett, having made effective use of the "code," is now wit-
ness to a world where words have dubious meanings.
Yet, Barrett, when he looks back on his life as a young lawyer
practicing law in New York, sees that it was not all quite what he
assumed it to be.120 Barrett is an example of how a man can, as
his bother-in-law put it, "pick up all the marbles," and still not
avoid those times in life when it all turns strange. Barrett starts
firing a gun close to his face, remembering a woman he knew in
high school; he contemplates suicide. Barrett, like the lawyer
Ivan Ilych in The Death of Ivan Ilych,121 finds his routine world
coming apart at the seams. He begins to fall during his golf
games and experience what appears to be seizures. (The com-
plex relationship of physical and psychological "causes" for Will
Barrett's complex of "symptoms" is an underlying theme in the
novel.) Barrett has lived according to a common-sense map that
uses ordinary reality to forge a "successful" life. But he now
needs another map, a philosophical/existential map that cor-
rects the gross distortions of the map of ordinary reality he's
grown so accustomed.
1 2 2
119. Id. at 46-47.
120. A danger in using the map of ordinary reality is that we begin to
treat it as if it were the only map available, the only map a rational person would
ever need. You do things automatically, or you live day-to-day, or you make
careful plans so you can achieve your goals, but all are designed to get you
where you are going according to a well-marked map. (Some of us move along
such well-marked maps that it feels as if there is no different routes possible,
indeed, that there is no map.) Along the way you talk so people understand
you, you fit in, you "go along" (as they say), and things work out like they
should (or so you think).
121. TOLSTOY, supra note 76.
122. Walker Percy's fiction is often characterized as philosophical in
tone. For an introduction to the philosophical and psychological foundations
of Percy's fiction, see ROBERT COLES, WALKER PERCv: AN AMmicAN SEARCH
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When we follow the well-worn path, live an unreflective life,
go after success with reckless abandon, we set ourselves up for a
"fall." Witness the archetypal failure of lawyers like Ilych,'23 and
Jean Baptiste-Clamence, in Albert Camus' The FaL' 24 Or con-
sider examples closer to home, those you know in your own fam-
ily, town, or church, and the stories you read about lawyers in the
daily newspaper and see fictionalized on television.
Consider, from some years back, a rather well-known Repub-
lican political operative named Lee Atwater, a tenacious "hard-
ball" political manager, and engineer of George Bush's presiden-
tial campaign in 1988. Atwater died in 1990 of a brain tumor.'25
Atwater's illness brought him around to reconsider his reputa-
tion for political hardball:
Lee Atwater, who used to revel in making his political
enemies squirm, who used to jog with the President and
spar with the press, now says the moment when he feels
most in control is when he goes to the hospital for the daily
treatment to fight the tumor in his brain.
"He has said radiation is the one time of the day he's
on the offensive," said Leslie Goodman, Mr. Atwater's press
secretary at the Republican national headquarters,
"because he's doing something that actively contributes to
his wellness."
Being on the offensive is what most of Mr. Atwater's
life has been all about. He brought a relentless, win-at-all-
cost aggressiveness to national politics that thrilled his
Republican followers and infuriated his Democratic
opponents.
But for the first time in his adult life, Mr. Atwater's
central preoccupation is no longer politics. His enemy is
not some Democrat he can slash away at, but a small clus-
ter of errant cells, about a quarter of an inch in diameter,
in the right forward part of his brain.
(1978). The literary themes of Percy's fiction are surveyed in JOHN EDWARD
HARDY, THE FICTION OF WALKER PERCY (1987).
Walker Percy died at his home in Covington, Louisiana, on May 10, 1990.
His unpublished nonfiction essays have been collected in WALKER PERCY, SIGN-
POSTS IN A STRANGE LAND (Patrick Samway ed., 1991).
123. See Paul Gewirtz, A Lawyer's Death, 100 HARv. L. REv. 205 (1987)
(reflecting on The Death of Ivan Ilych and the compartmentalization of our lives).
124. See CAMus, supra note 38; Dawson Martin, The Lawyer as Friend, 32
RUTGERS L. REv. 695 (1979) (drawing on The Fall in essay on the amoral stance
of lawyers).
125. See generallyJOHN JOSEPH BRADY, BAD Boy. THE LIFE AND PoUTIcs OF
LEE ATWATER (1997).
20001
170 NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 14
There is something about Mr. Atwater's situation that
is almost like a novel. At the age of 39 he had become the
dark prince of politics, admired and perhaps feared by
Republican colleagues; disliked and feared by many Demo-
crats. He is one of the youngest Republican national chair-
men in the party's history and a confidant of the President
of the United States, a President he helped elect.
Then, by his own description, Mr. Atwater came sud-
denly "this close to your Maker" when the tumor
announced its presence 25 days ago by causing a seizure as
he was delivering a fund-raising speech.
Everything has changed.
"I fooled myself into thinking I was indestructible," he
told his hometown newspaper....
[One person who visited Atwater reports in summary
fashion that he said], "The normal pettiness that accompa-
nies politics isn't, under normal circumstances, worthy of
very much. In this case it's pretty clearly blown off the
radar."
1 2 6
An earlier article reported that Mr. Atwater's "discovery of a
benign tumor in his brain has caused him to tone down his pit-
bull style of politics":
"I can't imagine me getting back in a fighting mood,"
Mr. Atwater said .... "I don't see how I'm ever going to be
mean."
Mr. Atwater first rose to prominence in South Caro-
lina politics with his aggressive, and negative, style of poli-
tics. He achieved nationwide fame with negative tactics
that he successfully used in George Bush's Presidential
campaign in 1987.
"It's going to be hard for me to be as tough on peo-
ple," he said ... in the interview over his automobile tele-
phone. Mr. Atwater talked on his way to the hospital for
his daily radiation treatment, which is intended to shrink
the olive-size tumor.
"What I'm going to do is take a new approach to how I
proceed, because politics is people. I've always loved peo-
ple. But I have a better sense of humanity, a better sense
of fellowship with people than I've ever had before.
126. Michael Oreskes, For Atwater of the G.O.P., Illness Is Now the Enemy,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 31, 1990, at A7.
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"Forget money and power," Mr. Atwater said. "I had
no idea how wonderful people are. I wish I had known this
before. What a way to find out."
"Seventy percent of the things I was frantically pursu-
ing didn't matter anyhow," Mr. Atwater said.
When it was suggested that he sounded like an entirely
different person, Mr. Atwater replied: "I'm the same guy.
You're seeing a guy who just stared right into the abyss.
Things I didn't think about too much are now important,
and that's human relationships and the love of a lot of peo-
ple, and how valuable they are."
"This whole experience has taught me something new
about love and mankind in general," Mr. Atwater said.
1 2 7
When we stay on well-worn paths, follow established, conven-
tional maps, we expect to end up at destinations we have chosen.
We assume that being practical and realistic and responding to
the demands of the Real World is all we need to succeed. Those
who adapt to this Real World not only accede to Necessity but do
so with pride; those who call themselves Realists assume that
their compromises and middle-way,1 28 avoids extremes and lends
authority to their moderation. They speak in authoritative tones
about "being realistic." They assume, sometimes rather righ-
teously, that their map of ordinary reality is Reality. And so it is
that we forget that even well-worn paths can lead us astray.
Charles Reich, in The Sorcerer of Bolinas Reef, says, "I was amazingly
wrong in the assumption I made. I took pride in being as realis-
tic as possible, but to a large extent I ended up misdirecting my
energy, being concerned with the wrong things, spending years
attempting to master the wrong curriculum." '12 9 If the well-worn
path led to gold, everyone would be rich. The one feature on
the common-sense map of reality most likely to be obscured is
the warning sign: Success has its costs. Hardball players like Lee
Atwater learn, but late and the hard way, that the route they fol-
low, leads to no paradise.
127. Tumor Seems to Mellow G.O.P. Chief, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17, 1990, at A8.
128. Realists fit everything, including good and bad, and extremes of
every dualistic sort, on a continuum, avoiding polarities like reason and passion,
masculine and feminine, objective and subjective, self and other, science and
religion.
129. CH-ARLES REICH, THE SORCERER OF BOLINAS REEF 20 (1977).
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IX. MYrHS THAT LocATE MoRAL DiscouRsE
We readily assume that we are ethical, assured that we know
the source of our ethics. We say of ethics-it is a matter of child-
hood and growing up, lessons learned from parents, following
time-honored principles, knowing right from wrong. We claim
ethics to be the seamless and inevitable translation of experience
into character.
Ethics does indeed have much to do with how (and where)
we were reared as children, how we were loved and cared for,
neglected or abandoned, and how the trust we learned to place
in ourselves and others has been reciprocated. We see ourselves
as moral persons because we have a history, a story-shaped,
parented past.
Others contend that, yes, while we certainly got our ethics as
children, ethics has a still more distant origin. Ethics emerges
from conventions and traditions of a community of people. Eth-
ics is what we get from being embedded in an already existing
tradition and culture. 130 We take on and adopt ethical roles in
dramas that are socially and culturally scripted, dramas already
ongoing. We inhabit, in this view of the source of ethics, a moral
world that predates personal experience.13" '
When we think about lawyer ethics and whether our efforts
to talk about ethics has any bearing on the way we live, we are
130. Michael J. Perry makes the point this way:
One of the most important sources of one's moral beliefs is certain
other person's experience-trusted others on whom one does and
must rely, in particular the moral community and tradition in which
one participates. By moral community I mean, in this context, a
group of persons who are the present bearers of, and participants in, a
moral tradition. By moral tradition I mean a particular history or nar-
rative in which the central motif is an aspiration to a particular form of
life, to certain ideals and goals, and the central discourse is an argu-
ment-in Alasdair Maclntyre's terms, "an historically extended,
socially embodied argument"-about how that form of life is to be
cultivated and revised.... Basic moral beliefs-deeply satisfying-are
less the property of individuals than of communities.
PERRY, supra note 65, at 29. It is, I think, this desire to see the lawyer as a part of
tradition and community that underlies so much of the work of Thomas Shaf-
fer. See, e.g., THOMAS L. SHAFER, AMERCAN LAwYvRs & THEIR COMMUNrnES:
ETHICS IN THE LEGAL PROFESSION (1991).
131. My own view is that ethics can no more lie in the remoteness of
childhood than in the immediacy of an ahistorical, unstoried present. The his-
torically formed character and the character of the moment are contingent,
each on the other.
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likely to confront what might be called an ethics origin myth. 13 2
One origin myth for ethics envisions a distant past (of some
greater or fewer years), a time of great simplicity when we found
right and wrong sharply delineated, when there was greater cer-
tainty about how one was to pursue a worthwhile life. In this
time now past, people had a more definitive sense of who they
were, what they were meant to do, how meaningful work was to
proceed, and how their lives were to unfold. Life had purpose
and meaning, restricted and confined, labored and painful, as it
may have been. This was a time when "tacit knowledge"' 3 and
practical affairs were conjoined, when moral knowledge served
the practical affairs of everyday life and knowledge was directly
linked to survival. What we did not know (and there was a
greater sense then that there was much we did not and perhaps
could not know) we left to the province of religion and fate,
which themselves gave rise to bodies of practical knowledge.
Those who accept this myth as an origin for ethics see our
movement over time as a decline. The myth leaves us longing for
the once good world, buying into an all-consuming busyness
even as we seek escape (and redemption) from our headlong
rush toward the future, as we try to sort through the muddles and
confusions of modern life. The task of ethics in this myth is that
of recovery, a battle to reclaim the sensibilities of a lost world in
which moral sentiments and stature provided safe haven.
A second, sharply contrasting mythic account of the origin
of ethics sees our movement over historical time as marked by
progress. The nostalgia for a lost paradise (and the yearning for
it) is viewed as folly, a kind of backward look that impedes our
confident embrace of the future. The past, rather than a time of
desirable moral certainty was, according to the myth of moral
progress, a time of great turmoil and savage indifference to
human suffering, a time when the first law was the law of the
jungle. The most dominant ethic in this vision of the past was
the will to survive. Necessities of survival left most human beings
indifferent to the nuances of ethics. In the far reaches of this
past, waking life was spent protecting ourselves from enemies
and dealing with the forces of nature. We feared the wrath of
distant gods and experienced everyday existence as brute destiny.
Human energies and imagination were summoned as allies
132. "There is some profound link, it seems between the story of a man's
life and the story of his world. The story of his world is his myth, the story in
which he lives, the greater story that encompasses the story of his life." DUNNE,
supra note 39, at 50.
133. On tacit knowledge, see MICHAEL PoLANyi, THE TACIT DIMENSION
(1967).
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against myriad fates that threatened to engulf and destroy as
often as they provided solace and comfort.
The moral bottom line in the myth of progress: we are less
brutish today because moral reckoning has slowly replaced the
law of the jungle. Ethics (and the social institutions and psycho-
logical changes that make ethics possible) has, ever so slowly,
transformed an ethic of survival into an ethic of human and
moral progress. Ethics celebrates the growing development of
human civilization.
Moral discourse is shadowed by contrasting myths of decline
and progress. These myths, one or the other (or still another),
appear as substrata in our conversations about who we are today,
and how the moral conditions of our own time, and our sense of
hope or futility about the evolution of a moral universe, plays out
in the practice of law. We rely upon myth to rationalize the
moral skepticism found in law school classrooms; myth is
required of those who set themselves against the practices of
extreme adversarial zeal. We lawyers are, for good and ill,
stranded in a world refracted through the prism of mythic stories
of moral progress and moral decline.
Whether the ethics we claim for ourselves emerges from a
nostalgic or barbarous past, we seem to have settled for a mud-
dled, modern, middle-ground, a myth of ethical mythlessness.
"It is too late to learn ethics." "Ethics can't be taught." "Moral
discourse is futile. No one changes their mind when we talk eth-
ics." "Ethics gives me a headache." We find no reason to talk
ethics, reflect on our moral fate, and see no future in making
ethics a central concern of professional life. We locate ethics in
the realm of individual privacy, or we sanitize ethics in a technol-
ogy of bureaucratized quasi-ethical rules. We demand that law-
yer ethics be reduced to law. The rationality of legalism seeks to
displace the mystery of ethics, even as our ethics become more
perplexing.
X. CuRiosIrY AND COURAGE
To confront the conventional disdain for ethics and the
myth of mythlessness requires courage and curiosity. It takes
courage to face ourselves and others squarely, honestly, and
truthfully. It takes courage to confront not only the powerful in
society but also the powerful ways we deceive ourselves. It takes
courage to confront and undo self-deception. And courage, like
any virtue, cannot stand alone. Courage requires curiosity (and
humility, and empathy, and...). Curiosity is a spur to courage, a
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magnetic pull into the ethical labyrinth of law work. Curiosity
fuels the desire to know how ethics works.
Curiosity has two archaic meanings that provide insight into
ethical inquiry. With its etymological roots in the Middle French
curios, Latin curiosus and cura, curiosity suggests both care as well
as "undue nicety or fastidiousness, inquisitiveness" and "a blama-
ble desire to seek knowledge (as of sacred matters)."134 The
archaic meanings of curiosity stand in contrast to its more mod-
ern definition: the desire to investigate and learn, inquisitiveness
about others' concerns. Curiosity, with its definitional matrix of
archaic and contemporary, virtue (inquisitiveness, care) and vice
(unwarranted prying, fastidiousness), compels ethical inquiry.
To be curious implies an eagerness to learn. Curiosity, man-
ifested as the desire to know, is associated with those who seek
excellence (or Quality), and excellence is always laced with a sub-
strata of moral understanding. To know any subject well, and
one's relation to it, there must be an inquisitiveness about the
ideals, virtues, and moral features that make the subject compel-
ling, that have given it a shape and a history. Curiosity is accom-
panied by the ever-present danger of "objectionable intrusiveness
or officiousness." For the ethically curious there is always that
"habitual impertinent curiosity ... about things secret or unre-
vealed. . . ." Our curiosity is always shadowed by an association
with prying and an "officious or busy meddling esp[ecially] in
personal affairs."1"5 We shy away from ethical matters because-we
don't want people (even the most well intentioned) prying into
our lives. (We all know what it means to have prying, meddle-
some neighbors, parents, friends, or colleagues.)
Courage and curiosity play themselves out in rather interest-
ing ways in legal education. Those who successfully undertake
the arduous work of legal education are acclaimed "good stu-
dents." Yet, some of us find the acclaimed to be thoroughly
deceived by their success. Richard Rodriguez, in The Hunger of
Memory, describes a student-himself-he calls a "scholarship
boy.""3 6 This student learns to mimic his teachers and receive
praise for the work he produces. 37 The "scholarship boy" is,
however, not a good student at all. "He relies on his teacher,
depends on all that he hears in the classroom and reads in his
134. All quoted phrases are from WEBSTER'S SEVENTH NEW COLLEGIATE
DICTIONARY 204 (1967) [hereinafter WEBSTER'S].
135. Id.
136. RICHARD RODRIGUEZ, THE HUNGER OF MEMORY 46-73 (1983).
137. I suspect that legal educators recognize as good students those who
are good in a rather limited sense.
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books. He becomes in every obvious way the worst student, a
dummy mouthing the opinions of others."138
The narrator in Robert Pirsig's Zen and the Art of Motorcycle
Maintenance, a teacher, comments on a different kind of student,
one who has lost his curiosity and certainly has no desire to be
like his teacher. "At first he thought it was laziness but later it
became apparent that it wasn't. They just couldn't think of any-
thing to say."139 Pirsig describes the teacher's "sinking feeling"
when a student, assigned to write a five-hundred word essay, took
as a topic, the United States. The student was encouraged to nar-
row her topic to Bozeman, Montana, where the university was
located:
When the paper came due she didn't have it and was
quite upset. She had tried and tried but she just couldn't
think of anything to say.
He had already discussed her with her previous
instructors and they'd confirmed his impressions of her.
She was very serious, disciplined and hardworking, but
extremely dull. Not a spark of creativity in her anywhere.
Her eyes, behind the thick-lensed glasses, were the eyes of
a drudge. She wasn't bluffing him, she really couldn't
think of anything to say, and was upset by her inability to
do as she was told.
It just stumped him. Now he couldn't think of any-
thing to say. A silence occurred, and then a peculiar
answer: "Narrow it down to the main street of Bozeman." It
was a stroke of insight.
She nodded dutifully and went out. But just before
her next class she came back in real distress, tears this time,
distress that had obviously been there for a long time. She
still couldn't think of anything to say, and couldn't under-
stand why, if she couldn't think of anything about all of
Bozeman, she should be able to think of something about
just one street.
He was furious. "You're not looking." he said .... For
every fact there is an infinity of hypotheses. The more you
look the more you see. She really wasn't looking and yet
somehow didn't understand this.
He told her angrily, "Narrow it down to the front of one
building on the main street of Bozeman. The Opera
House. Start with the upper left-hand brick." 4 °
138. RODRIGUEZ, supra note 136, at 67.
139. PIRSIG, supra note 43, at 190.
140. Id. at 190-91.
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The student, as she was about to complete the essay, said of
her experience: "I sat in the hamburger stand across the street
• . .and started writing about the first brick, and the second
brick, and then by the third brick it all started to come and I
couldn't stop." '141 The student rediscovered her curiosity, but she
needed an impetus and a method to do it.
It will take curiosity and courage (and some curious teach-
ers) to talk about lawyers and their ethics in law schools as they
are presently constituted. Is it not courage one needs to partici-
pate in a conversation that comes all too quickly back around to
the ethics not of lawyers in general, but to the ethics each of us
brings to the profession?142  Is there not some curiosity
demanded of those who must square an adversarial ethic with the
ordinary ethics we have in place when we take up the study of
law? It takes both courage and curiosity to explore the gap and
the dissonance of actions and images, our pronouncements
about adversarial zeal and the moral characters we purport to
have.
To figure out how the ethics we have already got works and
how the ethics we take on as lawyers can be reconciled with who
we already are (and seek to be) is a heady task. We will need
curiosity about ideals and ethics and how they are to be lived in a
hostile world. We need curiosity about ourselves, about our
hopes and fears, curiosity about how ethical life works and how it
fails. We must have the courage to listen.
XI. EDUCATING FAILURE
A profession like law draws the reflective and the unreflec-
tive, those willing to examine the moral fabric of their lives and
those who see such examination as nonsense and folly. It draws
both those capable of doing good and those who don't intend to
let the search for the good by others slow them down in getting
what they want out of life. In such a world, moral discourse pro-
ceeds with difficulty, looming always at the edge of failure.
Ethics reintroduces us to the experience of failure in profes-
sional life; it calls us to do an honest accounting of what we are
not.143 Seymour Wishman tells a story of failure and the atrophy
141. Id. at 191.
142. When we take up ethics, reflect on the character of ethics lived
around us, we must inevitably say something about ourselves and our own char-
acter. We must, it seems, also say something about our curiosity about ethics
and the ideals and pathologies we see associated with the adversarial ethic.
143. For an earlier effort to reflect on the role of failure in professional
life, see James R. Elkins, Ethics: Professionalism, Craft, and Failure, 73 Ky. LJ. 937
(1984-85).
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of his moral sensibilities. Bowen McCoy experienced failure in
both his own personal response and that of his climbing group
when confronted with a fragile sadhu. We can learn from such
failures and the pathologies (or what Jung would call the
shadow)144 they represent, or we can deny they have ethical
significance.
When we take up ethics, we can expect failure, and the fail-
ure is experienced firsthand when we try to re-imagine an adver-
sarial ethic lived as a virtuous life.' 4 5 A sense of failure follows our
talk of ethics, a history of failure that begins with Socrates (a fail-
ure that resulted in Socrates' death). But we must attempt, with
Wishman and McCoy, and other teachers, to confront and learn
from failure, but to do so, we must be willing to see failure as a
problem of professional life.' 4 6
Ethics talk does not, in and of itself, magically produce reso-
lute moral sensibilities or rid the world of amoral lawyers. Such
an admission turns ethics talk somber and lends support to those
who insist that ethics talk (if not all of ethics) is a futile endeavor.
Suspicions about ethics talk are confirmed when moral dis-
course, with its twists and turns, discomforts and anxieties, confu-
sions and perplexities, leads us in circles and produces no ready
answers.
The folk wisdom about moral failure is democratic and sim-
ple: we all suffer them.1 47 Some of us run from them, hide and
cover them up, and sometimes lie about them.1 4 We know mis-
144. See ROBERT BLY, A LITrLE BOOK ON THE HUMAN SHADOW (William
Booth ed., 1988); THE SHADOW IN AMERICA: RECLAIMING THE SOUL OF A NATION
(Jeremiah Abrams ed., 1994); James R. Elkins, Pathologizing Professional Life:
Psycho-Literary Case Stories, 18 VER. L. Rav. 581 (1994).
145. There are serious obstacles to an inquiry into the moral character
that lawyers take on in their zealous pursuit of client interests, obstacles which
must be addressed in the conversation ethics. Obstacles to moral discourse can
be found in the classroom (the legal ethics course is a curricula stepchild,
unwanted, unloved), in legal education (there is disagreement about the role
of morals and ethics in the practice of law), and in culture (moral relativism
when allowed to run rampant can make moral discourse difficult). More basi-
cally, it is legal discourse, and the legal persona, and our love affair with an
unbounded adversarial ethic that perverts and derails our conversation about
lawyer ethics.
146. See, e.g., Robert Coles, Legal Ethics: The Question of Principalities and
Powers, 21 Bos. COL. L. REv. 1017 (1980).
147. "In all lives there are serious moral failures; we fail to recognize this
because many such failures are unspectacular and hence are not noticed widely,
and perhaps are not noticed even by those committing them." GLENN TINDER,
AGAINST FATE: AN ESSAY ON PERSONAL DIGNITY 138 (1981).
148. On the various forms and shapes of these lies, see SISSELA BOK,
LYING: MORAL CHOICE IN PUBLIC AND PRIvATE LIFE (1978).
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takes are hard to admit, so hard that how we deal with them
becomes an integral part of our character. We try to care for
others, avoid harm, and do good work. But then, there is a mis-
take. We ignore one for whom we have responsibility to care.
Someone under our care is harmed. It is difficult to admit some-
thing has gone wrong. We abhor the thought of personal failure.
When ethics introduces the reality of failure, we cannot always
expect the messenger to be treated well. It takes real courage to
look, without despair, at the pathologies we develop as lawyers.' 4 9
Honesty hurts, but without honesty about failure we become
deluded about the quality and meaning of our work. Work
uneducated in failure is dishonest.1
50
Failure and the dark days of confusion and despair that
accompany it bring honesty to craft and truth to professionalism.
The truth of failure takes us back to the beginning, endowing the
high rhetoric of professionalism with the grounded humility
appropriate to a craft. With failure we are reintroduced to a new
way of seeing our work, a new truth about work. James Hillman,
writing about failure (calling it pathology), suggests that "it's
there all the time! The pathology [failure] is the place that
keeps the person in the soul, the torment, that twist that you
can't simply be naive, you can't simply go along in a natural way,
that there's something broken, twisted, hurting, that forces con-
stant reflection-and work. . .."1
When we stay close to the pathologies and failures of our
work, we see the soul of work, what makes it human, the heart of
it, and its dark shadow side. Without a sense of failure we are
unprepared for the tragic dimension of professional life. 15 2 The
149. See BENJAMIN SELLS, THE SOUL OF THE LAW (1994).
150. Carla Needleman says of craft, that it becomes an education in fail-
ure, an education that helps us see failure in what we do and how our attitude
toward failure affects what we make and the lives we live. See CARLA NEEDLEMAN,
THE WORK OF CRAFT: AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE OF CRAFTS AND CRAFTSMAN-
SHIP 15 (1979).
151. JAMES HILLMAN, INTER VIEwS 23 (1982).
152. Consider the following comments about the worm in the lawyer's
apple:
But the lawyer is always in a hurry; there is the water of clepsydra driv-
ing him on.... He is a servant, and is continually disputing about a
fellow-servant before his master, who is seated, and has the cause in his
hands; the trial is never about some indifferent matter, but always con-
cerns himself; and often the race is for his life. The consequence has
been, that he has become keen and shrewd; he has learned how to
flatter his master in word and indulge him in deed; but his soul is
small and unrighteous ... from the first he has practiced deception
and retaliation, and has become stunted and warped. And so he has
passed out of youth into manhood, having no soundness in him; and
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failure of professionals, and of professionalism itself, is no secret,
so an education in failure honestly accounts for what we know
about professionalism.
153
An education in professional failure teaches caution about
the rhetoric of success and how it provides a convenient "cover
story" for our work.15 4 Success blinds us to an ethic of work that
encourages deception and silence. Without the perspective of
failure, attending to work from the dark side up, we are in dan-
ger of misreading the text of our own life and the life of the work
we do. By turning the world of success on its head, seeking an
education from stories of mistakes and failure, wrong turns, poor
attitudes, confusion, anger, and disappointments, we make our
work lives more honest and truthful. 5 5 There is something of
value buried in the rubbish of our mistakes and failures-a rec-
ord and a truthfulness about who we are and what we do. If the
present legal culture did not lead us astray, if legal thinking did
not impede our memory and encourage self-deception, we would
have less need for ethics than we do. Ethics confronts us with the
promised but unlived and we cannot know this truth without suf-
fering. "We come to the truth only through suffering and
anguish, so that in order to recognize the truth we must be
drawn from our comfortable and self-contained worlds of
illusion." '56
is now, as he thinks, a master in wisdom. Such is the lawyer,
Theodorus....
MARTIN MAYER, THE LAWYERS 4 (1967) (quoting Plato) (alteration in original).
The [lawyer] role itself requires certain dispositions to guile, aggres-
sion, and instrumental behavior. The problem is that such disposi-
tions eventually become settled traits of character and thus change the
person who performs the role.
David Luban, Introduction to THE GOOD LAWYER, supra note 98, at 18.
153. Wendell Berry, a Kentucky farmer, novelist, essayist, and poet
reminds us that "no ideal is invalidated by anyone's or everyone's failure to live
fully up to it." WENDELL BERRY, STANDING By WORDS 100 (1983).
154. "At bottom, ours is a society built on individualism, competition, and
success. These values bring great personal freedom and mobilize powerful
energies. At the same time, they arouse great temptations to shoulder aside
one's competitors, to cut corners, to ignore the interests of others in the strug-
gle to succeed." Derek Bok, A Flawed System of Law Practice and Training, 33J.
LEGAL EDuc. 570, 575 (1983).
155. We soon realize the success we seek, but, in reaching the destina-
tion, we have lost something along the way. We get what we most want and find
it empty. The result is burnout, depression and numbness.
156. STANLEY HAUERWAS, VISION AND VIRTUE: ESSAYS IN CHRISTIAN ETHICAL
REFLECrION 47 (1981). Jules Henry observes:
For most of us, our abilities, our good looks and our social tech-
niques-our pleasant, public-relations hellos, our ability to laugh at
anybody's jokes, our capacity to hold conventional opinions and to
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But who among us has an appreciation for discomfort, anxi-
ety, confusion, failure? Taught to treat symptoms out of exist-
ence, we assume moral well-being to be the absence of symptoms.
But just as the symptoms of psychological and physical disorder
have a positive function, so too do the symptoms of discomfort
when we engage in moral discourse. Adrienne Rich observes:
In every life there are experiences, painful and at first
disorienting, which by their very intensity throw a sudden
floodlight on the ways we have been living, the forces that
control our lives, the hypocrisies that have allowed us to
collaborate with those forces, the harsh but liberating facts
we have been enjoined from recognizing. Some people
allow such illuminations only the brevity of a flash of sheet-
lighting, that throws a whole landscape into sharp relief,
after which the darkness of denial closes in again. For
others, these clarifications provide a motive and impulse
toward a more enduring lucidity, a search for greater hon-
esty, and for the recognition of larger issues of which our
personal suffering is a symptom, a specific example.
5 7
Moral discourse, when it intrudes into the domain of legal
discourse, is just the experience Rich describes, "painful and at
first disorienting" because it "throw[s] a sudden floodlight on
the ways we have been living, the forces that control our lives, the
hypocrisies that have allowed us to collaborate with those forces,
the harsh but liberating facts we have been enjoined from recog-
nizing." These lines say much about our lives as lawyers. There
is, as best I know, no way to take up ethics and no ethical life that
allows us to escape the perplexity of moral discourse, the cul-de-
sacs, box-canyons, and washed-out trails we find evidenced in our
efforts to talk about our ethics as lawyers.
** *
Law, legal education, and the legal profession, are perme-
ated with stories of success and failure.15 s How could it be other-
wise? Failure and success are linked archetypal themes at the
never value or fight for any position in an argument too much-never
seem quite adequate to ward off all the charges of failure.
JuLEs HENRY, ON SHAM, VULNERABILrIY AND OTHER FoRMs OF SELF-DESTRUCTION
90 (1973).
157. ADRIENNE RICH, ON LIES, SECRETS, AND SILENCE: SELECTED PROSE
1966-1978 215 (1979).
158. SeeJASPERS, supra note 65, at 23:
Crucial for man is his attitude toward failure; whether it remains hid-
den from him and overwhelms him only objectively at the end or
whether he perceives it unobscured as the constant limit of his exist-
ence; whether he snatches at fantastic solutions and consolations or
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heart of any heroic quest. Consider, for example, Cinderella and
her education in winning and losing as she experiences failure
upon failure and then a stunning "success." The lasting impres-
sion we have of Cinderella is her unqualified success. Our mem-
ory of Cinderella, her purported rescue by a prince, and our
desire to believe that good has prevailed, a remembering of the
story that obliterates the pain of Cinderella's suffering and the
fact that we know nothing of Cinderella's future life with the
prince.
In Greek mythology we find the story of Icarus, another
story of archetypal failure. Daedalus, Icarus's father, had
befriended the king, but out of favor had been held prisoner,
with his son Icarus, in a tower.
Daedalus contrived to make his escape from his
prison, but could not leave the island by sea, as the king
kept strict watch on all the vessels, and permitted none to
sail without being carefully searched. "Minos may control
the land and sea," said Daedalus, "but not the regions of
the air. I will try that way." So he set to work to fabricate
wings for himself and his young son Icarus. He wrought
feathers together, beginning with the smallest and adding
larger, so as to form an increasing surface. The larger ones
he secured with thread and the smaller ones with wax, and
he gave the whole a gentle curvature like the wings of a
bird.
Daedalus equipped both himself and his son with a
pair of these bird-like wings and taught his son how to use
them to fly. When all was prepared for flight, he said, "Ica-
rus, my son, I charge you to keep at a moderate height, for
if you fly too low, the damp will clog your wings, and if too
high, the heat will melt them. Keep near me and you will
be safe." While he gave him these instructions and fitted
the wings to his shoulders, the face of the father was wet
with tears, and his hands trembled. He kissed the boy, not
knowing that it was the last time. Then rising on his wings,
he flew off, encouraging him to follow, and looked back
from his own flight to see how his son managed his
wings .... They passed Samos and Delos on the left and
Lebynthos on the right, when the boy, exulting in his
career, began to leave the guidance of his companion and
soar upward as if to reach heaven. The nearness of the
blazing sun softened the wax which held the feathers
faces it honestly in silence before the unfathomable. The way in which
man approaches his failure determines what he will become.
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together, and they came off. He fluttered with his arms,
but no feathers remained to hold the air. While his mouth
uttered cries to his father it was submerged in the blue
waters of the sea, which thenceforth was called by his
name.
159
Our problem, as for Icarus, is that our ideals, often enough
untried and untested, are, as law teachers take pride in demon-
strating, little more than pretense and facade. An ideal claimed,
but not lived, is pretense. (The ideals that law students assert in
the classroom-the ethic they defend-are naive only because
they have not been lived.) High exalted hopes and longing for
greatness are shadowed by the looming (but denied) danger of a
"fall," an Icarus descent into a world that defeats us."r
XII. APPEARANCE AND REALITY
The tension between appearance and reality, fundamental
to our efforts to understand success and failure, can be traced to
the classical Greek philosophers who were concerned with "real
and false philosophers, statesmen and tyrants, unjust men who
seem just." '6 ' The appearance/reality, success/failure problem
159. THOMAS BULFINCH, THE OUTLINE OF MYrHOLOGY 156-57 (1913).
160. Paul Diel observes that "[e]very man who is comparable to Icarus by
his elevation" and "vainly exalted spiritual effort" [read professionalism] "finds
not the satisfaction he had imagined, but disappointment...." PAUL DIEL, SYM-
BOLISM IN GREEK MYTHOLOGY. HUMAN DESIRE AND ITS TRANSFORMATIONS 35
(1980).
161. Warren Lehman, Finding Our Way Back, 29 Am. J. Juus. 229 (1984)
(review essay). Richard Mitchell points out that Socrates talked about "the dif-
ference between being good and seeming good." RCHARD MITCHELL, THE GIr
oF FIRE 96 (1987). Mitchell suggests, "[i]t is obviously possible that the outward
appearance of goodness is a sign of inward goodness, but it is just as possible
that it is not. As to which is which, experience is a remarkably poor teacher."
Id. Jacob Needleman argues:
[It is the "power" of Socratic conversation] to penetrate, again and
again, behind the world of appearances; the world of emotional
appearances as well as the world of perceptual appearances-that is,
the world as I like it or dislike it, the world to which I am attached in
my emotions, the world of my emotions. To penetrate beyond the
world of appearances means to destroy my beliefs, my opinions, my
certainties not only about objects, but about myself.
JACOB NEEDLEMAN, THE HEART OF PHILOSOPHY 24 (1982).
We get beyond appearances by a process of "uncovering" presumptions
that lurk in our thinking:
[B]y analyzing conceded judgments we go back to their presupposi-
tions. We operate regressively from the consequences to the reason.
In this regression we eliminate the accidental facts to which the partic-
ular judgment relates and by this separation bring into relief the origi-
nally obscure assumption that lies at the bottom of the judgment on
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stalks our lawyer ethics talk. If the purpose of ethics talk is to
shore up the public image of lawyers, to hold ourselves out to the
world to be something we are not, to deny the moral fault lines
that appear in our work, then ethics talk is little more than an
organized effort to shore up an appearance.1 6 2 Albert Camus'
The Fall explores this terrain.1 6 3 The protagonist of the novel,
Jean-Baptiste Clamence, a Parisian lawyer, passes his time in an
Amsterdam bar recounting a life in which he assumed himself to
be one kind of person, while the life he was actually living pro-
duced a strikingly different person. Clamence describes, in lav-
ish detail, an imagined life as a virtuous lawyer. Then, in a
chilling self-dissection of that appearance, Clamence makes clear
that his virtue was a facade." 4 Clamence's righteous allegiance to
virtue convinced him he was a superior man, above and beyond
judgment. Clamence says of himself, "I have never felt comforta-
ble except in lofty places. Even in the details of daily life, I need
to feel above."1 65 To feel superior, Clamence practices virtue as a
style, and disguise. He later confesses that "style, like sheer silk,
too often hides eczema."1 66 Clamence is, simply put, a hypocrite.
A hypocrite (Greek hypocrite, actor) holds forth as having virtues
or qualities she does not have; a hypocrite is a dissembler, a
fake. 167
the concrete instance. The regressive method of abstraction, which
serves to disclose philosophical principles, produces no new knowl-
edge either of facts or of laws. It merely utilizes reflection to trans-
form into clear concepts what reposed in our reason as an original
possession and made itself obscurely heard in every individual
judgment.
LEONARD NELSON, SOCRATIC METHOD AND CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY 10 (Thomas K.
Brown trans., 1965).
162. See HUANCHU DAOREN, BACK TO BEGINNINGS: REFLECTIONS ON THE
TAO 64 (Thomas Cleary trans., 1990):
Diligence means to be keen in matters of virtue and justice, but
worldly people use diligence to solve their economic difficulties. Fru-
gality means to have little desire for material goods, but worldly peo-
ple use frugality as a cover for stinginess. Thus do watchwords of
enlightened life turn into tools for the private business of small peo-
ple. What a pity!
163. See CAMus, supra note 38.
164. On the use of Jean-Baptiste Clamence as a reflective mirror for our
own character, see Martin, supra note 124.
165. CAucus, supra note 38, at 23.
166. Id at 6.
167. Hypocrisy takes its meaning from the Greek word hypokrisis, an act
taken on by playing a part on the stage. See WEBSTER'S, supra note 134, at 410.
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The hypocrite in "[e]very age, every form of literature, and
every public stage has [been] held . . . up for contempt and
ridicule." '16 8
[The moral hypocrite] pretends that his motives and
intentions and character are irreproachable when he
knows that they are blameworthy. Then there are compla-
cency and self-satisfaction, the hypocrisies of the wealthy
and powerful who are so well able "to bear the misery of
others without a murmur." Whatever is in their interest
somehow is always also for the public good, in this best of
all possible social worlds. There is, finally, a cluster of atti-
tudes which taken together we call insincerity and
inauthenticity. These need not express themselves in con-
duct that injures others directly, but they are said to
deform one's personality. Any attempt to hide one's feel-
ings, every social formality, role, or ritual, even failures to
recognize one's character and possibilities are called acts
of hypocrisy or self-betrayal. Here the very act of playing a
part at all is utterly condemned.
169
We have, one fears, come to accept, in both ourselves and
others, the hypocrisy Shklar describes. Even though hypocrisy,
modeled ever so blatantly in public life, undermines our aspira-
tion for honesty in private life, Shklar finds political hypocrisy
less pernicious than one might assume. More frankness and pub-
lic sincerity would not, she speculates, be conducive to
democracy.
Would any egalitarian prefer more public frankness?
Should our public conduct really mirror our private, inner
selves? Often our public manners are better than our per-
sonal laxities. That "sugary grin" is, in any case, not a seri-
ous issue. On the contrary, it is a very necessary pretense, a
witness to our moral efforts no less than to our failures.
Indeed, one might well argue that liberal democracy
cannot afford public sincerity. Honesties that humiliate
and a stiff-necked refusal to compromise would ruin demo-
cratic civility in a political society in which people have
many serious differences of belief and interest. Our sense
of public ends is so wavering and elusive because we often
do not even see the same social scene before us. We do
not agree on the facts or figures of social life, and we heart-
ily dislike one another's religious, sexual, intellectual, and
168. JUDITH N. SHKLAR, ORDINARv VICEs 45 (1984).
169. Id. at 47.
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political commitments-not to mention one another's eth-
nic, racial, and class character.
1 70
Shklar concludes that in a liberal society hypocrisy is not viewed
as the ultimate vice for to do so would "entangle us finally in too
much moral cruelty, expose[ us too easily to misanthropy, and
unbalance [ ] our politics.'
71
Shklar's observations about hypocrisy present a dilemma for
lawyer ethics: Can we have an ethics, of lawyering or of public
life, that does not condemn practices we hold to be vices? If we
differ in our visions of reality and in our visions of moral recti-
tude, what kind of professional character can we celebrate?
What character can we condemn? Does moral condemnation
place us in danger of forgetting the folk admonition against the
throwing of stones by those who live in glass houses? If we are all
dwellers in glass houses, how can any one of us condemn the acts
of another? What qualities and abilities of forgiveness do we
need to complement our efforts at witnessing moral failure? If
our "public ends" are, as Shklar contends, "wavering and elu-
sive," and we cannot agree as to the "social scene before us," then
how can ethics talk ever come to any good?
When we talk ethics we need to keep in mind Shklar's cau-
tion about hypocrisy as political vice. We may have ethical sensi-
bilities we are simply not willing to articulate in public. This
reserve about ethics is not only a matter of humility, but an effort
to practice moral tolerance and maintain civility in a world in
which even ethics is contested. We are, as lawyers, political crea-
tures-political actors in a liberal society which holds that there
is not one path, but many paths of rectitude. Ethics teaches how
we sometimes walk the path together, and how we sometimes
walk it alone.
XIII. WHEN WE SOUND LIKE LAwYERs
In becoming lawyers we imagine a world of value and mean-
ing.172 In the struggle to express ideals, beliefs, hopes, fears, and
170, Id. at 78.
171, Id. at 86.
172. See WrrrGENSTEIN, supra note 1, at § 19 ("And to imagine a language
means to imagine a form of life."). Paul Ricoeur has noted that words have a
"militant existence" and that the word "makes something within the world."
Paul Ricoeur, Work and the Word, in EXISTENr IAL PHENOMENOLOGY AND POLIT-
icAL THEORY- A READER 40 (HwaYolJung ed., 1972). "[T]he spoken word is, in
a sense and an authentic sense, an annex of the enterprises of transforming the
human milieu by the human agent." Id. at 40-41. It is with words that we sing
the lament called ethics, that we rehearse alternatives to stale conventions and
static practices that lull us into moral sleep.
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dreams-all the human dimensions of the world of work we take
up-we use language that values, qualifies, and moralizes. In
speaking, we inevitably disclose something about our place in a
world strongly shaped by a lawyering ethos, ethic, and ethics. For
a lawyer, speaking is fundamental; we are advocates paid to speak
for others. Interpreting and manipulating language is play of the
highest kind in a lawyer's "language game." '73 To play this law-
yer's language game you must wear a special mask and take on a
new persona. Basically, law students learn, sometimes slowly and
painfully, sometimes as if born to the task, a linguistic style and
grab-bag of verbal skills associated with legal discourse. In mas-
tery of these verbal skills and legal voice the legal persona
emerges. 
1 74
Lawyers learn, sometimes haphazardly, sometimes methodi-
cally, to speak in a voice that identifies them as lawyers, in ways
that can both disfigure and distinguish us. Listen to lawyers and
judges and law students and you hear Law speak. When lawyers
speak, the sound is funneled through the mask; a persona is
always a shaping of sound and words. In wearing a mask and
speaking through it, a lawyer discovers and makes habitual his
cleverness and his power and his limits. But with any powerfully
clever way of speaking, the lawyer's way of speaking is endan-
gered by the constant undertow of subverting forces. A still
greater danger is that the deep resonance of the legal voice
becomes so alluring and powerful that it dominates and then
seeks to eradicate other voices and other sensibilities of those
who master the voice and then become its servant. 175 In Sey-
173. On language games, see WITrGENSTEIN, supra note 1, at § 7. When
lawyers talk "law talk," lay witnesses call it "legalese." When we hear profession-
als speak in the language idiom of their discipline we call it "jargon." For an
exploration of "law talk," see Mary Jane Morrison, Excursions into the Nature of
Legal Language, 37 CLEv. ST. L. REv. 271 (1989). The jargon of legalese symbol-
izes the impoverished (and fragmentary) ethical scripts we enact with clients
and with each other, scripts that implicate both our character and the character
of law. On the political and ideological character of our attorney-client interac-
tional scripts, see AUSTIN SARAT & WILLIAM FELSTINER, DIVORCE LAWYERS AND
THEIR CLIENTS: POWER AND MEANING IN THE LEGAL PROCESS (1995) (working
with verbatim scripts of lawyer/client conversations). Learning and mastering
the subtleties of legal language is an integral part of the transformation of self
that takes place in legal education.
174. Moral discourse sometimes reveals the remaking of character to fit a
legal persona, a fit that sometimes feels "natural," for others, quite forced.
175. Richard Wasserstrom observes:
[To become a lawyer] is to incorporate within oneself ways of behav-
ing and ways of thinking that shape the whole person. It is especially
hard, if not impossible, because of the nature of the professions, for
one's professional way of thinking not to dominate one's entire adult
2000]
188 NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 14
mour Wishman's story about his "brutal" cross-examination of
Ms. Lewis, we have an account of how that happened and how it
was so subtle, expected, and sanctioned, it could be explained
away, boastfully admitted, and laid to claims of professional
responsibility.
In wearing lawyer masks we do not listen to ourselves and do
not hear the "thick" sound of law in our voices. 176 Speaking
life.... The nature of the professions-the lengthy educational prep-
aration, the prestige and economic rewards, and the concomitant
enhanced sense of self-makes the role of professional a difficult one
to shed even in those obvious situations in which that role is neither
required nor appropriate. In important respects, one's professional
role becomes and is one's dominant role, so that for many persons at
least they become their professional being.
Richard Wasserstrom, Lauyers as Professionals: Some Moral Issues, in PROBLEMS IN
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 2, 14 (Andrew Kaufman ed., 3d ed. 1989).
William 0. Douglas may have captured the existential dimension of the
problem in his decision not to emulate his elders. "I looked around at the
older men in my profession and I knew I didn't want to be like any of them.
They couldn't climb a mountain, couldn't tie a dry fly; they knew nothing about
the world closest to me, the real world, the natural world." WILLIAM 0. DoUG-
LAS, Go EAST YOUNG MAN 156 (1974). There are, of course, lawyers who can tie
dry flies. See, e.g., ANATOMY OF A MURDER (Columbia Pictures, 1959) (depicting
Paul Biegler, a trout-fishing lawyer).
176. In the rites of passage from lay person to lawyer we first become inat-
tentive, and then unconscious of, what is painfully obvious to others. Julius
Getman argues that the "most prevalent mode of expression in legal education
is 'professional voice,' the essence of which is addressing questions of justice
through the analysis of legal rules." Julius Getman, Colloquy: Human Voice in
Legal Discourse, 66 TEX. L. REv. 577 (1988). Getman goes on to point out that
the rhetorical style of this "professional voice" is "formal, erudite, and old-fash-
ioned." Id. at 578.
Its passages often are interspersed with terms of art and Latin phrases,
as through its user were removed from and slightly above the general
concerns of humanity. Indeed, the focus on general rules, which is
one of the contributions of professional voice, ensures the use of lan-
guage that removes some of the feeling and empathy that are part of
ordinary human discourse.
Id. And what do we do with this professional voice we have so painfully learned
to speak? How is it used (and abused)?
Voice is one of the trappings of professionalism. Together with dress,
manner, and support personnel-secretaries, research assistants, peo-
ple to answer phones and to screen the lawyer's time-it serves sym-
bolically to remove the lawyer and the law professor from the concerns
of ordinary people. For this reason, too exclusive a focus on profes-
sional voice is dangerous to the lawyer's psyche.... Professional voice
overemphasizes the importance of sonorous phrasing and suggests
that a lawyer's professional responsibility necessitates responding to
complex emotional situations in terms of abstract rules.
Id. The danger of "professional voice" was suggested earlier by Richard Wasser-
strom when he observed that "the professions tend to have and to develop their
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through a mask, used instrumentally and for dramatic effect, we
train the ear not to hear the "hollow" sound in our boisterous
talk. (Moral talk too can reach for a high ground that empties it
of meaning while making it look and sound suspicious.) When
lawyers speak in a distancing, hollow way, they claim it to be an
integral part of law work, inevitable because lawyers speak not for
themselves but for their clients. To compensate for the cold,
thin, remote sound of Law, lawyers sometimes make great effort
to make their speech more human, to make it appear authentic
and real, as if it emanated from some great collective, authorita-
tive source. Lawyers quote Shakespeare and the Bible and the
Constitution, they mouth cliches and conventions in common
usage, they tell familiar stories, and they do so to translate law
talk into talk we will accept, into words familiar and comforting,
necessary and binding.
Yet, much of the speech of lawyers is scripted and bought,
forced into existence by the quest for profit, by mimicry, by the
desire to win (lawyers often see their work as a game involving
highly skilled players who keep score by their winnings), and by
expediency (saying whatever it takes to get desired results). Of
course, law talk is not always and inevitably impoverished; if it
were, it would threaten its own existence. And yes, there are law-
yers who mean the words they speak, and when they cannot tell
the truth, remain silent. For some, it is apparent when they
speak, they do not have their heart in it. Such a lawyer may
admit to herself that legal versions of truth are sometimes not
good enough and that truth deserves more. A lawyer concerned
about truth pays a price for the disconnect between words and
meaning, self and language. (The truth does not always arrive
postage-paid. There is no free lunch when it comes to truth.)
To remember how we speak and how we sound to others, we
must hear again the sound of our own voice. We must welcome
own special languages" and use these professional languages to depersonalize
the client by the exercise of linguistic "power":
Because the ability to communicate is one of the things that distin-
guishes persons from objects, the inability of the client to communi-
cate with the lawyer in the lawyer's own tongue surely helps to make
the client less than a person in the lawyer's eyes-and perhaps even in
the eyes of the client.
Wasserstrom, Lawyers as Professionals, supra note 99, at 21.
On "voice," see Mari Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and
Reparations, 22 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 323, 324 (1987); Carrie Menkel-Meadow,
Excluded Voices: New Voices in the Legal Profession Making New Voices in the Law, 42
U. MiAmi L. REv. 29 (1987); Frank Michelman, Traces of Self-Government, 100
HARv. L. REv. 4 (1986); Martha Minow, Many Silent Worlds, 9 W. NEw ENG. L.
REv. 197 (1987) (book review).
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the disquietude177 we experience when we hear ourselves given
over to the instrumental voice of the legal mask, a mask we so
eagerly, proudly, and sometimes vainly, wear.
1 78
The lawyer's limited way of speaking (staying in a role, fol-
lowing the script) is at once understandable and often func-
tional. It can also be an expression of power and a rhetorical
stance that muddle one's moral sensibilities. Law, in its objecti-
fying voice, makes it possible to treat others and ourselves as
objects instead of persons,1 79 a voice that can be used to obliter-
ate awareness of the consequences of actions. Seymour
Wishman's humiliation of Ms. Lewis and the "reasons" he
advances for his willful disregard of the truth and Ms. Lewis' dig-
nity, attest to the real possibility of an obliteration of moral con-
sciousness. Wishman, in his representation of the rape
defendant, gave no consideration to the possibility that Ms. Lewis
might be entitled to dignity and respect and failed to consider
that he, as a lawyer, might have a moral or personal duty to treat
her with respect (a duty that could be reconciled with his profes-
sional duty as a diligent, zealous lawyer for his client.) Instead,
Wishman rationalized the humiliation of Ms. Lewis with the
notion that it was not "personal" and indeed, was something he
was trained and professionally mandated to do.
With rationalizations of the sort attempted by Wishman we
begin to believe flat speech is round, that our legal version of
truth is the truth. "It is myjob." "This is what lawyers do." "Eve-
ryone is entitled to a lawyer to help them do what they want to do
so long as it is within the law."180 These are the claims of lawyers
177. Socrates gained a reputation for the disquietude he induced in
those he engaged in conversation. When our conversations turn to ethics and
we use moral discourse to critique legal discourse, we can expect a fair amount
of disquietude. Taught to turn away from trouble, to ignore the symptoms of
disease, ethics demands a contrary impulse, an affection for the symptoms
exposed in ethical inquiry and reflection.
It was the nature of the questions posed by Socrates, as it is the questions
we pose for ourselves, that jostle us out of complacency. On the "new" ques-
tions of philosophical concern posed by Socrates, see LANcER, supra note 27, at
7-10 (arguing the fundamental importance of our questions in contrast to more
widely revered answers). Socrates' "questions centered on what values things
had-whether they were good or evil, in themselves or in relations to other
things, for all men or for few...." Id. at 8. It was the perceived "new quality of
his questions" about value that made them so "disconcerting." Id. at 9.
178. Ethical discourse does not lend itself to the "cool," dispassionate,
problem-solving language we prize so highly in law.
179. See JOHN T. NOONAN, PERSONS AND MASKS OF THE LAW: CARDOZO,
HOLMES, JEFFERSON AND WYTIHE AS MAKERS OF THE MASK (1976).
180. In the public conversation about lawyer ethics an astounding pan-
theon of lawyer stereotypes is exposed. We need to take these lawyer stereo-
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and students of law. Empowered with a legal voice, these justifi-
cations are spoken with authoritative (and dismissive) clarity.
This sound of authority, indiscriminately made available to cli-
ents who pursue morally questionable ends, can be used tojustify
(legally) what is unworthy, unfair, and destructive. Lawyers learn
to use their legal voice to defend clients; they learn just enough
of the rhetoric of ethics to defend themselves.
One way to hear our own voice is to become conscious of
those times when the legal voice fails, when legal speech is used
to ignore pain, suffering, and violence. Learn what emperors
give up to be emperors; learn what persons give up to be law-
yers. 8 ' It is convenient to deny and painful to remember.' Even
more frightening, we deny the loss, and when it cannot be
denied we simply revalue how the loss might have mattered to us.
We dress the legal emperor in clothes that only other lawyers can
see. 182 Watch the nude emperor and listen to the many ways he
has learned to disguise his legal voice.
There are times, are there not, when the language of legal
discourse is inadequate to express who we are and the realities
that must be reconciled? At times, the law speaks in a shrill,
remote, abstract voice; at other times it is a voice that purports to
speak for history, for logic, for reality. But listen closely and
there is often a disembodied ring to the voice in which the lan-
guage of law is spoken. Law teachers promote this disembodied
voice when they offer a role, a new identity, and an ethic that
segregates ordinary notions of morality and language and feeling
from the many human skills, non-legal knowledge, psychological
strategies, and human sentiments we need as lawyers. We learn
by authority of teachers to accept and trust the virtuous necessity
types seriously and be attentive to how they are "voiced." The "voices" that
appear in moral discourse are real; they have a life of their own. We must
understand them or they will consume us.
Stereotypical explanations and justifications for the adversarial ethic are
"voiced" because they are inexorably linked to the various scripted roles we
accept as lawyers. The law school course in legal ethics is a good place to
examine the cliches used to justify and perpetuate these "voices." Some of us
are comfortable speaking conventional verities; others are not. Some students
of ethics learn by actively participating in class, some persist within the bell jar
of silence. Those who speak reveal in their "voice" a distinct persona.
181. There are differences in emperors, as in lawyers. One feature com-
mon to both is the struggle with power and authority. For different approaches
to the psychological dynamic of authority and power relevant to moral dis-
course, see RICHARD SENNETr, AUTHORITY (1981); ZALEZNIK & KETS DE VRIES,
supra note 76.
182. One way we defend against critics of the legal profession is with the
self-assured belief that outsiders do not see and understand how our ethics as
lawyers work.
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of a legal voice.18 There is a danger that we let this legal voice
sound in all our relations, in inappropriate places and questiona-
ble ways, and ultimately let it reshape the images we have of our-
selves and others. We need ethics talk and moral discourse to
direct attention to other voices, to those silenced and drowned
out by the overpowering voice of the Law. We lose sight of who
we are when we adopt a sonorous, morally bankrupt voice that
speaks law without recognition of ordinary moral sensibilities.
184
To be aware of this lawyer voice (and its wondrous possibili-
ties and known pitfalls), we must put some hard questions to our-
selves, to our education as lawyers, and to an ethic rooted in
adversarialism. What is the relationship of the language and
morals we bring to law school to the language and morals we
enact as lawyers? What kind of character do we enact when we
talk like lawyers? What happens to our ordinary sense of morality
when we adopt a legal persona and speak the voice of law? How
is my voice as neighbor, parent, spouse, or citizen to be recon-
ciled with my voice as a lawyer? 8 5 How will I know when to use
183. Legal discourse provides a new web of meaning (personal and cul-
tural) that acts as an overlay on the map of ordinary reality, commonsense, and
moral sensibility. The problem is that lawyers do not speak in a single voice or
with a "prescribed" vocabulary. "[ T ] he apparently single vocabulary which con-
stitutes what we call legal language is actually several vocabularies." Walter
Probert & Louis Brown, Theories and Practices in the Legal Profession, 19 U. FLA. L.
REv. 447, 470 (1966-67). As lawyers we shift from one language to another,
from one sense of meaning to another. This shifting feature of legal language
allows us, as lawyers, "to move through several perspectives without being aware
of the shift and without being observed, except perhaps by the skeptic's eye."
Id.
184. We lose, in an overzealous adoption of the legal voice, the ability to
hear our own voice. We lose the ability to see the look of dismay of those who
witness and experience the sting of our adversarial ethic. Yet, we must rely, far
more than we are willing to admit, on those who can hear our voice, on listen-
ers to whom we portray, with arrogance, our single-minded, disembodied ethic.
Without their disapproval, we are lost.
185. In a seminar of law teachers a participant remarked: "One can never
speak as a whole person. When we speak, it is always part of us that does so."
This observation, from the day it was spoken, has plagued me. It says some-
thing about who we are in the world, how we convey human sentiments, and
who we have become as moral persons.
My colleague's observation calls for reflection. What could one mean by
the statement "One can never speak as a whole person"?
-Speech is a cognitive function which can proceed without reflecting
underlying emotions and feelings.
-When we speak we are never "fully committed" to what we say (all
speech is a form of deception and manipulation).
-When we speak, we do so in performance of a role-lawyer, friend,
student, father-a role is not synonymous with person, nor is
speech.
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the language of law and when to resist it? And how will I learn to
move from one language to another, from one voice to another,
as I move from context to context, client to client, and from
office to home, and home to office?
These questions, personal experience, and a new genre of
personal narratives and critical humanistic writings in contempo-
rary jurisprudence suggest that we speak with more than one
voice, 1 8 6 voices that law forgets, ignores, discounts, devalues, or
demeans.1 7 At times, the voice speaking from an ethical stance
and the voice speaking law seem irreconcilable. We fear that a
voice trained in law cannot also be a voice that reflects workable,
ordinary, moral sensibilities. The struggle to shape, control, and
integrate these voices, and to see how these voices constitute and
impoverish the roles we imagine for ourselves as lawyers, is cen-
tral to moral discourse. a8 The struggle with and against moral
discourse is a struggle to overcome the incoherence of a world of
law (practice) split off from a world of ethics (moral sensibility),
a splitting constantly underway but never fully realized. In moral
discourse we experience a pull in different moral directions as we
take up the varied practices of our craft and respond to the dif-
ferent "voices" and morality tales enacted in the practice of law.
Wittgenstein suggested that the limits of language set the
limits of one's world."8 9 Our world, as lawyers, is bound by the
-There is no whole person as there is no one self to constitute a
whole.
Can one speak as a whole person? Is it possible to be a whole person, to even
temporarily experience one self as whole? How does the absence of wholeness
play itself out in our speech as lawyers?
186. See Getman, supra note 176, at 577:
Legal education like the law itself uses a variety of distinct voices.
Regardless of specific content, these voices convey characteristic
messages. Not only do they embody different rhetorical styles, but
they manifest different values, respond to different psychological
needs, convey different archetypical visions, perform different func-
tions, and pose different problems.
187. The most extensive effort to work out the implications of the limited
nature of legal discourse using literature and the humanities as a constant
reminder of what legal discourse forgets, ignores, discounts, devalues, and
demeans, can be found in WHITE, supra note 25. See also James Boyd White,
What Can a Lawyer Learn from Literature?, 102 HARv. L. REv. 2014 (1989) (book
review).
188. This integration of voices and ways of being has been central in the
work ofJames Boyd White beginning with the magisterial The Legal Imagination.
See WHITE, supra note 25.
189. See LUDWIG WITrGENSTEIN, TR cTAus LoGICO-PHILOSOPHICus § 5.6
(1961). Roberto Unger concludes Knowledge and Politics with an appeal to God:
"But our days pass, and still we do not know you fully. Why then do you remain
silent? Speak, God." UNGER, supra note 99, at 295.
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language we use ag° and the voice we give to our speaking as law-
Susanne Langer observes that "our primary world of reality is a verbal one.
Without words our imagination cannot retain distinct objects and their rela-
tions, but out of sight is out of mind." LANGER, supra note 27, at 126. The
anthropologist, Malinowski, extends Langer's point and uses law as an example:
The mastery over reality, both technical and social, grows side by side
with the knowledge of how to use words. Whether you watch appren-
ticeship in some craft within a primitive community or in our own
society, you always see that familiarity with the name of a thing is the
direct outcome of familiarity with how to use this thing. The right
word for an action, for a trick of trade, for an ability, acquires meaning
in the measure in which the individual becomes capable to carry out
this action.
Take, for instance, the problem of law in its verbal and pragmatic
aspects. Here the value of the word, the binding force of a formula, is
at the very foundation of order and reliability in human relations.
Whether the marriage vows are treated as a sacrament or as a mere
legal contract-and in most human societies they have this twofold
character-the power of words in establishing a permanent human
relation, the sacredness of words and their socially sanctioned inviola-
bility, are absolutely necessary to the existence of social order. If legal
phrases, if promises and contracts were not regarded as something
more than flatus vocis, social order would cease to exist in a complex
civilization as well as in a primitive tribe.
Bronislaw Malinowski, The Language of Magic and Gardening, in 2 CORAL GAR-
DENS AND THEIR MAGIC 232-35 (1935), reprinted in WiLLIAM R. BISHIN & CHRISTO-
PHER D. STONE, LAW, LANGUAGE, AND ETHics 407, 408 (1972).
190. C.W. Mills observed that "[w]e may 'locate' a thinker among polit-
ical and social coordinates by ascertaining what words his functioning vocabu-
lary contains and what nuances of meaning and value they embody." C. Wright
Mills, Language, Logic and Culture, in POWER, POLITICS AND PEOPLE: THE COLLEC-
TIVE ESSAYS OF C. WIGrr MILLS 423, 434 (Irving Louis Horowitz ed., 1963).
The simple truth, as Mills, one of the great humanistic sociologists, observes:
[L]anguage provides not only words but the meaning of words. No
thinker can assign arbitrary meanings to his terms and be understood.
Meaning is antecedently given; it is a collective "creation." In manipu-
lating a set of socially given symbols, thought is itself manipulated.
Symbols are impersonal and imperative determinants of thought
because they manifest collective purposes and evaluations. New
nuances of meaning which a thinker may give to words are, of course,
socially significant in themselves; but such "new" meanings must in
their definition draw upon the meanings and organization of collec-
tively established words in order that they may be understood, and
they are conditioned thereby; and so is the acceptance and/or rejec-
tion of them by others. Here again, the thinker is "circumscribed" by
his audience because in order to communicate, to be understood, he
must "give" symbols such meanings that they call out the same
responses in his audience as they do in himself. The process of "exter-
nalizing" his thought in language is thus, by virtue of the common
essential to meaning, under the control of audience.
Id. at 434-35.
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yers. We are pulled by the power of our lawyer voice into a web
of meaning that can both empower1 91 and impoverish us.' 9 2 It is
with ethical thought and moral action (and the talk in which
they are rehearsed) that we weave the world as it is with the world
as we imagine it, in the voice we speak as lawyers.
XIV. AN OLD PEDAGOGY AND FOUNDATIONS FOR A NEW ONE
A. Notes on the Traditions of Legal Ethics Teaching
There is one course in the law school curriculum that lies
neither at the core nor at the periphery-a course that seems to
belong nowhere and everywhere. The course is legal ethics, a
course in which students are asked to consider the nature of pro-
fessional responsibility.
193
191. For an elegant defense of "thinking like a lawyer," see Peter R.
Teachout, Uneasy Burden: What It Really Means to Learn to Think Like a Lawyer, 47
MERCER L. REv. 543 (1996).
192. Peter Goodrich has explored the impoverishment of legal language,
legal thinking, and legal consciousness in the representation of rights of an
indigenous people. Goodrich describes a confrontation of the Haida Indians
of the Queen Charlotte Islands and their efforts to use the courts to protest a
logging license granted an American lumber company. See Peter Goodrich,
Moralities of Annunciation: An Introduction to Courtroom Speech, in 2 LAw & SEMIO-
TICS 143 (Roberta Kevelson ed., 1988). Goodrich relates:
[H]ow the chiefs of the Haida appeared before the court in full cere-
monial dress accompanied by eighteen elders of the Haida nations but
without lawyers.... Chief Lightbrown and others retold at length the
mythological history of the Haida arrival in the islands.... A series of
further anecdotal narratives, mythologies and traditional poems were
presented to the court as evidence of the ancestral claim of the Haida
to the islands.
Several Haida artists explained at length the character and sym-
bolism of their art forms, of their totems, masks and carvings all of
which also spoke to the integral relationship of the Haida to the lands
of their love of it and respect for it.... [Olne of the women elders
sang traditional songs to the court for a full afternoon. The songs
repeated ancestral legends and evidenced again that in Haida custom
and art, inhabitant and nature were one....
Id. at 144-45.
Goodrich reports that an injunction was granted the next day to prohibit
Haida interference with the logging operation. The couh found that the "evi-
dence presented as to the Haida title to and relationship with the islands was
not legally relevant to the case being heard which simply concerned interfer-
ence with a valid logging license." Id. at 145. The legal web of meaning did not
comprehend the Haida way of life and the language of the Haida people.
193. I have been writing about the legal ethics course for some years now
and the arguments I present here are drawn from previous efforts to describe
the nature, dynamics, and possibilities for a pedagogy of lawyer ethics that
escapes its present confines. SeeJames R. Elkins, Moral Discourse and Legalism in
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We have mandated the teaching of legal ethics and made it
another subject in the law school curriculum. But in doing so,
we still do not adequately explore what ethics means to lawyers,
how ethics works in the day-to-day life of particular lawyers, or
what obstacles we confront in our efforts to make ethics a central
concern in legal education. The unexamined premise, now
widely accepted, is that legal ethics is a subject to be taught and
learned by those who set out to be lawyers. We hold, at the same
time, quite stubbornly, the intuitive notion that students have
already acquired their moral and ethical sensibilities before they
arrive at the law school. Consequently, we teach ethics, denying
that ethics can be taught. I believe that ethics can be taught and
learned (as we learn anything truly worthwhile) and conse-
quently, find myself at creative odds with those who see conversa-
tions about lawyers and their ethics as futile.
We are, in legal education, quite earnest when we say we
teach ethics. We assume that the ethics we teach must be shaped
by the profession, by the fact that we are lawyers, not journal-
ists-advocates, not therapists. We expect, without question, that
legal ethics will be distinct to law as a profession.
We claim that legal ethics stands apart, not only as it is
shaped by the ethics and ethos of lawyers, but also by its demands
for acting in ways difficult to explain in terms of ordinary moral-
ity. Lawyers take up a morality that stands apart from ordinary
morality, or so one of the conventions of professional ethics
would have it. This assumption, that legal ethics exempts us
from the claims of ordinary morality, sets up a tension between
law and ethics, between the way we talk as lawyers and the way we
engage in everyday moral conversation. We see the tension most
clearly when we try to engage in moral conversation in the law
school classroom about the conventions and practices of lawyers.
One way we put our assumptions about lawyer ethics into
practice is to treat legal ethics as far as possible like other courses
in the law school curriculum. Law teachers have so "legalized"
ethics that law school versions of ethics look more like law than
they do ethics. In this way, lawyers have the best of all possible
worlds-the claim to ethics without learning ethics, ethics with-
out moral discourse. At best, the pedagogy of ethical legalism
conflates ethics with the law of lawyering. At worst, it tells those
who come to law school with high ideals that anything goes in
the name of adversarial justice.
Legal Education, 32J. LEGAL EDUC. 11 (1982); Elkins, supra note 143; James R.
Elkins, The Pedagogy of Ethics, 10J. LEGAL PROF. 37 (1985).
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The pedagogy of ethical legalism emphasizes ethical rules
(the Model Rules of Professional Conduct) that govern lawyers in
some (but not all) aspects of their work. Ethics, in this view, is a
matter of rule-following. Learning ethics is an exercise in apply-
ing rules. Legal ethics is the law of lawyering.
The trend toward legalization of legal ethics is reflected in
L. Ray Patterson's Legal Ethics: The Law of Professional Responsibil-
ity.194 Patterson argues that the professional responsibility course
"is directed primarily to the rules of conduct for lawyers and
rules relating to the practice of law generally." A professional
responsibility course, in Patterson's view, is "a law course involv-
ing rules of law and legal problems." Patterson explicitly and
emphatically rejects the notion that professional responsibility is
rooted in ethics, or an understanding of ethics and moral philos-
ophy. A course in legal ethics is a law course. The body of ethi-
cal rules governing legal practice is viewed by Patterson, and
others, as the law of lawyering.
Patterson is right to suggest that ethical decisions are made
within a legal context. Some professional practices, like the mis-
appropriation of client funds, are not only ethically wrong, but
also criminal in nature. Other instances, such as the failure to
file lawsuits within prescribed statutory periods or the neglect of
a client's case, involve malpractice for which the attorney may be
civilly liable for damages. Given this "law" of professional respon-
sibility, some ethical problems can be resolved by finding and
applying appropriate rules.
Patterson is also right in suggesting that the growing body of
law and standards of professional responsibility deserve serious
study as a body of emerging legal principles. There is no harm
and much gain from a study of the law of lawyering. It would be
quarrelsome to quibble over whether' such a course should be
called "Professional Responsibility" or "The Law of Professional
Conduct." It is somewhat more problematic, however, when Pro-
fessor Patterson appropriates "legal ethics" as the title of his book
and then summarily declares that legal ethics is a matter of law,
not ethics.
Law teachers make ethics look like law and disguise ethical
thinking as legal thinking so ethics will be more palatable to the
law-trained mind. It is law teachers who make ethics compatible
with existing notions and expectations of the character, talent,
and skills that will be successful in a law world defined by an
adversarial ethic. When law students come to ethics, their law
194. L. RAY PAY'IERSON, LEGAL ETHICS: THE LAW OF PROFESSIONAL RESPON-
SIBILM (2d ed. 1984).
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trained minds rebel. And if we think carefully about legal educa-
tion we will see there is no mystery in the rebellion:
[The law] seeks to assimilate everything that happens to
that which has happened. It seeks to relate any new phe-
nomenon to what has already been categorized and dealt
with. Thus, the lawyers' virtually instinctive intellectual
response when he is confronted with a situation is to look
for the respects in which that situation is like something
that is familiar and that has a place within the realm of
understood legal doctrine.
... [P] ersons who are genuinely concerned with far-
reaching and radical... solutions to social ills ought to be
on guard against and ought to mistrust this powerful ten-
dency on the part of the lawyer to transmogrify what is new
into what has gone before or to reject as unworkable or
unintelligible what cannot be so modified.... 1
95
The taste for legalism precedes entrance into the hallowed
halls of the law school. But it is law teachers that are the paid
gatekeepers to the world of law. And it is the law teacher gate-
keeper who teaches legal ethics and professional responsibility as
an ahistorical, asocial, and apolitical regulatory scheme, a body
of rules. The student is asked, often explicitly, to assume that the
relationships of attorneys and clients, lawyers to each other, law-
yers to law, and lawyers to the broader world are devoid of signifi-
cant moral content, that lawyers who do the bidding of their
clients, must do so without regard for the ramifications of their
actions. The effort to separate and isolate the lawyer and her
ethical worldview from the broader social world in which legal
skills are witnessed is sanctioned by a rule-oriented legalistic con-
ception of ethics, a brand of ethics especially devised, and legal-
ized, for the benefit of law students.
William Twining presented us with two powerful images of
lawyering: Pericles and the plumber. The legalist views the law-
yer as a kind of plumber. Plumbers have only the most limited
need for ethics, and consequently, if we imagine lawyers as legal
plumbers we can get all the ethics we need from a set of rules.
But the legalist flounders when he tries to imagine an ethics of
lawyering fit for Pericles-for lawyers as leaders, teachers, plan-
ners, statesmen and stateswomen. For Pericles, the "simplified
amoral universe" of the lawyer as technician/plumber ethic will
not suffice. When the ethics of lawyering is reduced to zealous
195. Wasserstrom, Lauyers and Revolution, supra note 99, at 128-29.
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representation of skilled warriors governed by an adversarial
ethic limited only by constraints of law, then we have simplified
our ethics, turned ourselves into ethical plumbers, and act as
agents in an amoral universe. Those who subscribe to legalism as
a predominant and defining feature of their moral universe do
not take kindly to ethical challenges to legal discourse and the
adversarial ethic.
Simply put, the teaching of lawyer ethics as a branch of law,
still prevalent in American law schools, is a facade and a fraud.
When we get beyond the law of lawyering, and ethics imagined as
ethical legalism, the fraud in legal ethics lies fully exposed.
Teaching lawyer ethics as the law of lawyering or as introduc-
tion to moral discourse still requires that we deal with this
phrase, ethics. The question-what is ethics?-is largely ignored
by teachers of legal ethics. As the pedagogy of legal ethics comes
of age, and a new generation of teaching materials appear, the
question-what is ethics?-still haunts us. The time has come to
take account of our ghosts.
There is now a general consensus that legal ethics is best
taught by using problems and dilemmas that arise in legal prac-
tice. The problems are usually those that neatly fall into (or
agonizingly between) existing provisions of our ethical rules. For
example, whether the lawyer can jointly represent two criminal
defendants of varying degrees of involvement and with different
criminal records who have been charged with a single crime.
The problem is clearly a question of conflict of interest, and as a
possible complication, confidentiality as well. What we do not
find in law school ethics courses is how the representation of a
client's interest may substantially undermine rather than pro-
mote the common good. In legal ethics we do not attempt to
deal with the systematic practices of police,judges, and other law-
yers who undermine social justice. In the law school teaching of
ethics, it is the client that commits perjury, not policemen or
prosecutors. One might ponder the meaning of an ethical prob-
lem that forces the student to elect to either defend a lying client
or abandon the client. Is it only our clients that present a prob-
lem of truth-telling? One begins to wonder about the ideological
underpinnings in the selection and teaching of "practical" ethi-
cal problems.
Students and teachers of lawyer ethics are a pragmatic,
rational lot, an orientation that predisposes us to see ethics, like
law, as simply a matter of solving complex problems. Thomas
Shaffer argues that the quandary method is probably unavoida-
ble, but of limited value. Lawyers are good enough at "defining"
problems, developing alternatives, exploring consequences, and
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deciding on an appropriate resolution, so good they want to use
the same method in ethics. There is a strong tendency to take
what we do well, problem-solving, and use it as a way of thinking
about ethical problems. When legal ethics is subjected to the
pragmatic talents of the problem-solver it becomes just another
set of problems, no more or less difficult than those found in
administrative law or corporations. Legal ethics is made relevant
and appealing to law students by grounding the study of ethics in
practical (law-like) problems, in a pedagogy of practicalism. An
ethics of problem-solving suggests that professional life is an
unending series of ethical dilemmas in which one "can't win for
losing," that every choice is a painful one. When we present ethi-
cal choice as a choice between competing goods, the implicit
message is that ethics is for losers. The practical problem-solving
approach to ethics can obscure the fact that it is what we bring to
an ethical dilemma, as much as any rule or principle that we
might apply to the problem, which defines our moral judgment.
The pedagogy of practicalism leads to a disembodied ethical self,
a conception of ethics as a game, as part of the strategy and tech-
niques integral to the courtroom warrior and gamesman.
In a pedagogy of practicalism (a parade of ethical quanda-
ries and a set of rules to apply to facts to get an ethical answer),
rules undermine the students' perception of lawyer ethics as eth-
ics. Law students "know" that lawyers do not spend an inordinate
amount of their busy day worrying about ethics and the body of
ethical rules that govern their practice. Even so, there is a sense
of security that comes from an ethics premised on rules. Rules
suggest answers. Law students, as lawyers in general, tend to be
pragmatists who want to solve problems, not wallow in them.
(One of the attributes of law is that it resolves disputes and
answers our questions.) Lawyers traffic in answers. This does not
mean that the answers are easy to produce, that they appear by
some form of magic, or that they will always be conclusive. The
thinking lawyers bring to bear on a problem is designed to
respond to a problem so that everyone feels that an answer has
been produced, even though the answer makes neither client or
lawyer happy. The lawyer begins with an event, a situation, a
question, and works toward an answer. Both lawyers and clients
want answers to their questions. With so much focus on answers
and problem-solving, uncertainty poses a threat to lawyers. In
times of uncertainty, we demand that ethics be a source of
answers rather than an impetus for questions. We expect ethics
to rationalize and reconcile the many cross-currents and contra-
dictions that lie at the heart of professional life.
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A pedagogy of ethical practicalism fails to address the funda-
mental ideals and beliefs, hopes and dreams, that accompany the
entry into professional life. Focusing on rules and quandaries, a
pedagogy of ethical practicalism steers the student away from
what she needs the most-moral discourse. Consequently, there
is little focus in law school ethics courses on virtue, on the charac-
ter reflected in our choices, and on the person who is the lawyer.
We focus instead on problem, situation, and role. A study of law-
yer ethics as ethics would shift attention to how and by what
means may a lawyer live a good life (in the Platonic and Socratic
sense of good), be a good person, and do work that is socially
worthwhile and personally fulfilling.
The problem in the pedagogy of legal ethics is that we know
less about ethics, at least in legal education, than we assume.
And what legal educators do in the name of ethics may, upon
closer inspection, turn out to be a most peculiar kind of ethics.
If we do not know what we are doing, and its effects are unknown
or unintended, then the teaching of what we call legal ethics will
always be superfluous, if not worse.
When we give a course a name like legal ethics, or profes-
sional responsibility, we expose strands of the profession's his-
tory. There is some significance in what we call our work, or the
name we give a law school course. Names lend authority, words
bind us to meanings. We cannot make names and words mean
anything we want. A law school course is constructed around a
name. Contract teachers believe they have an obligation to teach
something called contracts. But what are we to make of this
peculiar case we name by the juxtaposition of terms like legal
and ethics? Do we face an anomaly similar to that in the long-
standing joke suggested by the idea of military music? Does the
idea of legal ethics suggest a coherent body of thought,1 9 6 a
methodology, a perspective or a way of seeing the world, a mode
196. The notion that ethics is a special field of study, a discipline, with its
own language, body of knowledge, and methodology is now commonplace.
The Hastings Center found that when ethics is taught outside philosophy
departments and theology schools, teachers tend to have no formal training in
moral philosophy or ethics. See THE HASTINGS CENTER, THE TEACHING OF ETH-
ICS IN HIGHER EDUCATION (1980). The report expresses concern about the
proliferation of courses in applied ethics taught by those "with no special pro-
fessional qualifications .. " Id. at 62. The Report argued that "[t]hose who
have not made a strong effort to become familiar with the field of ethics cannot
be expected to teach rigorous and well-grounded courses, whether theoretical,
applied, or professional." Id. at 65. The Report concludes that all ethics teach-
ers need "special" training to teach ethics. "Whatever the shortcomings of a
training in philosophical or theological ethics, it normally provides some well-
established criteria for assessing and justifying moral arguments and some body
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of understanding? And if this phrase legal ethics means nothing
so lofty as a body of knowledge or coherent mode of knowing,
does it point to some practical or pragmatic knowledge of how
we are to act as lawyers?
B. Foundations for a New Pedagogy
1. A Set of Ethical Rules Cannot Fully Capture the Moral
Character of Lawyers
We have traditionally focused the teaching of lawyer ethics
on the ethical regulation of lawyering. When we teach lawyer
ethics as legal regulation, we forget that ethics (for lawyers or
anyone else) can never be captured, once and for all, in a set of
prescribed rules that if followed, result in a life of respectability.
No worthwhile human activity can be completely defined by a set
of prescribed rules (roles or scripts). Our ethical rules may help
us address ethical behavior, but they also mask the complexity of
the moral dimension of lawyering practices; they cannot instill
the commitment necessary for a morally sensible life.
The law of lawyering may be important as a regulatory and
sanctioning system for lawyer discipline, but it cannot and should
not be equated with lawyer ethics.'9 7 Legalistic thinking, driven
of developed theory.... There are, in short, disciplinary standards of rigor and
quality." Id. at 63.
While the Report finds advanced degrees in both philosophy and the field
in which ethics is taught desirable, they are deemed impractical. The Report
concludes that the only way an "applied ethics" teacher can be "adequately
grounded" is to have formal training in ethics. How much training is necessary?
The Report proposes that at least one year is necessary to ground the teacher in
the discipline of ethics. Ethics is, in the view of the Hastings Center Report, a
discipline with its own "internal dynamics" which one can understand only with
professional training.
It can be argued, notwithstanding the Hastings Center Report recommen-
dations, that it is not some discipline called ethics that law teachers need to be
trained, but the simple, everyday skills of moral discourse. Lawyer ethics is diffi-
cult to teach, and often taught poorly, but it is not due to an absence of formal
"training" in philosophy but embracing a legal mind-set in a setting in which
that mind-set is to be questioned that undermines the teaching of lawyer ethics.
197. Thomas Shaffer must be given credit for efforts extending over
many years to make this point. Shaffer has shown how we impoverish the idea
of ethics by envisioning lawyer ethics through the positivist prism of a legalistic
world view. See generally THOMAS L. SHAFFER, AMERICAN LEGAL ETHICS: TEXT,
READINGS, AND DISCUSSION ToPICS (1985). Yet, lawyer ethics is routinely reduced
to law. Listen, as L. Ray Patterson, talking about his law school course in legal
ethics, makes the reductive move: "A course in legal ethics is, and should be, a
law course involving rules of law and legal problems. That the subject of the
rules is ethical conduct and that the problems may be characterized as ethical
in nature does not make them any the less legal." PATTERSON, supra note 194, at
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to the point of legalism, transmutes moral inquiry and moral dis-
course into a legal version and vision of ethics-legal ethics with-
out ethics.1 18 Law school renditions of ethics (and continuing
legal education programs on the ethical rules) are ethics of the
most narrow, limited sort.199 Ethics is not a fox to be caught in a
net of rules (however well the rules are constructed and
applied), and the fox will not be lured to some ethical high
ground by repeated, ritualized exhortations about professional-
ism. Ethics is too ordinary, crafty, and elusive to be caught so
handily by regulation and rhetoric.
We must finally admit that the moral rhetoric of rules and
the law of lawyering is an impoverished, off-handed way of talk-
ing about lawyer ethics.2z° Legal ethics, when imported into the
law school curriculum, and taught in the manner of other law
courses, is not ethics but its mutation, the law of lawyering.2z 1
When lawyer ethics is translated into disciplinary concerns and
ethical rules, our professional rhetoric of ethics will increasingly
be seen as a set of empty promises, or worse, a disguise that
masks the extremes of an adversarial ethic blindly worshiped as
an effective exemption to ordinary moral restraints. If we are not
willing to judge our ethical sensibilities as lawyers by ethics recog-
198. We have codified lawyer ethics into what looks and reads like rules.
We have moved from an ethics of "canons," and later a "code," to an ethics of
"rules." In the name of progress, we have attempted to legalize ethics, to
reduce ethics to rule-following.
199. If we could keep ethics simple and straight-forward, if we could just
do ethics the way we follow a recipe in a cookbook, or establish ethical rules
and follow them (and punish those who do not) we would indeed find ethics to
be simple. Ethics, oddly enough, is somewhat analogous to the criminal law,
where we make laws that proscribe behavior, and punish those who violate the
social consensus on wrongdoing, but crime keeps happening. We have plenty
of criminal laws, and invest heavily in the efforts to catch criminals and prose-
cute them, and are now placing hundreds of thousands of them in overcrowded
prisons without "solving" the crime problem. You can promulgate law-like ethi-
cal rules for lawyers, put more resources into investigations of client complaints
about lawyers, and punish more lawyers for violations of profession imposed
ethical rules, and still not "solve" the problem of lawyer ethics.
200. The instrumental transmutation of legal ethics into the law of lawy-
ering impoverishes the pedagogy of lawyer ethics, and is another way legal edu-
cators pander to those who possess the efficient and economical virtues of a
"legal mind." Some go further, and suggest the use of regulatory ethics to bol-
ster the "public image" of the profession. With the rhetoric of "ethics," students
learn to justify an adversarial ethic limited only by prescriptions of law.
201. The problem is even more pronounced now that "legal ethics" is
tested as part of the Multistate Bar Examination. Many law teachers have
turned their legal ethics courses into a preview of the ethical (law-like) rules
that are tested on the Multistate Professional Responsibility Examination.
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nized by those outside the profession then legal ethics does not
deserve its name.
While no one actually claims that the presence, study, or
even the persistent application of a set of ethical rules will make
anyone a good lawyer, we continue to teach legal ethics as if the
rules would do what we know they cannot. (In some circles, this
is called magical thinking.) We spin our wheels, endlessly analyz-
ing ethical problems from a legal frame of reference. And, more
seriously, we ignore ethics in the process. Law students know
this, law teachers know this, and yet, teachers and students turn
their back on what they know-that any ethics that makes a dif-
ference is not an ethics of authoritative rules.2 °2
When ethics talk is confined to ethical rules, it fails to reflect
the power and responsibility that lawyers have in modern society,
the way others perceive our use of this power and responsibility,
and the dysfunctional and immoral aspects of professional prac-
tices tied to adversarial zealotry. If our aim in the study of legal
ethics is simply to alert lawyers to practices for which they are
subject to punishment (or trouble with state bar ethics commit-
tees), then a study of the ethical rules is sufficient. If, however,
the role of the lawyer is too narrowly and technically defined,
then we must reexamine the fundamental goals and assumptions
that prevent us from realizing (or even recognizing as valid)
more worthwhile ethical aims in the practice of law.203
2. Legal Education Shapes Lawyer Ethics
We rearrange the moral fabric of everyday life when we edu-
cate ourselves to be lawyers. Law students often complain that
202. Some years ago, I set out to travel around the country talking with
legal ethics teachers and moral philosophers interested in lawyer ethics. The
result of my interviews with ethics teacher colleagues can be summarized as
follows: Teachers of legal ethics believed the teaching of lawyer ethics to be of
importance and were saddened by the unwillingness of students to take ethics
more seriously. Even so, many of the teachers I interviewed had resigned them-
selves to teaching legal ethics as a survey of the ethical rules and the application
of these rules to resolve lawyers' ethical dilemmas. The result then (a result
that would, I believe, be confirmed if conducted today) was that law teachers
teach legal ethics and professional responsibility courses as if they were law
courses. Interestingly enough, both students and teachers know that lawyer eth-
ics cannot be reduced to the law of lawyering, but neither teachers nor students
knew how to extricate themselves from a form of instruction that ignores ethics
in the name of ethics.
203. One aim of ethics might be to help us confront the evil that takes
place in the name of law and lawyering. See Stephan A. Landsman, Satanic
Cases: A Means of Confronting the Law's Immorality, 66 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 785
(1991).
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keeping their ethical bearing in the study of law is problematic.
Legal education teaches and promotes an adversarial ethic from
the first day the student enters the portals of a law school until
the day she leaves. But we also know that law schools do not
initiate this zest for adversarialism. We seem to be culturally
programmed for the kind of teaching and training that law
school versions of adversarialism promote. 20 4 Actually, we know
little of how this adversarial ethic is translated (by way of educa-
tion), into a working sense of professionalism that drives compet-
ing ethical sensibilities underground.2 5 The study of law shapes
and bends and sometimes deforms the character we bring with
us to the study of law. The character transformation takes place
when we submit our ordinary notions of law and justice and
morality (and the character these notions entail) to the some-
times subtle (sometimes not) influences of legal discourse.20 6
Law school is a rite of passage; for some, it is a night-sea jour-
ney of the soul. 2 07 Law school may be remembered affectionately
as hard fought because there is some hardness necessary to learn-
ing to be a lawyer and do what lawyers do. Law school is not just
learning to know what lawyers know, but a trip over stormy seas,
for some a time of profound uncertainty, for others a time of
transformation.
It is during these legal rites of passage that we develop a
legal persona and determine, in preliminary fashion, how we will
wear the legal mask and live with its fit and feel. 208 Those who
acquire a new legal identity and character sometimes express
concern about what they gain and lose by way of their education
204. On the depth of adversarialism in American culture, see William F.
May, Adversarialism in America and the Professions, in COMMUNITY IN AMERICA: THE
CHALLENGE OF HABITS OF THE HEART 185-201 (Charles H. Reynolds & Ralph V.
Norman eds., 1988).
205. Law teachers, when they adopt the rhetoric of instrumentalism and
legalism, ask their students to put aside their personal morality. Other legal
educators object. See Bryant G. Garth, Legal Education and Large Law Firms: Deliv-
ering Legality or Solving Problems, 64 IND. L.J. 433, 44245 (1989) (arguing that we
should let "personal morality" "play a role in all legal advice" and that legal
education is the place we learn to integrate personal morality with professional
practice).
206. I have attempted to explore this change in previous essays. See, e.g.,
James R. Elkins, Becoming a Lawyer: The Transformation of Self During Legal Educa-
tion, 66 SOUNDINGS 450 (1983); Elkins, supra note 100.
207. SeeJames R. Elkins, Rites of Passage: Law Students "Telling Their Lives",
35 J. LEGAL EDUC. 27 (1985); James R. Elkins, The Quest for Meaning: Narrative
Accounts of Legal Education, 38J. LEGAL EDUC. 577 (1988).
208. Law teachers demand that their students learn to talk and "think
like lawyers." We cannot be ethical lawyers unless we confront the legal persona
we have acquired during the course of our schooling in legal discourse.
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and initiation into the legal profession. We need to listen to
them and ourselves as we explore the effects of an initiation into
law. 
209
3. How to Confront the Moral Dimension of Our Professional
Lives
There is no common agreement on what constitutes the
"public interest," ethical lawyering, or professional responsibility.
We are reluctant to talk about our own ethics ("morals are pri-
vate"), and reticent to honestly confront the limits of the adver-
sarial ethic that underlies our professional work. We have only a
vague, unarticulated sense of the qualitative, value-laden, moral-
charged nature of legal knowledge, lawyering skills, and profes-
sional ethos. We know (or fear) (or ignore) the troubled "eth-
ics" of the profession, and we are unsure what, if anything, can be
done to change the course of our profession. Basically, we are
unclear about how to proceed, knowing as we do that "[a]ny
effort to give voice to our deepest feelings and thoughts is liable
to be unavoidably vague at times. Truth is greater than both our
209. We bring with us to ethics, predispositions, attitudes, values, ideals,
beliefs, and dreams that are channeled into the stream of everyday life and an
antinomian stream that flows beneath and out of view of everyday life. C.G.
Jung called the self we present in our everyday world persona and the self hid-
den to the world shadow. It is a daimon, a life dream or fantasy about who we
are, what we are to do and to be in this world, that shuttles between persona
and shadow. Learning ethics, and being ethical, depends ultimately on this dai-
mon and how we deal with it, with our images, dreams and fears. The moral and
ethical views expressed in the justification of choices gives the daimon life,
reflected as character. For an interesting treatment of the daimon and its cen-
trality and determinative influence on character, see JAMES HILLMAN, THE
SOUL'S CODE: IN SEARCH OF CHARACTER AND CALLING (1996).
The daimon is another name for the inner voice. The inner voice is often
strong, clear and unmistakable, so persistent that it develops its own personal-
ity. A strong inner voice of this kind, what the Greeks called daimon, can be a
relentless vision, guiding, pulling, pushing one along. For some the daimon is a
long-standing dream or vision that occurs so persistently that consciously or
unconsciously we live to fulfill its design. For others, the inner voice is sporadic,
inaudible, or mute. And for still others, the sound is that of many voices, voices
that set one off in many different directions, chasing conflicting purposes and
ideals.
My own inner voice emerges and subsides; sometimes loud, now dim as
fading light. At times I listen, at others I go about the day ignoring it. This
inner voice, my daimon, is associated with some deep (and cutoff) part of my
self. The daimon expresses a different view on the world, and on me, from its
protected place in the interior. It is my inner voice that gives me an interior
sense of how things work, a sense of what is good that comes from within (what
has gone on before) watching what goes on from without (what is happening
now).
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thoughts and our language."2t ° We find, at times, that both lan-
guage and skill in expressing ethical sensibilities are wanting. We
do not have a ready, determinative language by which we can
resolve moral issues and allay moral concerns. As Richard Rorty
has pointed out, "[w] e have not got a language which will serve as
a permanent neutral matrix for formulating all good explanatory
hypotheses, and we have not the foggiest notion of how to get
one."211 Much of the time, we don't know how to characterize
and describe the nature and extent of the moral dimensions of
the problems that confront us.
One might assume that law students and lawyers would be
the first to see the need for ethics, and that making ethics central
to our professional work would enhance our lives. Many do not
see ethics this way at all. Lawyers and law students are, at best,
ambivalent about ethics. Our ambivalence may reflect the cau-
tious way we make up our minds about matters of importance.212
Another reading of our ambivalence is that we find ourselves in a
culture in which not thinking about important matters is expedi-
ent and serves our instrumental goals.
We generate, for the public and for ourselves, a rhetoric of
professionalism that makes it appear that lawyers are deeply con-
cerned about ethics. But professionalism is often a rhetoric of
justification (business-as-usual). The most controversial actions
of lawyers-wearing down the opposing party with delay, dirty
tricks, hard-ball practices, contrived emotional performances for
the benefit of jurors, stretching and distorting and ignoring the
truth, exorbitant fees, are all defined as ethical. (Our profes-
sional ethics is the ethics of the professional services market
place.) These strategies and practices (and the market for
them), embraced by some, are vigorously contested by lawyers
unwilling to use the guise of professional morality to justify
uncivil, 213 contemptible behavior that perverts not only profes-
sionalism, but also justice.
The question for lawyers is whether we can, or whether we
are even willing to try, to draw moral distinctions between zeal-
210. DANIEL MAcUiRE, THE MORAL CHOICE 37, 39 (1978).
211. RicHARD RORTY, PHILOSOPHY AND THE MIRROR OF NATURE 348-49
(1979).
212. See Gillers, supra note 73, at 1617-18 ("We are frequently ambivalent
about how lawyers should behave in a particular circumstance. One reason for
this may be that we are still making up our minds about a matter.").
213. A major source of reported job dissatisfaction of lawyers is the
increasing lack of civility between lawyers. See Milo Geyelin, Lawyers Object to
Colleagues' Rudeness, WALL ST. J., June 24, 1991, at B1.
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ousness and zealotry. Is it morally acceptable for lawyers to iden-
tify so completely with the adversarial ethic that zealousness is
transmuted into zealotry? Is lawyer ethics (and the professional
morality we claim for it) a way of justifying the loss of our ordi-
nary moral sensibilities?214
The ethics of lawyers must be measured with and against an
adversarial ethic that many lawyers (and students of law) con-
sider sacrosanct. The adversarial ethic is for many lawyers an eth-
ical benchmark. It is an ethic used by lawyers to excuse
themselves from moral scrutiny. Lawyers want their ethics to be
defined by law, code, rules. The counterpoint to the proposition
that the law is the only limit to zealousness poses an ethical ques-
tion: Can a good person be the kind of lawyer that takes zealous-
ness to its legal limits without regard to moral consequences?
An inquiry into lawyer zealousness and its limits is, ulti-
mately, a question about goodness, about the goodness of our
adversarial ethic and the goodness of the character we take on as
advocates of the ethic. When we explore the good we attribute
to the ethic, we inquire into the preconditions (frameworks,
worldviews, cognitive styles, rhetorical stances, philosophies, sto-
ries, myths) that find their way into our justification of what law-
yers do. And as we converse about lawyer work and lawyer ethics
(an inquiry that sometimes takes the shape of a story, ajourney, a
philosophical quest), we begin to see what it means to live a life
of character, in pursuit of Quality,2 15 a life with a sense of public
purpose, serving others, a life embedded in community.
Moral discourse can help energize and cultivate the
impulses, beliefs, and stories that undermine the sense that our
roles, stances, and ethic are fixed, frozen, sanctioned, unyielding
(Necessary and Real), that we must submit to a reality that leads
to a morally impoverished view of lawyering. The disparity
between the ideals that linger in moral discourse and the reality
of modern day lawyering, the conflict between what we know and
what we do (how we talk and how we live), lies at the heart of our
214. The question of how our sense of professionalism is to be embodied
in a "professional morality" and how this morality of professional life is related
to ordinary morality is a frequent theme in legal ethics writings on professional-
ism. See, e.g., ROBERT H. ARONSON & DONALD WEICKSTEIN, PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY 9-16 (1980); ALAN GOLDMAN, THE MORAL FOUNDATIONS OF PRO-
FESSIONAL ETHICS 1-33 (1980); DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL
STUDY 104-47 (1988); THE GOOD LAWYER, supra note 98; Stuart Hampshire, Pub-
lic and Private Morality, in PUBLIC AND PRIVATE MORALITY 23-53 (1978); David
Luban, Calming the Hearse Horse: A Philosophical Research Program for Legal Ethics,
40 MD. L. REV. 451, 462-70 (1981); Richard A. Matasar, The Pain of Moral Lauyer-
ing, 75 IOWA L. REv. 975 (1990).
215. On the pursuit of Quality, see PiRsIG, supra note 43.
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concern about professional responsibility and our participation
in lawyer ethics talk.
4. A Conception of Practice
When we try to figure out what these practices mean in the
lives we live, how we live in our practices and how we resist them,
we find ourselves telling a story. For Alasdair MacIntyre, it is in
the story of our practices that we find the most "compelling
account" of who we are and what we do.2 16 By the practices we
take up, we locate ourselves in a "narrative order. '21 7 Practice, as
MacIntyre uses the term, is another way of delineating the points
of moral interest on the compass we rely on in our professional
lives.
In MacIntyre's view, a philosophical account of practice
must include some notion of virtue. MacIntyre seems to have in
mind something of what Atticus Finch demonstrated in To Kill a
Mockingbird, when he took on the case of Tom Robinson, the
young black man falsely charged by Mayella Ewell, a white
woman, of raping her. It is Maycomb, Alabama, in the 1930's
and it is unlikely that an all white male jury will acquit Tom
Robinson even if innocent. Atticus takes Robinson's case, which
causes some folks in Maycomb to talk derisively about him in
front of his children, Scout and Jem. The racist element of
Maycomb society is bothered by the possibility that Atticus
intends to defend Tom Robinson zealously. Atticus knows he is
not going to "win" a jury acquittal, but he also knows that any-
thing less than a spirited defense of Tom Robinson is uncon-
scionable. It is Atticus' character and how it is lived out in the
practice of a Southern lawyer in the Old South that makes him
an admirable hero. Atticus immerses himself in the practice of
law, but he doesn't separate who he is in the office from who he
is with Jem and Scout at home.
But before we get to anything like the moral sophistication
of Atticus Finch there are more basic matters to explore.
MacIntyre distinguishes football and chess, which are examples
of practices, from tic-tac-toe and throwing a football, which are
not. "Bricklaying is not a practice; architecture is. Planting tur-
nips is not a practice; farming is. '"218 MacIntyre points to arts,
sciences, games, politics ("in the Aristotelian sense"), family life,
painting, music, physics, chemistry, biology and the work of his-
torians as human endeavors that constitute practices and thus
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give rise to virtue. Lawyering, viewed as a set of rules without
regard to "excellence" and appropriate "conceptions of the ends
and goods involved," does not, I would argue, amount to a prac-
tice as MacIntyre outlines it. For example, MacIntyre uses the
example of a child who learns to play chess because of the desire
for candy that he can purchase with the money made available by
a parent who pays the child money to play chess:
Thus motivated the child plays and plays to win.
Notice however that, so long as it is the candy alone which
provides the child with a good reason for playing chess, the
child has no reason not to cheat and every reason to cheat,
provided he or she can do so successfully. But, so we may
hope, there will come a time when the child will find in
those goods specific to chess, in the achievement of a cer-
tain highly particular kind of analytical skill, strategic imag-
ination and competitive intensity, a new set of reasons,
reasons now not just for winning on a particular occasion,
but for trying to excel in whatever way the game of chess
demands. Now if the child cheats, he or she will be defeat-
ing not me [the parent who pays the child to learn chess],
but himself or herself.219
Like the child learning to play chess, some of our reasons for
taking up law are good ones and some not so good. We don't
have, and would be leery of, any "motivational tests" to screen
those who seek to enter law school on the basis of good and bad
motives. We take students of law as we find them, so long as they
demonstrate an ability to follow the Map of Ordinary Reality
(high grades and an ability to master standardized tests). (There
is concern that this Map of Ordinary Reality favors, in morally
questionable ways, members of the dominant culture and
marginalizes-punishes-cultural minorities.) But we expect
the student of law, as she learns and begins to talk law, to take up
legal discourse as a practice that "involves standards of excel-
lence." We become more than we might have expected when we
take up a "practice" because it asks us to accept the "authority" of
standards that allow us to judge the "adequacy" of those who
attempt to engage in the practice.
This business ofjudging ourselves is paradoxical. A practice
requires that we judge ourselves by standards of performance
derived from the history of the practice.22 ° In a practice, I "sub-
ject my own attitudes, choices, preferences and tastes to the stan-
219. Id. at 175.
220. This kind of evaluation is brilliantly demonstrated in Kennedy, supra
note 40.
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dards which currently and partially define the practice. ' 221 The
virtues of a practice are realized in the work of the practice, but
only when the work reflects the historical standards of the prac-
tice. Yet, these standards are never complete and whole, never
totally determined, and never totally binding on me. And they
are not, as MacIntyre observes, "immune from criticism." 222 Even
so, says MacIntyre, "[i]f on starting to play baseball, I do not
accept that others know better than I when to throw a fast ball
and when not, I will never learn to appreciate good pitching let
alone to pitch. 223
Whether we have set out to play baseball, practice law, or
talk ethics we find that some folks are better at it than others.
We don't want, as novices and new initiates, to get "hung-up" on
the fact that some seem to do so well what we have yet to master.
To get "hung-up" would simply incapacitate us, make us so anx-
ious about the journey to be taken, we might never get underway.
It is the excellence others demonstrate and the virtue and prac-
tice of a discipline by which a neophyte sets her course. It is hard
to imagine thinking about lawyers without thinking that some,
like Atticus Finch, are better men by being better lawyers.
There are problems with MacIntyre's notion of practice.
First, practices, with their history and standards, can push us to
accept questionable conventions of practice, as well as toward
excellence. Worse still, a practice can become pernicious. His-
torical longevity does not impart virtue, as slavery and human
cruelty make clear. The persistent historical practice of genocide
does not make human extermination a moral art. Child abuse
practiced over time does not become a virtuous practice by way
of longevity. Women, for example, take no solace in a practice of
law, with patriarchal roots reaching back to ancient history, that
treats women unfairly.
Next, practice perpetuates itself, increasingly taking itself for
granted, forgetting its own checkered history, narrowing its focus
and purposes, and discounting and devaluing those at the mar-
gin of the discourse that sustains the practice. A practice
excludes deviant ways of thinking. It divides the world into insid-
ers and outsiders, discounting the evaluation of insider practices
by outsiders. A practice, drawing too exclusively on its own stan-
dards and history of excellence, becomes hostile to criticism.
Professions confer upon themselves moral authority. The
assumption (rooted in professional arrogance) is that those
221. MAcINiYRE, supra note 74, at 175.
222. Id. at 177.
223. Id.
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outside the practice who lack relevant experience in the practice
are not competent to judge what is good and what is not. Doc-
tors, for example, sometimes hold law (and lawyers) in disdain,
because they think we lawyers are out of our league when we
inquire into their negligent practices and demand they be held
accountable.
Next, a practice may embody false consciousness, or a sense
of false necessity. We see this vividly when we talk about lawyer
ethics. Some of us use the idea of ethics to mean that we can do
anything short of the unlawful and still claim to be ethical. You
will find lawyers who claim that playing "hardball" is necessary,
"dirty tricks" are just part of the game. The lawyering game turns
out to be a rough one. And, we are told, anyone who gets in the
game should expect "fouls" because they are an integral
(assumed, expected) part of the action.
When we say, or hope, or dream, that being a lawyer is more
than just a 'job," we are alluding to law as a practice, with an
ethic that transforms the work. It is hard to imagine practicing
law without developing a lawyer's sensibilities, a sense or ethic
that makes the work feel worth doing.
5. Ethics Cannot Exist Without a Critical Perspective
To be an ethical lawyer and live a worthy professional life,
one must measure herself against an ethic that both recognizes
and calls into question the lawyer's professional ethic and ethos.
A study of lawyer ethics limited to ethical rules and conventions
of lawyer practice makes a mockery of this evaluation. In the best
of worlds, lawyer ethics would be an introduction to a way of
thinking and talking, a way of imagining the practice of law that
allows one to reflect on and question the ethic(s) we embrace.
Legal ethics, because it is ethics (as well as a form of behavioral
regulation dependent on rules and sanctions) must take seriously
the premise that we, as lawyers, live in both the best and worst of
worlds. In a professional world given over to moral malaise, we
resign ourselves to compromised lives, inhabiting worlds in
which we shield ourselves from accountability and our own
impoverished ethical imaginations.
While there is a need to view ethical problems in the context
of normative conventions of like-minded practitioners of the art,
there is a danger that this sociological conception of professional
ethics undermines the very notion of ethics.224 Advocates of
"descriptive ethics" grounded in a sociology of normative conven-
224. Tradition, as we learn virtually everyday, can be profoundly immoral.
Doing what others do may avoid moral failure. And so we struggle with the
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tions fail to see that the conflation of professional ethos and eth-
ics leads to moral failure.
What does it mean to be critical? And how are our critical
impulses related to the ethical stances we take as lawyers? 225 Crit-
ics try to express reasoned judgments by evaluating the value,
truth, rightness, or full appreciation of a matter. A critic consid-
ers merits and evaluates; they stress faults and in doing so blame,
censure, condemn, and denounce. A critic expresses opinions
that are reasoned. We admire critics for thinking more carefully
about a matter than we ourselves have done. Ethics too is about
reason, having good reasons for what we do and the action we
take, good enough reasons to justify the consequences of our
actions. The critic not only has an opinion, but expresses it; a
critic speaks out, professes, holds forth. However, opinions do
not make us critics; the judgment reflected in our opinions does.
Opinions are more or less valuable, depending on the judgment
that goes into them. Opinions are interpretations, "readings" of
events, persons, situations. But there is a dark shadow that fol-
lows the critic. Critics stress faults and are given to harsh and
captious judgments. Critics become carpers, negativists, nay-say-
ers. We grow tired of critics and view them in a negative light
because they ignore the basic childhood teaching-"If you can't
say something good, don't say anything at all."
My colleague, Wythe Holt, once argued that we all are
already critics. We are indeed critics in that we make judgments
about the value and truth of matters that affect our lives. We
make judgments concerning the merits of alternative ways of
thinking and acting. We denounce others for poorjudgment (or
silently scoff) and blame ourselves, openly or secretly, for our
poor judgments. We are then, in this sense, all critics. Even so,
some of us turn out to be better critics than others. And it also
seems obvious that our critical impulses can be covered up and
buried.
6. Ethics Is a Complaint about the World and How It Works
Our complaints about modern life-the way we and our
neighbors live, the way we think and act, the kind of friends, lov-
ers, and spouses we turn out to be-are confused, and sometimes
stories, strategies, and ethic(s) that give us an identity and root us in communi-
ties that make and undermine the possibility of a moral professional life.
225. What kind of image do you have of yourself as a critic? How has
your idea of "being critical" taken on positive and negative associations in your
life? How have your critical impulses (and the obstacles to those critical
impulses) been factored into the story that you tell about your decision to
become a lawyer?
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shrill, pained cries-songs of lament for the way we now live.
226
Ethics is not a quiet lullaby, but a keen "lamentation for the dead
uttered in a loud wailing voice," a "wordless cry." 2 2 7 Now is the
time to pay attention to what ails us, to recount and remember,
to recover what has been lost, time to remember the
forgotten.228
XV. A TEACHER'S ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT LAWYER ETHICS TALK
When we engage in moral discourse about a profession and
the life it makes possible, we explore, question, and test old
assumptions. Moral discourse searches out what we take for
granted and tests what we say about ourselves and about how
being a lawyer shapes our hopes and ideals. Ethics depends
upon assumptions-about each other, the world, and ourselves.
Most of these assumptions are implicit, offering moral instruc-
tion from just off center stage. We rely upon these assumptions
without giving much thought to them and do not, for the most
part, ever attempt to articulate them. It would, of course, be
impossible to make all our operative moral assumptions explicit.
And yet these assumptions affect us so directly, and at times
adversely, that it becomes the province of ethics to encourage
attention to these assumptions-to learn what they are and how
they are enacted as a moral stance.
In Plato's Protagoras, the dialogue begins with Socrates ques-
tioning an impetuous young Hippocrates, who has roused Socra-
tes from an early morning sleep to secure an introduction to
Protagoras, a popular teacher who claims to teach his students
sophos or wisdom. Socrates' questions make clear that Hip-
pocrates has not thought carefully about the course of instruc-
tion he intends to pursue. 29 (Of course, there are times when
teachers too are unreflective about what they have set out to do.)
Charles Taylor, in a brilliant philosophical analysis of moral
self-identity, observes that we "draw on" these assumptions "in
any claim to rightness," and that "we are forced to 'spell out' the
nature of our assumptions (as best we can) when we defend our
actions;" " [t] his articulation can be very difficult and controver-
226. Drucilla Cornell argues that the self is in crisis, a crisis linked to
modernity, to the times in which we live. See Drucilla Cornell, Toward a Modern/
Postmodern Reconstruction of Ethics, 133 U. PA. L. REv. 291 (1985).
227. WEBSTER'S, supra note 134, at 46.
228. See STANLEY COHEN & LAURIE TAYLOR, ESCAPE AarEMPTS: THE THEORY
AND PRACTICE OF RESISTANCE TO EVERYDAY LIFE 206 (1978) ("It is almost as if our
true self has been stolen from us and we are left with only traces, echoes,
memories.").
229. See HUBBARD & KARNOFSKY, supra note 3.
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sial. '23 ° To learn how ethics works, we must articulate the unex-
amined assumptions that so bear heavily on what we do and how
we proceed.
Since the assumptions the student brings with her to lawyer
ethics talk are to be made part of the study of lawyer ethics con-
ducted as moral discourse, it seems appropriate for a teacher to
articulate his pedagogical assumptions. These assumptions
should be scrutinized carefully by students and challenged when
they are wrong-headed and lead ethics talk astray.
A. Our Curiosity and Questions about Ethics
We must all be curious (even if disdainful) about ethics.
Would it be possible, one might wonder, to have no questions
about the moral and ethical dimensions of the legal and profes-
sional world you have elected to enter? One might see in this
curiosity about the moral dimensions of professional life a paral-
lel to a quality of mind necessary for other, more practical lawyer-
ing skills. Jennifer Jaff, a law teacher colleague, makes the
connection this way:
There is a value to asking questions. We all learn from
asking questions either of ourselves or of others. And the
answers lead to the next question, on and on. Thus, if the
teacher can take the student from question to question,
thereby demonstrating the progression of the teacher's
own thought (or ajudge's thought or a court's thought, or
a litigant's thought), the student can begin to visualize
what forms the progression of his or her own thought
might take. The ability to formulate the question that will
best advance the inquiry is the skill that students need to
develop to be able to think and learn on their own.
Accordingly, the student must be able to see us, their
teachers, in the act of formulating the best next question.
Where we have figured some things out and reached cer-
tain conclusions, the student needs to see what guided our
figuring out, how we got from point A to point B. By show-
ing our students the questions that we formulated along
the way, we demonstrate how they can reach conclusions
of, and on, their own.
2 31
230. CiARLEs TAYLOR, SOURCES OF THE SELF: THE MAKING OF MODERN
IDENTITY 8-9 (1989).
231. Jennifer Jaff, Frame-Shifting: An Empowering Methodology for Teaching
and Learning Legal Reasoning, 35 J. LEGAL EDUC. 249, 262 (1986). The use of
questions in legal education is often associated with the Socratic method. Many
commentators have observed that the law school version of questioning has lit-
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B. Skepticism and Hope in the Study of Ethics
In lawyer ethics talk, we confront in a dramatic way the con-
tradiction between skepticism and hope, both as the contradic-
tion is embodied within a particular individual and as it is
expressed by those who speak as skeptics and those who speak
their hope.
C. Ethics Matters
I concede that we do not always know best where the serious
might lie and that the perils that may befall us are not always
adequately or fully perceived. For some, ethics will matter only
because they want to know enough about ethics to avoid trouble.
Their study of lawyer ethics is driven by what my colleague,
Thomas Shaffer, calls the bad-man theory of lawyering, which
assumes everyone operates as close to the minimal limits of
acceptable moral and ethical standards as possible as a matter of
self-interest.
D. We Believe We Are Already Moral and Ethical
It is hard to find anyone that will openly express a desire to
be unethical. James Pike said this of this moral ambition: "The
fact is . . . that virtually every lawyer wants to feel that he is not
only a good lawyer (in the sense of technical proficiency) but
that he is a lawyer of impeccable integrity. He not only wishes
this to be his public image, he wishes to think this of himself.
232
The assumption that we already have all the ethics we need leads
some to the firm conviction that ethics talk is futile. "If I am
already ethical why talk about ethics at all?" "If I am already ethi-
cal then ethics cannot be taught, at least, to me, now." The
assumption that we are already ethical and have no need for ethi-
cal study confronts us with a paradox: "[t] he mind has its ways of
keeping us from truths, as well as leading us to them.
233
tie to do with the historical Socrates and his philosophical practices. Ironically,
Jennifer Jaff criticizes not only the law school version of Socratic questioning,
but also Socrates himself. See id. at 259, 262.
232. JAMES PIKE, BEYOND THE LAW: THE RELIGIOUS AND ETHICAL MEANING
OF THE LAWYER'S VOCATION 91 (1963).
233. Coles, supra note 146, at 1019. The assumption that we now know
ethics as well as we are ever going to know ethics sets the stage for the ethical
trickster. Anthropologists and folklorists remind us that the trickster is a uni-
versal folk hero who brings change by trickery through his ability to escape
harm. Tricksters are "survivors par excellence." SUSAN NIDITCH, UNDERDOGS
AND TRICKSTERS: A PRELUDE TO BIBLICAL FOLKLORE xi (1987) ("Trickster narra-
tives help us to cope with the insurmountable and uncontrollable forces in our
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E. The Shared Experience Necessary to Converse about Good Lawyers
We may find that what we share is sometimes less than what
we need, but more often, we may rush to stake out disagreements
before we try to learn and act on what we have in common. The
integrity of an ethical inquiry requires that we keep in view what
we have in common, what we share, and where we stand
together. "[E]thical quarrels always take place against a back-
drop of agreement." '2 3 4 We must find a way to stand together
because we know there will be times we cannot.
F. Differing Visions of the Real World in which Lawyers Practice
People see the world in different ways, which bears on the
conversation that takes place about lawyer ethics. There are real
differences in how we exercise judgment, evaluate character, and
take on the duties and responsibilities of professional life. Law-
yers devote their lives to different purposes and projects. Every
worthwhile journey does not lead to the same destination.
A lawyer cannot escape conflict. "A lawyer's moral life, even
a quiet lawyer's life, is full of conflict and the emotional turmoil
that goes with it."2 5 Ethical inquiry will, I assume, subject us to
disagreements and conflicts that befall caring persons. Some will
be deeply troubled by the conflict and the absence of an authori-
tative way to resolve differences. In the absence of hard answers,
some will conclude that lawyer ethics talk is futile; even optimists
will at times find it troubling. One moral philosopher describes
our condition as one where "moral premises are like so many
incommensurable fragments of lost languages. The moral con-
cepts we use, deprived of the contexts in which they formerly
make sense, have become mere means of expressing our feelings
and manipulating others." '2 3 6 We must work with the fragments
we have available.
own lives personifying and in a sense controlling the chaos that always
threatens.").
234. BOOTH, supra note 2, at 422.
235. Michael Meltsner, Healing the Breach: Harmonizing Legal Practice and
Education, 11 VT. L. REv. 377, 377 (1986). Any ethics worth pursuing is difficult
and demanding. In applying ethics we get ourselves into that space where our
ideals come into conflict and choice is necessary. Ethical choice calls our char-
acter into question, and this "calling into question" moves, stirs, perplexes and
angers.
236. Jeffrey Stout, Liberal Society and the Languages of Morals, in COMMUNITY
IN AMERICA, supra note 204, at 127.
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G. The Study of Lawyer Ethics Requires Ethical Reflection
and Introspection
We must talk and write about ethics so we can see more
clearly what moral philosophies we enact. We must learn more
about the moral philosophers we have already taken up. If, as I
suspect, our assumptions about lawyer ethics are encoded in the
short-hand expressions, conventions, and images we use for talk-
ing and writing about ethics and moral concerns, then ethical
reflection begins with close attention to the ways we talk ethics.
H. Agendas Affect Our Ability and Willingness to Engage in Moral
Discourse and Our Character as Lawyers
We come to this conversation about lawyer ethics with "bag-
gage." Some resist the exposure of their assumptions and their
agendas; others find the exploration and charting of this realm
of the implicit quite exhilarating. Some agendas promote open
inquiry and public scrutiny. Others do not. Some agendas are
cryptic and difficult to decode. Sometimes, we can readily iden-
tify an agenda and give it a name; at other times, we cannot.
Identifying and working with these agendas can be controversial.
I. Exemplars and Scoundrels
The legal profession has both exemplary lawyers and a fair
number with morally questionable character. A study of lawyer
ethics can rightfully ignore neither.
J. We Must Attempt To Teach and Learn Ethics
I would go still further: It is never too late to develop ethical
discernment and moral sensibilities. The task may not be easy; it
may sometimes (indeed, often) fail. Ethical learning and teach-
ing may not take place when planned or commanded. Yet, an
extended conversation about ethics is a journey it would be
remiss not to undertake.
I assume that ethics can be learned (and taught). This is
what might be called a weight-bearing assumption. I cannot,
however, as a bearer of this assumption, be certain beyond all
doubt that I am right. I can only hold to the assumption, see
how it works, and watch to see how it is challenged. I stand open
to argument and refutation. In ethical conversation and argu-
ment, it is possible to learn that I am wrong, even when I think I
am most right. Assumptions founded on the best of motivations
can lead us astray.
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K. A World of Caring People
It is difficult to imagine a world without caring people, a
world without ethics. Colin Turnbull, an anthropologist,
describes a tribe called the Ik who made cruelty (and other vices)
commonplace in their social relations.23 7 In the film, The Road
Warrior, survival in a post-apocalyptic world is the dominant ethic;
only the powerful (and those the powerful protect) have any
chance to survive. In both real and fictional worlds, we learn that
it is possible for a moral universe to implode. We must try, in
some fashion, in everyday life to believe in ethics, to believe that
each of us has the capacity to be bound to the other by a stan-
dard of care that makes mutual security and well-being possible.
Knowing that the web of relations that holds us together (and
protects us from each other) is fragile, we continue to depend on
each other.
L. Moral Person Will Be Concerned about Justice
Law is an instrument of justice, and the practice of law can-
not (that is, morally and ethically) be divorced from justice.
There will be, as one might expect, areas of both agreement and
disagreement about what constitutes justice, the nature of our
duty to alleviate suffering, and what we are required to do and be
as ethical lawyers. It is the discussion, debate, argument, chal-
lenge, examination, reflection, and musing upon our agree-
ments and disagreements about what lawyers do when they act
justly that gives moral substance to our conversations about law-
yer ethics.
Lawyers who seek to be nothing more than legal technicians
and sophistic word-plumbers may disavow any special obligation
to concern themselves withjustice. But most of us do not take up
law to be sophists and technicians. It may happen to us along the
way, but we don't set out with that as a plan. We come to law
with stories that reflect diverse motives and purposes in becom-
ing lawyers, but I know of no one who comes to law that does not
imagine law as an honorable calling and a form of socially signifi-
cant work. Yet, this high regard for law as a profession may not
237. The Ik are described in COLIN TURNBULL, THE MOUNTAIN PEOPLE
(1972). The modern American prison, described in JACK HENRY ABBOTT, THE
BELLY OF THE BEAST: LETTERS FROM PRISON (1981), is another example of a
nightmarish world, where the prevailing ethic is a violent milieu of caged men
at war with their keeper-guards and with themselves. For a similar, less dra-
matic, account of prison life, see JEAN HARRIS, STRANGER IN Two WORLDS (1987)
(describing the story of her incarceration for the killing of Dr. Herman
Tamower, a Scarsdale, New York diet doctor).
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take into account the possibility that a lawyer's ultimate status is
associated with his sense of justice and his practice of law as a
means to virtue.
We should note that lawyers have long had a special role in
American society. It is this prominence in American social and
political life that gives rise to popular fascination with lawyers
and makes lawyers of interest to sociologists, moral philosophers,
cultural critics, novelists, and movie-makers.
Lawyers need to see themselves as doing work with intrinsic
value, work that is socially significant, contributing in some way,
small or large, to the public good. This claim to "goodness,"
more assumed than questioned, is under close scrutiny by critics
and outside observers of the legal profession. The moral dimen-
sion of our professional practices requires study and conversa-
tion because our claims of "goodness" as lawyers, and
consequently as persons, sometimes doubles as rationalizations
of amorality.
M. Moral Discourse, Communities, and Moral Traditions
Notwithstanding our communal allegiance to law, we con-
tinue to think about ethics (including lawyer ethics) as some-
thing that belongs to an individual, an individual's history,
struggles, and moral sensibilities. Consequently, we take up
moral discourse within the limited strictures placed on it by a
culture of individualism. Individualism, embedded as the deep
structure of modern life, tells us that each of us stands alone,
each person her own moral island.
Paradoxically, law, in its traditional forms-contracts, torts,
property, and criminal law-runs counter to the moral individu-
alism we assume in the study of lawyer ethics. The law provides a
language to describe, interpret, and give meaning to a web of
connectedness between person and public. Ethical discourse,
like law, is another way of articulating the relational web of per-
sonal and public, individual and community. Ethics is the moral
web created by human beings as they produce a sustainable ecol-
ogy of everyday life. Ethics, like law, links persons and actions to
social consequences and helps us evaluate the harm that follows
from choices, decisions, and actions made with too little regard
for others.
A hermit living in the mountains would, one might specu-
late, have fewer moral concerns than those of us who make our
lives serving others. The hermit can be nasty and brutish. His
neighbors, miles away, do not suffer unduly from the hermit's
foibles. The hermit's need for ethics is no greater than his need
LAWYER ETHICS
for a fancy sanitation system. (Hermits worry little about pollu-
tion.) When hermits make a mess of their cabins and clutter up
the woods around their houses there is little public outrage. Eth-
ics, like aesthetics and sanitation, have radically different mean-
ings depending on our social settings. When the hermit moves
next door, his aesthetics and ethics will mean something more to
me than when he lives a solitary existence. Lawyers, unlike her-
mits, always live next door.
The reconstructive element of moral discourse is work we do
alone (as we entertain moral doubts) and together (as we mutu-
ally question the moral stances that lawyers take). Ethics talk is
work both personal and public. It is individual in the reconstruc-
tion of a vulnerable and fragmented self, social in the rebuilding
of habitable, desirable communities. The project draws on psy-
chological, political, and spiritual sensibilities. The outcome of
the project will affect the way we experience and locate ourselves
in the world.2 3
EPILOGUE
We end ethical inquiry as we began, with unanswered ques-
tions. William James, the philosopher, is reported to have con-
cluded near the end of a long, productive life, that when all is
said and done there is no advice to be given. The web of rela-
tions that binds us as a professional community in the name of
professionalism is a fragile and sometimes illusory one, too often
unresponsive to moral concerns. If there is, ultimately, no advice
to be given on ethical matters, we will still have talked, listened,
fashioned our questions, explored concerns about how profes-
sional skills are melded into a lawyer identity and how the various
identities we create shape our character. By speaking out and
professing moral concerns, by listening, questioning, talking, we
mark ourselves as one kind of lawyer as opposed to another.
A conversation about lawyer ethics is a conversation about
our moral lives, about the assumptions we make about what we
do as lawyers when we leave ethics on "automatic pilot" and stray
into the adversarial world of lawyering. It is in moral discourse
that we take account of our profession, its troubled adversarial
ethics, and the afflictions of character of those overly-identified
with the ethic.2" 9
238. We undertake this project in the knowledge that others, elsewhere,
are engaged in similar tasks, sharing our frustrations and fears.
239. For some readers, the claims I make for moral discourse will be inad-
equate to describe moral discourse. Consequently, I might say that in a conver-
sation about lawyer ethics we: (i) discuss the difficult choices that lawyers (and
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If you are troubled by what you know and hear about the
ethics of lawyers, you will find much to ponder as you engage in
moral discourse. Ethics looks squarely to the mess we have
made, and continue to make, of our world and attunes us to new
moral possibilities by way of the metaphors, images, and stories
that reside in our everyday conversations. In ethics talk we
explore the conditions that shape a lawyer's work, the stories we
tell about this work and ourselves as we engage in it and are
engaged by it, the need for new directional paths, ways of think-
ing, and transformative theories that rekindle hope, belief, and
faith.
We know, even if in a vague and ephemeral way, what we
want: a good world and a good life, a world that is fair and just, a
world that we help make fair and just by our work as lawyers. We
can still believe in ethics, believe that each of us is bound to the
other by a standard of care that can be judged for its adequacy.
We have not, as lawyers and citizens, even in our contemporary,
postmodern, technological, bureaucratic, masculinist, nuclear
culture, obliterated ethics, try as we have. When we imagine a
thoroughly brutish world, a world of "winners" without moral
compass, we begin to see how much we depend on law col-
leagues, clients, and judges to live ethical lives.
law students) confront; (ii) recognize and confront the conflict between the
persons we are and the professional identity we assume as lawyers, and reflect
on the relationship of who we are at home and who we are as lawyers at the
office; (iii) explore the strategies and ploys that link who we are as persons and
the world we help create as lawyers; (iv) examine the conflict created when we
look out for the interests of paying clients and ignore social and community
interests that either the client or we find reason to ignore; (v) observe how
difficult it is to talk about these conflicts and recognize how the choices we
make in resolving conflicts often impoverish the ideals and dreams that
brought us, originally, to study and practice law; (vi) discover that part of who
we are as professionals exists as a deaf-mute companion, so that we live day-to-
day by acting on implicit rather than explicit choices about our character and
ethics, cultivating one voice and one way of being in the world, and stifling
other voices and ways of being.
I adhere to the notion that learning lawyer ethics is in reality a way of talk-
ing about how to be a good person. Some students are puzzled by this notion
that lawyers must be good persons before they can hope to be good lawyers.
Some students find that this idea carries too much baggage. I claim otherwise.
Working out this disagreement, we engage in moral discourse and attempt,
against the odds, to re-imagine lawyer ethics as ethics.
